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This thesis compares the economic cost of the Monterey
County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) groundwater allocation
plan for the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin (SVGB) to a
proposed free market allocation plan using transferable water
rights. This analysis develops a detailed free market
allocation program. It also estimates implementation costs
for both plans, including the initial investment in office
facilities and water use monitoring equipment, and monthly
operational costs.
The thesis analyzes representative water users from the
Urban, Industrial and Agricultural sectors of the valley. A
marginal cost curve for reducing water use is developed for
each representative. These curves are used to determine the
compliance costs for each allocation plan.
This study concludes that the free market allocation
program is more efficient than the MCWRA' s allocation program,
assuming both plans use similar water use monitoring systems
.
Furthermore, the current MCWRA allocation program does not
prevent overdrafting in the SVGB.
111
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This thesis compares the economic cost of the Monterey
County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) groundwater allocation
plan for the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin (SVGB) to a
proposed free market allocation plan using transferable water
rights . This analysis develops a detailed free market
allocation program. This free market allocation plan is
patterned after the South Coast Air Quality Management
District's Regional Clean Air Incentives Market Program in Los
Angeles, California.
This thesis analyzes the Urban, Industrial and Agricul-
tural sectors of the Salinas Valley. For each sector,
representative businesses or organizations were selected and
asked to participate. Each participant was analyzed, and
marginal cost curves for reducing water consumption were
developed to determine compliance costs for each allocation
plan. The Urban sector participants include the City of
Salinas, the California Water Service Company, Inc. and the
Marina Coast Water District. The Industrial sector's
representative was J. M. Smucker Company. The Agricultural
sector included sixteen farms located throughout the valley.
Farms were selected by their ability to provide historical
data on crop type, acreage and yield information, as well as
growing and packing costs per acre.
iv
The thesis further examines the implementation costs of
the MCWRA' s allocation plan verses the theoretical free
market allocation plan. It also estimates implementation
costs for both plans, including the initial investment in
office facilities and water use monitoring equipment, and
monthly operational costs.
This study concludes that the free market allocation
program is more- efficient than the MCWRA' s allocation program
assuming both plans use similar water use monitoring systems.
Furthermore, the current MCWRA' s allocation does not bring the
groundwater basin into balance. The groundwater being
extracted annually from the basin is greater than the amount
of water that is annually recharged into the basin. This
result demonstrates that the MCWRA is not complying with the
California State Water Board requirement for the agency to
eliminate overdrafting in the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin
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The Salinas Valley is currently experiencing a serious
groundwater allocation problem which is reducing groundwater
quality and quantity. This deterioration has occurred because
the demand for water is greater than the natural and augmented
recharge capabilities of the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin
(SVGB) . Excessive groundwater pumping from the SVGB has
caused serious chronic overdraft conditions in the northern
half of the Valley. 1
The annual historical overdraft (1970-1992) is estimated
by Montgomery Watson Engineering to have averaged 37,000 acre-
foot (ac-ft) per year [Ref. 2:p. 5-14]. It also has been
estimated that approximately 750,000 ac-ft of groundwater has
been cumulatively overpumped during the six year period
between 1986 and 1992 [Ref. l:p. X]
.
This chronic overdrafting has seriously reduced ground-
water levels in the northern half of the valley. In August of
1992, the groundwater levels in this region reached the lowest
levels in recorded history. [Ref. l:p. X] The northwest
corner of the valley has experienced the greatest change. The
1Overdraft occurs when groundwater is being extracted
from the basin at a greater rate than it is being replenished.
groundwater elevation has dropped approximately 85 feet since
1930 [Ref . 2:p. 2-6] .
Lowering the water table affects the valley in two ways:
it increases the cost of extracting groundwater, and it
accelerates seawater intrusion into the aquifer along the
coast. Groundwater extraction costs have been estimated to
increase $0.10 per ac-ft for every vertical foot the
groundwater level drops, assuming that extraction volume
remains the same. [Ref. 3] The total cost of lowering the
water table by one vertical foot throughout the valley would
be approximately $53,500 annually.
The seawater intrusion effect is the more significant of
the two effects. Seawater intrusion is currently occurring
along the coast at a rate of 16,700 ac-ft per year [Ref. 2:p.
8-3] . Seawater intrusion is caused by overdrafting in front
of the seawater/f reshwater interface [Ref. l:p. 31]. This
causes the freshwater gradient to shift from its predominately
westward to an eastward movement. This reversal has acceler-
ated seawater intrusion into the coastal aquifers. This
seawater intrusion front poses an imminent threat to the
municipal water supply for the City of Salinas. It is
possible that the seawater presently confined in the "180 foot
aquifer," located along the coast, could gain access to the
unconfined portion of the Salinas Valley groundwater basin. 2
This would endanger the municipal water supplies of several
communities and thousands of acres of farmland.
Overdraf ting, the six year drought affecting the Salinas
Valley and the lack of new water supply projects have made it
imperative that local communities stop overdrafting the SVGB
to hold the seawater intrusion front. One of the primary
steps required to achieve these goals is to develop a water
allocation plan that would bring the basin back into balance




The Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) and the
Monterey County Board of Supervisors are the government
agencies tasked by the State of California via the State Water
Resources Control Board to develop and execute a program to
prevent further groundwater overdrafting and seawater
intrusion. The MCWRA has complete authority under the
Monterey County Water Resources Agency Act (Stats. 1990, Chap.
1159) to establish any ordinances, reasonable procedures,
rules, and regulations that would conserve water for present
2The "180 foot aquifer" is a confined water-bearing
strata located at an elevation of 180 feet below the ground.
See Chapter II, Section D of this thesis for further
hydrogeologic description of the Salinas Valley Groundwater
Basin.
3Balance is a state of equilibrium where the amount of
groundwater being extracted from the basin is equal to the
basin's natural and supplemental recharge.
and future use within the SVGB and to prevent groundwater
extractions which are harmful to the groundwater basin.
The MCWRA has two strategies to achieve these goals. The
first strategy is to develop new water sources and/or increase
the efficiency of the natural and augmented recharge
capabilities of the SVGB. The second strategy is to develop
a program to manage water demand for the valley. This is
accomplished by enacting ordinances enabling the agency to
monitor and control groundwater use and to set upper pumping
limits for all commercial, industrial and municipal wells in
the Salinas Valley. Such ordinances have been enacted over
the past three years. Through these actions, the MCWRA has
slowly established a water allocation plan based on a
regulatory system of control. 4
Currently, the State Water Resources Control Board
believes that the current MCWRA allocation plan is inadequate
for the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin [Ref . 30 :p. 1] . When
senior MCWRA staff members were asked if any other allocation
plan was given serious thought, they indicated that the only
other allocation plan discussed was a tax based allocation
plan. [Ref. 4] No serious consideration has yet been given
to a free market allocation system. It appears the agency and
4 In a regulatory control system, the government agency
determines the amount of a given natural resource (i.e.,
water) that any group or industry will be allowed to use.
the general public have not seriously considered the free
market allocation method.
Since the economic community considers free market
allocation to be the most efficient way of allocating a scarce
resource, this thesis will examine a free market approach to
groundwater allocation in the SVGB. This research examines
the advantages and disadvantages of three methods for
allocating groundwater and examines whether a specific free
market allocation plan would be more efficient than the
current MCWRA allocation plan. The information derived from
this research will provide the MCWRA, local community leaders
and the State Water Resources Control Board with some critical
insight into the free market allocation method and the
potential benefits it could bring to the valley.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS
The primary objective of this research is to determine if
a free market (privatization) allocation plan is more economi-
cally efficient 5 than the MCWRA' s allocation plan for a small
5Economic efficiency refers to "the relationship between
the monetary value of ends and the monetary value of means.
The valuations that are counted are, consequently, the
valuations of those who are willing and able to support their
preferences by offering money.
From this perspective a parcel of land is used with
maximum economic efficiency when it comes under the control
of the party who is willing (which implies able) to pay the
largest amount of money to obtain that control. The proof
that a particular resource is being used efficiently is that
no one is willing to pay more in order to divert it to some
other use" [Ref . 12:pp. 9-10].
sample group. This will be accomplished by analyzing the cost
impacts of the two plans on a small sample composed of the
following segments of the valley: the industrial segment (an
agricultural processor), the urban segment (City of Salinas,
Marina Coast Water District, California Water Service Company,
Inc.) and the agricultural segment (16 farms located
throughout the valley) . These three segments were selected
because they use the most groundwater in the valley.
In order to achieve the main objective of this research,
the following specific research questions will be answered:
What are the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of
the regulatory control allocation method, taxation
allocation method, and privatization allocation method?
Can a privatization allocation plan be legally adopted
based on the current regulations and authority of the
MCWRA?
What would be the organizational structure as well as
the operating procedures and guidelines for a privatiza-
tion allocation program in the Salinas Valley?
What would the estimated costs be for initial capital
expenditures and operation of a privatized allocation
program for the Salinas Valley? How would these costs
compare to the regulatory allocation program?
How would the estimated compliance costs for the
privatization program compare to the estimated
compliance costs of the regulatory allocation program?
C . METHODOLOGY
For each market segment, the marginal cost of conservation
will be estimated and a cost of compliance determined for each
allocation plan based on the subsample's projected water use
in 1994, 1995, and 1996. This information will show local
decision makers the economic trade-offs between a free market
allocation plan and the MCWRA's allocation plan.
Also this thesis estimates the cost of implementing both
allocation plans. Implementation costs are based on histor-
ical cost data obtained from the Monterey County and estimates
received from the private sector.
D. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The major limitation in developing accurate compliance
costs for the urban and agricultural sectors is obtaining
accurate historical water use data. In the agricultural
sector, historical water use data does not exist. There is no
accurate information available about the amount of water
normally applied per acre by crop type in the Salinas Valley.
Therefore, this analysis assumes that the agricultural water
use per acre equals the average water use per acre of
irrigated crop land. This average is derived from the
Montgomery Watson Groundwater model statistics [Ref. 2: pp. 2-3
& 4-15]
.
In the urban sector, the City of Salinas had no annual
water use records except for 1987. Therefore, for the City of
Salinas it is assumed that historical water use per capita is
constant. The City of Salinas's historical water use for 1988
through 1993 is derived by multiplying historical water use
per capita for 1987 by annual population estimate for the
relevant year. All projected water use figures for the urban
sector were obtained from official Urban Water Allocation
Plans submitted to MCWRA by the City of Salinas, Marina Coast
Water District and California Water Service Company.
Another significant limitation is the inability to obtain
information about irrigation efficiencies by crop type for the
different methods of irrigation. This data is essential to
identify the irrigation method that achieves the highest water
efficiency and to determine the marginal cost of saving an
acre- foot of water by improving irrigation methods. However,
there is accurate data about distribution uniformity for the
different methods of irrigation used in the valley.
Distribution uniformity (DU) equals irrigation efficiency (IE)
(if one does not take into account application losses) when
the amount of beneficially used water is the same as the
average amount infiltrated in the low quarter. 6 Therefore,
"DU may be considered as the maximum potential IE of a
properly managed irrigation system, if under- irrigation is to
be avoided" [Ref. 5:p. 6]. This thesis assumes that irriga-
tion efficiency is the same as DU. This assumption generally
agrees with the historical irrigation efficiency data
presented in Chapter V.
6The low quarter is the average depth of water
infiltrated in the 25% of the areas receiving the least amount
of water.
The analysis for determining compliance costs for the free
market allocation plan assumes that a sub- sample
representative will be able to purchase or sell as much water
at the prevailing market price as they desire.
E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The most important findings of this research include:
Based on the projected water use trends derived from
this research sample group, the MCWRA's allocation
program does not eliminate overdrafting in the Salinas
Valley Groundwater basin.
The MCWRA's allocation program reduces the amount of
groundwater used per capita by 15% using 1987 as a
baseline. However, it does not stop urban sector water
use from increasing. The Association of Monterey Bay
Area Governments projects that the urban population will
continue to grow in the future.
The comparative economic analysis indicates that the
free market (privatization) allocation program is
economically more efficient in reducing water use than
the MCWRA's allocation program for the sample group,
assuming similar water use monitoring procedures.
The MCWRA's allocation program has a lower start-up cost
than the free market program. This is because the free
market plan uses a computerized well monitoring system.
Implementation costs are relatively equal if both
programs use similar well monitoring systems.
H. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
This thesis is divided into six chapters. In Chapter II
the relevant characteristics of the Salinas Valley are
discussed, including climate conditions, historical land and
water use, geologic conditions, hydrogeologic conditions,
current problems with SVGB (overdrafting, seawater intrusion,
and nitrate contamination) , the MCWRA Mission and Authority,
and the steps taken to date by the MCWRA to prevent over-
drafting and stop seawater intrusion.
Chapter III discusses the three primary methods of
allocating a scarce resource. It outlines the current
economic thought on the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Chapter IV describes a privatization allocation program
for the SVGB. The legal authority of the MCWRA to implement
such a program is discussed, along with a methodology for
defining, issuing and trading water rights. The chapter also
discusses the program's administrative, monitoring and
enforcement requirements.
Chapter V estimates the cost of implementing and
operating both the privatization allocation plan and the
MCWRA' s allocation plan. The chapter also compares the
economic cost of compliance under both plans for a small
sample group composed of urban, industrial and agricultural
water users.
Chapter VI summarizes the major conclusions drawn from
this research and highlights the research required to resolve
outstanding issues.
10
II. BACKGROUND ON THE SALINAS VALLEY AND THE
GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS
The Salinas Valley is located in the coastal region of
north central California. This elongated valley is surrounded
by the Gabilian mountain range to the east, the Elkhorn Slough
to the northeast, and the Sierra de Salinas and Santa Lucia
mountain ranges to the west. The altitude of the valley floor
varies from zero to about 400 feet above sea level. The
Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin (SVGB) , which is the only
source of fresh water for the valley, extends from Bradley,
near the southeast end of the valley, to Monterey Bay, at the
northwest end of the valley. The basin's width varies from
about 10 miles near the Monterey Bay to about three miles near
Bradley. The location for this study is shown in Figures 2-1
and 2-2 [Ref. 2:Fig. 2-1 & 4-2] The SVGB is legally




The Salinas Valley is close to the Pacific Ocean and has
a mild mediterranean climate. The area enjoys moderate
temperatures with slight seasonal variations. The summers are
cool and dry while the winters are mild and rainy. These
moderate conditions are created by the mountains surrounding
11
Figure 2-1. Study Area
12
Figure 2-2. Study Subareas
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the valley. They help retain warm air flows in the winter and
cool air flows in the summer. The air flows are generated by
temperature differences between the ocean and the land. The
predominant winds are from the west and the northwest.
Therefore, the ocean's influence decreases as one travels from
the coast towards the southeast. This decrease, and a strong
solar heating effect during the summer, explains why the
valley's interior generally has higher average summer tempera-
tures and lower average winter temperatures than the rest of
the valley.
In the valley, precipitation increases as one travels from
east to west and as elevation increases. An average rainfall
of 60 inches per year occurs along the crest of the Santa
Lucia Range. The Santa Lucia Range has the highest average
rainfall in comparison to the other mountain ranges that
surround Salinas Valley. The minimum average rainfall occurs
at Soledad in the interior of the valley and amounts to only
11 inches per year. The mean annual precipitation in the
mountain ranges surrounding the valley varies from about 20
inches near the Gabilan Range to about 25 inches in the Sierra
de Salinas, excluding the area along the crest of the Santa
Lucia Range. The mean annual precipitation in the interior of
valley ranges from about 11 inches in Soledad to 14 inches at
the Nacimiento and San Antonio Reservoirs. The majority of
the rainfall occurs during the winter months (November -
March)
,
which accounts for more than 75% of the annual
14
rainfall. This is the only source of fresh water for
recharging the SVGB. [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
This combination of topography and climate provides the
Salinas Valley with the ideal environment for farming and
ranching. This climate gives the farming community year-round
growing conditions, with 350 frost -free days near the coast
and 200 - 250 frost-free days inland. These conditions allow
the majority of farmers to plant two or three crops per year.
The capacity for multiple crops is only limited by the growth
rate of the crop and soil conditions.
B. HISTORICAL LAND AND WATER USE
Land use is a key element in determining which allocation
plan will be more economically efficient. Land use directly
affects water consumption rates. It also can affect the
land's capacity to percolate rainwater, runoff and irrigation
water. The three principal categories of land use are
agricultural, urban (which includes residential, commercial
and industrial areas) and native vegetation. In the SVGB,
"agricultural land accounted for 47 percent followed by native
vegetation with 46 percent, while urban land use was only 7
percent" [Ref. 2:p. 4-12] Figure 2-3 [Ref. 2:Fig. 4-10] shows
the Salinas Valley land use distribution for 1990. Over the








Figure 2-3. 1990 Land Use Distribution
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acreage in the Salinas Valley has been relatively stable, even
though there has been some conversion of farmland to urban use
near the major urban areas (i.e., City of Salinas) . Figure 2-
4 [Ref. 2: Fig. 4-9] shows that the ratio between agricultural
and urban land use has been relatively constant between 1970
and 1985. Urban acreage has grown slightly as farmland is
converted to urban uses.
Agricultural production is the largest industry in the
county. In fact, Monterey is the number one vegetable
producing county in the nation [Ref. 6:p. 2] . According to
the Monterey County Agricultural Commissioner, the Salinas
Valley produces 95 percent of the artichokes, 55 percent of
the broccoli, 35 percent of the cauliflower, 30 percent of the
lettuce, and 20 percent of the celery grown in the United
States. Agricultural sales in the county in 1993 exceeded 1.8
billion dollars. [Ref. 7:p. i] The preceding data reflects
the sensitivity that groundwater allocation has on the local
economy since this industry uses 90% of the groundwater
extracted from the SVGB. In Monterey County, the four row
crops with the highest dollar value in 1990 were lettuce,
broccoli, strawberries and cauliflower [Ref. 7:p. 30].
Based on the most current estimates (1991) from the United
States Bureau of Reclamation's (USBR) Geographic Information
System (GIS) , 197,827 acres of land are being used for farming








Figure 2-4. Agricultural Versus Urban Land Use
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with ground water. According to the Montgomery Watson
groundwater model, the agricultural community uses 512,000
acre-feet of water per year. This is 90.5% of the total
groundwater extracted from the aquifer each year. This is an
average of 2.588 acre- feet per acre of farmland. Future
farming is projected to remain constant up to the year 2020
[Ref . 8: pp. 3-6] . It has also been estimated that 80 percent
of the land in the valley could be irrigated; 65 percent is
currently being irrigated [Ref. 9:p. 16]
A survey of eight fields conducted in March 1988 indicated
that these fields were only achieving 58% average irrigation
efficiency [Ref. 31:p. 7]. 7 This is somewhat below the
theoretical irrigation efficiencies that should be obtained
under typical conditions and proper water management. It is
also far below the ideal potential efficiency levels according
7The term irrigation efficiency "is a measure of the
proportion of water applied that is actually used
beneficially. Irrigation efficiency (IE) is defined as:
IE = water beneficially used / total water applied
where beneficial uses include water necessary for:
* crop transpiration
* salinity control
* climate control (frost protection and crop cooling)
and beneficial uses do not include:
* application losses such as spray drift or uncollected
run- off
* evaporation from wet soil surfaces or wet foliage
* deep percolation of water past the root zone (in excess of
leaching requirement)." [Ref. 5:p. 4]
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to documentation from the California Mobile Irrigation Labs
(CMIL) [Ref. 5:p. 6]. The following Table 2-1 [Ref. 5:p. 6]
presents irrigation efficiencies for a well designed
irrigation system with excellent and average management.







Linear Move 90 70
Furrow 88 70
Drip 88 65
Hand Move Sprinkler 75 60
If a 58% average irrigation efficiency is typical in the
Salinas Valley, the farming community is wasting somewhere
between 2% and 32% of the groundwater used for irrigation.
For every 10% decrease in efficiency, the farming community
wastes an estimated 51,200 acre- feet of water per year. This
estimate is based on the groundwater extracted per year for
agriculture according to the Montgomery Watson model mentioned
previously.
Urban and industrial centers are located in the city of
Salinas (population 115,000) and the communities of Gonzales,
Marina, King City, Soledad, Chualar, and Castroville. These
urban areas have experienced tremendous growth during the last
ten years. For example, population in Salinas has grown 37
percent during this time. The majority of the industrial base
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in these urban areas is centered around the agricultural
community and its needs.
Table 2-2 [Ref. 8:p. 3-3], developed by the Army Corps of
Engineers, estimates the Salinas Valley's urban and industrial
water demand for 1990 and 2010. It is based on
[The] association of Monterey Bay Area Governments (AMBAG)
population projections, estimates provided by the Monterey
County Flood Control and Water Conservation District
municipal demand estimates for Marina and Fort Ord by the
Sea-water Intrusion Committee (December 1988), population
estimates by the U.S. Bureau of Census (1971) and a survey
of water use conducted by the District in cooperation with
the County Planning Department (1984). [Ref. 8:p. 3-2]
In general, urban water use has increased slightly over
the past twenty years. Figure 2-5 [Ref. 2: Fig. 4-12] shows
the historical total annual water use for both the urban and
agricultural sectors. The largest subcategory of urban water
usage is residential.
Residential water use is expected to increase by 148.6%
between 1980 and 2020 [Ref. l:p. 48]. Table 2-3 [Ref. l:p.
48] presents both the historical and projected annual
residential water demands for major urban centers in the
Salinas Valley.
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TABLE 2-2. PROJECTED URBAN AND INDUSTRIAL WATER DEMAND
Year 1988 Year 1990 Year 2010








Salinas 150 102.627 17,241 145,000 24,359
Castroville 175 5,177 1,015 6,650 1,303
Greenfield 133 7,290 1,086 8,510 1,268
Gonzales 154 5,180 893 6,175 1,065
King City 165 8,581 1,586 15,700 2,901
Soledad 99 8,090 897 9,750 1,081
Marina 1068 21,012 3,800 37,879 6,400
Fort Ord N/A 30,460 8,200 32,124 8,200
San Ardo 215 460 111 550 132
Spreckels 201 670 151 800 180
Chualar 150 580 97 700 118
San Lucas 148 202 33 240 40
Unincorporated 140 30,551 4,790 42,122 6,605
Industrial 2,305 2,305
220,880 42,204 306,200 55,957
8This data was provided by Richard Youngblood of the







Figure 2-5. Total Annual Water Use
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TABLE 2-3. HISTORICAL AND PROJECTED ANNUAL
RESIDENTIAL WATER DEMAND





King City- 1,009 2,220
Total 15,673 38,970
Residential water use includes water used indoors and
outdoors. An estimated 60 percent of urban water use is for
indoor applications; the remaining 40 percent is for outdoor
purposes. [Ref. 3] Indoor water consumption is relatively
constant, while outdoor use varies with a demand cycle that is
similar to the demand cycle for agricultural water use.
Furthermore, water consumption varies with the type of
dwelling. Apartments and condominiums usually have a lower
water consumption per capita than a single family residency.
Since irrigation systems are usually installed and maintained
by professional irrigation experts, apartments and
condominiums typically have lower landscape water requirements
and higher irrigation efficiency.
The second largest subcategory of urban water use is
commercial water use. Commercial water users are small
businesses that use water mainly for indoor sanitation,
personal consumption and landscaping. Examples of commercial
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users are banks, food stores, restaurants and retail
establishments. (Commercial laundries and car washes are
included in the industrial category.) Commercial water use is
expected to increase by 116.6% between 1980 and 2020 [Ref.
l:p. 49]. Table 2-4 [Ref. l:p. 49] presents the historical
and forecasted future annual commercial water demand for major
urban centers in the Salinas Valley.
TABLE 2-4. HISTORICAL AND FUTURE ANNUAL COMMERCIAL
WATER DEMAND





King City 393 891
Total 4, 199 9,094
Industrial users are the third largest subcategory of
urban water users. Industrial water users are industries or
businesses which use large volumes of water. Typical examples
of industrial users are food processing plants (fruit,
vegetables and seafood) , beverage bottling plants (wineries
and soft drink producers), commercial ice manufacturers,
laundries, and car washes. This category is expected to
increase by 100.9% between 1980 and 2020 [Ref. l:p. 49].
Table 2-5 [Ref. l:p. 49] presents the historical and future
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annual industrial water demand for major urban centers in the
Salinas Valley.
TABLE 2-5. HISTORICAL AND FUTURE ANNUAL
INDUSTRIAL WATER DEMAND





King City 132 359
Total = 902 1,812
The last urban subcategory is the general public
subcategory. This subcategory includes government institu-
tions such as public buildings, schools, prisons, public
hospitals, fire departments, state, county, and city parks, as
well as national parks and military installations. The
general public water demand is expected to increase by 120.9%
between 1980 and 2020. [Ref . l:p. 50] Table 2-6 [Ref. l:p.
50] presents the historical and future annual general public
water demand for major urban centers in the Salinas Valley.
26
TABLE 2 - 6 . HISTORICAL AND FUTURE ANNUAL
GENERAL PUBLIC WATER DEMAND





King City 56 130
Total = 215 475
Given these preceding projections for each subcategory,
the annual water usage in the urban category will increase by
an estimated 139.9% between 1980 and 2020.
C. GEOLOGIC CONDITIONS
Geologically, the Salinas Valley is a deep asymmetric
valley which overlays a low-permeable formation of consoli-
dated rock from the Tertiary Age and earlier. Unconsolidated
marine and alluvial sediment cover this layer and form the
Salinas Valley's permeable, water-bearing aquifers and the
low permeability clay aquiclude 9 .
The valley's shape and location derive from the tectonic
history of north central California. The Salinas Valley runs
parallel and west of the San Andreas Fault zone and has
numerous faults that travel through the valley. The most
9The term aquiclude describes the groundwater -bearing
properties of a rock formation. Aquicludes do not transmit
water easily and do not yield water to wells, though they may
retain much water in their fine pores [Ref . 14 :p. 6] .
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famous faults are the Gabilan Fault, which is located on the
east side of the valley, and the King City fault located on
the west side. These faults along with the consolidated rock
layer formations form the boundary of the groundwater basin.
The major geological features of the Salinas Valley are:
the Granite Basement, Monterey Formation, Purisma Formation,
Paso Robles Formation, and Quaternary/Recent Alluvium [Ref.
2: pp. 2 -4] . The Granite Basement occurs at depths from 100 to
2,600 ft. The upper 100-200 ft. of the granite is fractured
and deteriorated. Limited quantities of water are believed to
be available from this zone. However, this is not considered
a viable groundwater supply due to the low yields, great
depth, and the expense required to extract water from this
zone. This formation is considered to be the base for
groundwater exploration.
The Monterey Formation represents the bulk of the
consolidated marine rocks sitting on top of the Granite
Basement. It is primarily composed of massive mudstones. It
also contains some sandstone beds close to its base. The
sandstone units generally yield some water, but the mudstone
beds do not. The sandstone beds in the Monterey formation
provide most of the oil extracted in the San Ardo oil fields.
The Purisma formation consists of siltstones and
sandstones. It is not considered a critical source of
groundwater. The Paso Robles formation is a conglomerate
which is composed primarily of fine to course sandstones,
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mainly of fluvial origin. The Quaternary and the Recent
Alluvium formations are composed of sands and gravel. They
supply most of the groundwater in the Salinas Valley. The
geology of the formation is very complex, with rapid changes
in soil composition occurring both vertically and horizon-
tally.
D. HYDROGEOLOGIC CONDITIONS
The Salinas Valley groundwater basin is generally composed
of three major water-bearing strata or aquifers. The aquifers
in the SVGB are broken into two classes: confined and uncon-
fined. These aquifers are identified by their elevation below
ground: the 180 foot aquifer, the 400 foot aquifer, and the
deep aquifer. There is limited knowledge and data about the
deep aquifer and the aquiclude that lies between the 400 foot
aquifer and the deep aquifer.
An aquifer is basically a giant bathtub filled with water
saturated coarse sand. This aquifer is constantly being
recharged by surface water and/or rainwater through deep
percolation. The hydrogeological definition of an aquifer is
a saturated, permeable, geologic unit that transmits
significant quantities of water under ordinary hydraulic
gradients. A confined aquifer is an aquifer that is confined
between two relatively impermeable geologic layers. An
unconfined aquifer is an aquifer whose upper boundary is not
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confined by an impermeable geologic layer. The upper boundary
of an unconfined aquifer is the water table.
The Salinas Valley aquifer is recharged principally by the
Salinas River and secondarily by rainfall in the valley. The
Salinas River drains the surrounding 3,950 square miles of
mountains and foothills. The river is about 170 miles long;
the lower 93 miles flow through the floor of the valley on its
north-western journey to the coast. It finally discharges
into the Monterey Bay near Castroville.
All irrigation, domestic, municipal and industrial water
requirements in this basin are supplied from the Salinas
Valley groundwater basin, except for some limited acreage near
Greenfield. There the residents receive supplemental water
from the Arroyo Seco river (a tributary of the Salinas River) .
In 1946, the California State Department of Water
Resources subdivided this groundwater basin into four inter-
connected hydrological regions (See Figure 2-2) . The first
region is the called the Upper Valley Area. It is identified
as the southern end of the valley and has a gross area of
85,000 acres. The major urban centers within this area are
San Ardo, San Lucas and King City. The second region is
called the Forebay Area. It extends from the northern
boundary of the Upper Valley to the city of Gonzales. It
contains approximately 77,000 acres and two major urban areas:
Greenfield and Soledad.
30
The third region is the East -Side Area. It's geographical
boundaries are north of the Forebay Area, three miles south of
city of Castroville and east of U.S. Highway 101. It
contains 43,000 acres and two major urban areas: Santa Rita
and the eastern suburbs of Salinas. The final region is the
Pressure area. The area lies west of U.S. Highway 101 and
extends north from the Forebay area to Monterey Bay. It
contains 81,100 acres and five major urban areas:
Castroville, Marina, Salinas except for the eastern suburbs,
Chualar and Gonzales.
E. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH SALINAS VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN
The Salinas Valley groundwater basin's current problems
can be grouped into three categories: decreasing groundwater
levels, seawater intrusion and nitrate contamination. These
three problems are not independent. They are symptoms of a
greater problem: the overdrafting of the groundwater basin.
Overdrafting occurs when the amount of groundwater extracted
is greater than the basin's natural ability to recharge
itself. This is not an isolated problem but is occurring
throughout the Salinas valley.
1. Lowering of Groundwater Levels (Overdrafting)
Groundwater levels generally will decline when
extractions (through pumping) exceed the water inflow or
recharge into the basin. Numerous locations throughout the
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valley are experiencing significant declines in their ground-
water level. Three times each year the Monterey County Water
Resource Agency (MCWRA) measures the basin's groundwater
levels
.
Groundwater levels in the Forebay and Upper Valley
areas have remained relatively constant for the last sixty
years, except for the drought years (1987-90) . These
historical trends are shown in Figure 2-6 [Ref. 2:Fig. 2-6].
The groundwater level in the Forebay area has actually risen
slightly over the last twenty years. The Nacimiento and San
Antonio reservoirs, built in 1957 and 1965, contribute
significantly to the stability of water levels in these areas
[Ref. 2:p. 2-6]. They provide controlled releases of water
which increase the ability of the Salinas River to percolate
water to the basin year around. Controlled releases also
avoid the waste that would occur if water was allowed to flow
into the ocean. Without these reservoirs, the Salinas River
would rise above its optimum flow rate for percolation during
the rainy season, and water would be wasted to the ocean.
During the late spring, summer and early fall this river would
be a dry river bed.
The East side and the Pressure Area have experienced
a slight drop in water levels during the past 50 years, as
shown in Figure 2-7 [Ref. 2:Fig. 2-7]. The elevation of the
water table in the East Side area has decreased approximately
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Figure 2-7. Historical Groundwater Levels in
Pressure and East Side
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other region in the SVGB. After 1965, the Pressure Area's
180- ft aquifer has appeared to stabilize. Well owners near
the coast have been forced to abandon their wells due to
seawater intrusion. These wells were replaced with wells that
extract groundwater from the 400 ft. aquifer.
Figure 2-8 [Ref
.
2: Fig. 2-9] shows that the aquifer as
a whole has experienced a rapid decline in groundwater level
since 1984. This data is somewhat skewed for the 180-ft. and
400-ft. aquifers near the coast. Seawater intrusion has
maintained the groundwater level by supplementing lost
freshwater with salt water.
These declines in groundwater levels result when
groundwater pumping activity exceeds the natural recharge
rate. This is illustrated by comparing the historical average
total recharge with the historical extraction, using the
Montgomery Watson groundwater model (See Table 2-7 [Ref.
2:Table 2-6]) . This comparison shows that the Salinas Valley
groundwater basin has been overdrafted by 37,000 acre- feet
per year. Table 2-8 [Ref. l:p. 24] gives the estimated
groundwater basin deficits from 1987 to 1992.
Overdrafting affects the groundwater basin in two
ways. First, the cost of extraction increases for individual
well owners as the groundwater level drops. For every
vertical foot the ground- water level drops, costs increase an




Figure 2 - 8 . Annual Average Groundwater Levels in the
Salinas Valley: 1945-1992 (Source: MCWRA,
1993)
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TABLE 2-7. SALINAS VALLEY AVERAGE SEAWATER



















*NOTE: Boundary Inflow = Total Boundary Inflow - Seawater
Intrusion
TABLE 2-8. ESTIMATED GROUNDWATER DEFICIT
IN THE SVGB: 19 87-1992







Furthermore, no one has put a social cost or economic value on
the water that is being consumed from these reserves. By the
37
year 2020, urban sector demand alone is expected to increase
by 139.9% over the 1980 usage.
2 . Seawater Intrusion
The second problem the Salinas Valley groundwater
basin faces is seawater (saltwater) intrusion along the coast.
The current rate of seawater intrusion is 17,000 acre- feet per
year. Seawater intrusion is caused by overdrafting in front
of the seawater/freshwater interface in the Pressure Area.
This causes the freshwater gradient to shift from its
predominately westerly location to a more easterly location.
This reversal has accelerated seawater intrusion into the 180
ft and 400 ft aquifers in the Pressure Area [Ref l:p. 31] .
Seawater intrusion is advancing at a rate that affects 575
surface acres per year above the 180- ft aquifer. Boyle
Engineering estimates that the seawater interface is moving
inland at an annual average rate of 800 ft per year. [Ref. 1
:p. 32] For the period 1970 to 1992, the Montgomery Watson
Model report estimates that the average annual seawater
intrusion rate into the Valley was 16,700 acre- feet; 11,300
acre-feet in the 180-ft aquifer, 4,600 acre-feet in the 400-
foot aquifer, and 800 acre- feet in the deep aquifer. Figure
2-9 [Ref. 2: Fig. 5-14] shows the historical annual average
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Figure 2-9. Historical Annual Average Seawater Intrusion
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Seawater intrusion is slowly degrading the basin's
groundwater quality. Seawater has a normal chloride concen-
tration of 500mg per liter. When seawater mixes with ground-
water, it slowly contaminants the aquifer with chloride. If
the chloride concentration goes above 250 mg per liter, the
water is no longer recommended for use as drinking water. If
the chloride concentration goes above 350mg per liter, it is
no longer fit for crop irrigation. Such water will damage the
crops and reduce yields.
"In 1992, the MCWRA has measured chloride concentra-
tions exceeding 500mg per liter in water from wells within
three miles of the Salinas City limits" [Ref l:p. 32]. The
location of the seawater intrusion front poses an imminent
threat to the municipal water supply for the City of Salinas.
This has the potential to devastate the local economy. It may
require the City to import fresh water from outlying areas,
which is a very expensive solution to the problem of seawater
intrusion.
3. Nitrate Contamination
The third problem in the groundwater basin is nitrate
contamination. Nitrate contamination has had a significant
effect on groundwater quality since the mid-1940' s. This
contamination corresponds to the introduction of inorganic
nitrogen based fertilizers. These fertilizers have become
heavily used in the Salinas Valley. It is believed that
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nitrogen based fertilizer is the primary source of the nitrate
contamination in the groundwater basin. The fertilizer's
nitrogen migrates into the aquifer when irrigation water is
over-applied. Other possible sources of nitrate contamination
are: confined animal producing operations, individual septic
tank waste disposal systems, and municipal and industrial run-
off [Ref . l:p. 37] .
As of 1987, nitrate contamination has been found in
the 400- ft aquifer. The MCWRA believes this is due to
isolated point sources. The risk of further degradation from
contaminated recharge sources is rising. Increasing nitrate
concentrations have been found in the Upper Valley and Forebay
areas in the 180- ft aquifer. In 1987, the mean nitrate
concentration levels for the 180- ft aquifer in this region
exceeded California's maximum contamination level (MCL)
fornitrate in drinking water. (The current California MCL for
nitrate is 45 mg per liter.) Also in 1987, forty-eight
percent of all wells monitored by MCWRA in the unconfined
hydrogeologic regions (Upper Valley and Forebay area) exceeded
90 mg per liter. This is twice the MCL for nitrate. In 1991,
water from the 180- ft aquifer in the East Side and the Upper
Valley areas also exceeded the MCL for nitrate. Table 2-9
[Ref. l:p. 37] shows the mean nitrate concentrations and the
percentage of wells that exceeded the California's MCL. These
wells are monitored by MCWRA in the 180- ft aquifer.
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TABLE 2-9. MEAN NITRATE CONCENTRATIONS AND








Pressure 35.8 92 18
East Side 90.9 49 53
Forebay 49.6 42 38
Upper Valley 55.1 27 59
1991
Pressure 30.5 72 13
East Side 57.5 57 46
Forebay 40.8 57 35
Upper Valley 73.5 22 68
In order to prevent these problems from worsening, it
is crucial that local authorities restore the groundwater
balance in the Salinas Valley ground water basin. This can be
accomplished by providing new sources of fresh water, reducing
the amount of water extracted, or a combination of both. The
agency responsible for developing and implementing a plan to
restore balance in the groundwater basin is the Monterey
County Water Resource Agency (MCWRA)
.
F. MCWRA MISSION AND AUTHORITY
The MCWRA' s basic mission is to manage and protect the
Salinas Valley Ground Water Basin. This organization,
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originally the Salinas Valley Flood Control and Water
Conservation District, was transformed into the Monterey
County Water Resources Agency when the State of California
passed the Monterey County Water Resources Agency Act in 1990.
This act broadly defines the agency's mission and powers. The
MCWRA has delineated from this broad mission statement a list
of goals, objectives and policies for the SVGB which are
published in the Monterey County General Plan.
The MCWRA' s mission as defined by the Monterey County
Water Resources Agency Act is:
...to manage the groundwater in the Salinas Valley
Groundwater Basin, and, in connection with such ground-
water management activities, to conserve water in any
manner, to prevent the waste or diminution of the water
supply within the territory of the agency, and to prevent
groundwater extractions which are determined to be harmful
to the groundwater basin. The agency may further adopt, by
ordinance, reasonable procedures, rules, and regulations
to implement the Act, and may specify in any ordinance
that a violation of the ordinance is an infraction.
[Ref. MCWRA Ordinance No. 3717, Sect. 1.01.00 - Authority]
The MCWRA' s mission is further explained by their
published goals, objectives and policies, which are enumerated
below:
1. Water Resources
5 GOAL : To conserve and enhance the water supplies
in the county and adequately plan for the
development and protection of these
resources and their related resources for
future generations.
5.1 OBJECTIVE : Protect and preserve watersheds and
recharge areas, particularly those
critical for the replenishment of
reservoirs and aquifers.
43
5.1.2 POLICY Land use and development shall be accom-
plished in a manner to minimize runoff
and maintain groundwater recharge in






To promote adequate, replenishable water
supplies of suitable quality to meet the
County's various needs.
Eliminate long-term groundwater over-
drafting in the County as soon as
practicably possible.
Increased uses of groundwater shall be
carefully managed, especially in areas
known to have groundwater overdraf ting.
Water conservation measures for all types
of land uses shall be encouraged.
Explore and implement measures to supply
additional water to critically deficient
areas
.
6.2.1 POLICY: The County shall pursue development of






To ensure that the County's water quality
is protected and enhanced to meet all
beneficial uses, including domestic,
agricultural, industrial, recreational,
and ecological.
Protect and enhance surface and ground-
water quality by implementing current
adopted water quality programs and by
continuing to evaluate new problems:
develop new programs in accordance with
the following policies by 1984.
The County shall establish growth
policies which are integrated with the
natural limitations of the County's
surface and groundwater bodies to sustain
acceptable quality.
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21.1.2 The County shall assume an active role in
initiating and supporting beneficial
water programs that affect the County.
21.1.10 The County shall implement a program to
prevent further seawater intrusion by
developing a supplemental source of water
for the North County. This may include
water importation, water conservation,
and waste water reclamation.
21.2 OBJECTIVE : Enhance the quality of water in the
County by regulating the type, location,
and intensity of land use, and grading
operations
.
3 . Water Service
53 GOAL : To promote adequate water service for all
County needs
.
53.1 OBJECTIVE : Achieve a sustained level of adequate
water services.
53.1.1 POLICIES : The County shall encourage coordination
between those public water service
providers drawing from a common water
table to assure that the water table is
not overdrawn.
5 3.1.2 The County shall, through the MCWRA and
other appropriate agencies, assure
adequate monitoring of wells in those
areas experiencing rapid residential
growth.
53.1.3 The County shall not allow water
consuming development in areas which do
not have proven adequate water supplies.
53.1.4 New development shall be required to
connect to existing water services
providers which are public utilities,
where feasible.
53.1.5 Proliferation of wells, serving residen-
tial, commercial, and industrial uses,
into common water tables shall be dis-
couraged.
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In order to accomplish this mission, the State of
California recognizes that the MCWRA must have complete
authority over the groundwater as well as the ability to raise
funds to finance its operation. The State of California has
established this authority through its constitution and public
laws and acts giving the MCWRA legal authority to control all
freshwater within the Salinas Valley and to raise funds
through surcharges and/or fines on ordinance violations.
The following are California laws and acts which are
pertinent to the MCWRA' s ability to allocate water: they are
presented to familiarize the reader with the MCWRA' s current
legal authority.
California Constitution, Article X, Section 5. - Conserva-
tion of water resources; restriction on riparian rights.
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that
the waste, unreasonable use, or unreasonable method of use
of water be prevented and that the conservation of such
waters is to be exercised with a view to reasonable and
beneficial use thereof in section shall be self -executing,
and the Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance
of policy in this section contained.
California Constitution, Article X, Section 5. - Public
Use; State Regulation and Control.
The use of all water now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribu-
tion, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject
to the regulation and control of the State, in the manner
to be prescribed by law.
California Water Code, Section 100. - Beneficial Use of
Water.
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It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in the State the general welfare requires that
the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that
the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of
use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of
such water is to be exercised with a view to the reason-
able and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the
people and for the public welfare...
California Water Code, Section 100.5 - Conformity with
Local Custom; factor in determining reasonableness of the
use, method of use, or method of diversion of water.
It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this
State that conformity of a use, method of use, or method
of diversion of water with local custom shall not be
solely determinative of its reasonableness, but shall be
considered as one factor to be weighed in the determina-
tion of the reasonableness of the use, or method of
diversion of water, within the meaning of Section 2 of
Article X of the California Constitution.
California Water Code, Section 102. - State Ownership of
Water;
Right to Use.
All water within the State is the property of the people
of the State, but the right to use the water may be
acquired by appropriation in the manner provided by law.
California Water Code, Section 104. - State Use and
Control of Water.
It is hereby declared that the people of the State have a
paramount interest in the use of all the water of the
State and that the State shall determine what water of the
State, surface and underground, can be converted to public
use or controlled for public protection.
California Water Code, Section 105. - Development for
Public Benefit.
It is hereby declared that the protection of the public
interest in the development of the water resources of the
State is of vital concern to the people of the State and
that the State shall determine in what way the water of
the State, both surface and underground, should be
developed for the greatest public benefit.
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California Water Code, Section 106. - Highest Use of
Water; Domestic; Irrigation.
It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this
State that the use of water for domestic purposes is the
highest use of water and that the next highest use is for
irrigation.
California Water Code, Section 106.5. - Municipal Water
Rights.
It is hereby declared to be the established policy of this
State that the right of a municipality to acquire and hold
rights to the use of water should be protected to the
fullest extent necessary for existing and future uses, but
that no municipality shall acquire or hold any right to
waste waster, or to use water for other than municipal
purposes, or to prevent the appropriation and application
of water in excess of its reasonable and existing munici-
pality to apply such water to municipal uses and when
necessity therefore exists.
California Water Code, Section 109. - Efficient Use of
Water; Encouragement of Voluntary Transfer of Water and
Water rights.
a. The legislature hereby finds and declares that the
growing water needs of the State require that use of
water in an efficient manner and the efficient use of
water requires certainty in the definition of property
rights to the use of water and transferability of such
rights. It is hereby declared to be the established
policy of this State to facilitate the voluntary
transfer of water and water rights where consistent
with the public welfare of the place of export and
the place of import.
b. The Legislature hereby directs the Department of Water
Resources, the State Water Resources Control Board,
and all other appropriate state agencies to encourage
voluntary transfers of water and water rights,
including, but not limited to, providing technical
assistance to persons to identify and implement water
conservation measures which will make additional water
available for transfer.
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G. STEPS TAKEN TO RESTORE THE WATER BALANCE
Following their published goals and objectives, the MCWRA
intends to restore the Salinas Valley groundwater basin
through a program incorporating development and construction
to establish new water sources and water demand management.
Any new water supply project will have to overcome environ-
mental, economic, technical, social and political hurdles
before actual design work can be started. Under the current
approval process for developing a new water source, the most
difficult approvals to obtain are from the Federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Federal Fish & Wildlife Agency and
State of California's Environmental office.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) require any new
water supply construction project to comply with both acts.
Under these acts, the project must demonstrate that it has no
significant adverse impact or cumulative negative effect on
the environment. The project's sponsors must document their
resource use and mitigate any environmental impacts associated
with the project. The sponsors must also document that all
effective water conservation measures are currently in place,
and that water demand still exceeds the current fresh water
supplies. Thus, the MCWRA must establish a viable water
conservation program before developing new water sources. An
essential component of any water conservation plan is a water
allocation program.
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MCWRA, through its "Basin Management Plan (BMP) is
currently determining the most economically viable way to
develop new water sources and increase water storage
efficiency in the groundwater basin. Capital cost estimates
for the proposed projects range from $173.7 million to $327.5
million. These projects have estimated operating and
maintenance costs ranging from $1.8 million to $5.2 million
per year [Ref . 10: Table 5] . It will take a great deal of time
for the political process to develop a consensus on environ-
mental mitigation, cost sharing, technical feasibilities, and
social and political issues for these projects.
Because of the time required to develop water supply
projects, a water demand management program (alias the
regulatory control system) appears to have become the critical
element for reducing the near term imbalance in groundwater
consumption. Water demand management will be necessary as
long as water demand exceeds the recharge.
A water demand management program can vary from voluntary
educational programs to direct intervention through rationing
and strict governmental control . The MCWRA has chosen both a
voluntary educational program and strict government controls.
The controls impose upper pumping limits for the farm




At this time, the MCWRA has several voluntary educational
programs to promote water conservation methods/programs and
improve irrigation efficiency:
1. The Mobile Irrigation Laboratory program by MCWRA does
free evaluations for local farmers and recommends how to
improve their irrigation system's efficiency. This
program was developed in 1990 as a cooperative, cost
sharing program with the California Department of Water
Resources. Since its development, the mobile lab
program has conducted more than 100 evaluations in the
Salinas Valley.
2. The California Irrigation Management Information System
(CIMIS) is an integrated network of computerized weather
stations located throughout California. This system
estimates crop water requirements based on crop type and
real time weather data. This program helps Salinas
Valley farmers determine irrigation schedules and water
budgets. This program is also co- funded by the
California Department of Water Resources and MCWRA.
3. The Water Awareness Committee of Monterey County (WAC)
provides a forum to inform community and industry
leaders about water related issues and educational
programs. It also provides MCWRA with critical feedback
from industry and the community.
The second part of the MCWRA' s water demand management
program appears to have been established through several
ordinances allowing the agency to monitor, control and set
upper pumping limits for all commercial, industrial, agricul-
tural and municipal wells in the Salinas Valley. These
ordinances were passed during a period of three years and are
presented in chronological order from oldest to newest.
On October 17, 1989, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3428 required
registering and documenting water use for:
1. Water distribution systems with 50 or more service
connections;
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2. Industrial and commercial operations with water demand
greater than or equal to 5 acre feet per year.
On March 5, 1991, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3523 required all
agricultural water users in the Salinas Valley to file water
conservation plans with a target reduction of 20 percent.
Although filing the conservation plan is mandatory, the actual
water conservation practices used are discretionary as long as
the farmer achieves his reduction target. These conservation
plans are required to include the following:
1. The location of the areas under cultivation and their
acreage, with maps showing cultivated areas and all
agricultural wells.
2. A signed and dated copy of the water conservation plan.
3
.
A schedule showing when during the year each chosen
water conservation practice would be implemented.
4. The entire conservation plan had to be fully implemented
by 1993.
On April 30, 1991, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3539 established
regulations on water devices and uses such as:
1. Indoor and outdoor plumbing systems;
2. Decorative fountains;
3. Washing of automobiles or exterior surfaces;
4. Landscaping;
5. Water waste and indiscriminate, non-beneficial uses.
On February 2, 1993, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3663 affected all
wells in Zone 2, 2A and 2B (i.e., the Pressure area where
overdrafting is currently the greatest) . It required wells
having a discharge pipe with an inside diameter of three
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inches or greater to install flowmeters and annually report
pumping activity, water distribution and use. This ordinance
gives MCWRA the ability to monitor and enforce MCWRA Ordinance
No. 3523 and provides the potential to regulate pumping
activities and charge a surcharge to create economic incen-
tives to reduce water consumption. This ordinance also
provides critical consumption data needed to develop a water
demand management program.
On July 27, 1993, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3696 required all
wells in subareas P-l, P-2, and E-l (i.e., the East Side Area)
to comply with the same requirements as the wells in MCWRA
Zones 2, 2A and 2B.
On October 5, 199 3, MCWRA enacted three major ordinances:
Ordinance No. 3717 changed the required compliance date
for MCWRA Ordinance No. 3663 and No. 3696 to November 1,
1993 for zones 2, 2A and 2B, and February 15, 1994 for
zones P-l, P-2, and E-l.
Ordinance No. 373 5 revised MCWRA Ordinance No. 3 72
effective on December 14, 1993. Ordinance No. 3720
established upper limits for pumping water from wells for
agricultural irrigation in zone 2, 2A and 2B. It also
established increasing penalties for violations of the
ordinance. Penalties are based on an "increasing block
rate structure" also known as a "Tier Penalty Rate
Structure." This structure increases the amount of
penalty in incremental steps or tiers based on how much is
pumped over the established limit. The revision to
Ordinance No. 3735 was enacted to increase the upper limit
for certain type of crops.
Ordinance No. 3742 established charges for agricultural
water from the Salinas Valley groundwater basin in zones
2, 2A and 2B, based on the quantity of water pumped. The
Charges are incremental, increasing as the quantity of
water pumped increases above the upper pumping limit. The
revenue collected from this surcharge can only be used to
develop and construct new water supplies to serve the
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increasing demands for water in the basin. This surcharge
is also based on an "increasing block rate structure."
This water tax strategy is used to encourage water
conservation.
On January 18, 1994, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3 744 allowed
MCWRA to control urban water consumption. The ordinance
requires all urban water purveyors to submit urban water
allocation and conservation plans for the territory within
their jurisdiction. Suppliers are also required to reduce
groundwater pumping by 15% per capita below the usage level in
1987 (last pre-drought year) , or with a suitable alternative
reduction approved by the Agency.
A variety of tax structures recognize that as the marginal
cost of water increases (with the tax), demand will decrease.
The tax structure must simply increase water prices as water
consumption increases. There are three basic ways to accomp-
lish this. One is a tier tax structure, as enacted by MCWRA.
This structure reduces average and sometimes peak water
consumption use.
The second tax scheme is known as the "lifeline tax
structure" or "two tier tax structure." This structure
ensures affordable water prices for necessary, minimum
consumption. Water use in excess of the minimum requirements
is taxed at a significantly higher rate. A "lifeline tax
structure" reduces average water use [Ref . l:p. 75]
.
The last structure is known as the "Scarcity Tax
Structure." This structure is used when supplies are
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diminishing. It passes the costs for developing new water
supplies to current users. This structure uses a positive
linear increase in price as supplies are depleted. Scarcity
tax structures reduce average water use and discourage new
service connections in water shortage areas or where water
distribution systems are rapidly expanded [Ref. l:p. 75].
The Scarcity Tax Structure will reduce groundwater pumping
in all areas of the Salinas Valley groundwater basin. In
turn, this will help bring the groundwater balance back into
equilibrium, assuring a reliable groundwater source for the
future. The tier tax rate structure will also provide the
economic incentive for well owners to increase water use
efficiency and reduce over- irrigation through cost awareness.
This, in turn, reduces nitrate contamination caused by
nitrogen based fertilizer.
The chronological development of the preceding ordinances
indicates the framework of MCWRA's most likely future alloca-
tion plan. It is likely to be based on demand management and
will incorporate two methods of controlling water allocation:
maximum consumption and taxation.
The maximum consumption approach limits the amount of
groundwater that certain sectors of society can extract. This
approach is consistent with MCWRA Ordinances No. 3744 and
3720. These pumping limits will likely be established at a
level that balances total annual groundwater extraction and
annual recharge volumes for the groundwater basin.
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Continuing taxation with upper pumping limits provides the
agency a new revenue stream with which to finance new water
sources and operate the allocation program. The tax approach
also encourages increased water efficiency and reduces water
use through economic incentives; the upper pumping limits
assures the groundwater cycle is always is balanced. The
combined effect will slowly restore the Salinas Valley aquifer
to its natural groundwater storage capacity. This ability to
tax was established by MCWRA Ordinance No. 3742.
In Chapter V, this inferred water demand management
allocation plan will be compared to a proposed privatization
allocation plan designed for the Salinas Valley groundwater
basin. The comparison will indicate which program would be
more economically efficient at reducing water use for a small
sample of representatives from the industrial, urban and
agricultural sectors of Salinas Valley. The following chapter
will review literature on natural resource allocation and
explore the advantages and disadvantages of the various
methods of allocating natural resources.
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III. BACKGROUND ON THREE METHODS OF
ALLOCATING GROUNDWATER
"What is common to many is taken least care of, for all
men have greater regard for what is their own than for
what they possess in common with others." Aristotle
Throughout the country, local municipalities have been
increasing their interest in using economic incentives through
privatization to efficiently use or conserve their public
goods/natural resources. Privatization is the process of
taking an "Open Access Resource" (classification of public
good or natural resource) , breaking it down into definable
parcels or units and transferring or selling these property
units to private or public organizations. Each private or
public organization will have the right to use, control and
obtain benefit from this resource as well as the ability to
transfer these rights to another party. Privatization has
four basic behavioral implications that occur once private
ownership and transferability have been established:
1. Private owners can gain by employing this resource in
ways that are beneficial to others, or can bear the
opportunity costs of ignoring these economic opportun-
ities .
2. Owners have strong incentives to properly care for and
maintain this resource in order to preserve its value.
3. Owners have strong economic motives to conserve for the
future when the resource is expected to increase suffi-
ciently in value.
4. Accountability is established for the damage done to
others by the owner misusing his resource.
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The key element of privatization is transferring property-
rights to ensure that individuals will consider the oppor-
tunity costs of their actions. For example:
As long as individuals are free to buy and sell water
rights, market prices will emerge, making owners aware of
the cost of wasting water. If rights are not transfer-
able, however, the fact that water has more valuable
alternative uses will make little difference; the owner
will not be able to sell the rights and capitalize on
these higher valued uses. [Ref. 11 :p. 227]
The two areas receiving the most academic attention are
tradeable water rights and air pollution discharge permits.
Working theories in these markets provide the fundamental
foundation for studying the privatized transferable water
rights in the Salinas Valley groundwater basin. Two
fundamental principles are required to obtain allocation
efficiency through privatization: definable and enforceable
property rights, and the ability to trade these rights.
A. PROPERTY RIGHTS
The first principle of definable and enforceable property
rights is that the individual will take into account the
opportunity costs of his actions. As long as individuals are
free to buy and sell water rights, market prices will emerge,
making the owners intensely aware of the economic costs of
their actions.
Definable and enforceable property rights are a prerequi-
site for economic efficiency. Under the principle of economic
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efficiency, a transaction is desirable if it generates
benefits in excess of both the private costs borne by the
consenting parties as well as the external cost imposed on
nonconsenting secondary parties. Externalities occur when a
transaction takes place between two parties and the trans-
action or market price does not reflect the true benefit and
costs to the two parties and society. This externality can
have two effects: external benefit or external cost.
External benefits occur when the transaction has a beneficial
effect on the welfare of a nonpaying second party or society.
External costs result when the transaction harms a nonpaying
second party or society.
If property rights are not definable or enforceable, the
resource is an "Open Access Resource, which is defined as a
resource to which access is unrestricted, (and no one) has the
right to exclude others from using (this) resource. Overuse
and abuse of such a resource is typical." [Ref. 15 :p. 527]
This is exemplified in the article "The Tragedy of the
Commons" by Garrett Hardin [Ref. 12:pp. 88-91]. Hardin
graphically illustrates numerous examples of this in the
public goods/natural resources area, i.e., North African
herdsmen, fisheries off the New England coast, Hutterite
communities in the northwestern United States (when their
community population exceeds 150) , and the recent Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation policy. In all these
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examples, the natural resource or public good was exploited to
the point of devastation.
The most visible of these examples was photographed in
1974. A satellite photo of Northern Africa showed an
irregular dark patch, 390 square miles in area, with a green
spot in the center. This green spot was fenced green pasture.
Outside of it, the vegetation had been devastated. The fenced
area was private property. The owner practiced proper land
management. The land was subdivided into five areas and the
herd was rotated to a new area each year. This left the
remaining areas fallow for four years, giving the land
adequate time to recover from grazing.
The land outside the fence area was public grazing land
open to nomads and herdsman. These nomads and herdsman
increased the size of their herds, but the grazing capacity of
this land remained constant. The herds slowly exceeded "the
natural carrying capacity of their environment, soil was
compacted and eroded, and 'weedy' plants, unfit for cattle
consumption, replaced the original plants. Many cattle died
and as a consequence, so did humans." [Ref. 12 :p. 88] Thus,
the private land demonstrated that private property with
defined ownership encourages owners to consider the
opportunity costs of past, current and future actions.
James Madison, in 1788, explained what happened best: "If
men were angels, no Government would be necessary. That is,
if all men were angels. But in a world in which all resources
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are limited, a single non-angel can spoil the common environ-
ment for all." [Ref. 12 :p. 89]
The spoilage process comes in two stages. First, the non-
angel gains from his competitive advantage over the angels
(pursuing his own interest at the expense of others) . Then,
as the once noble angels realize that they are being left
behind, some of them renounce their angelic behavior. They
try to get their share out of the commons before competitors
do [Ref. 12 :p. 89] . Thus, resource which is an "Open Access
Resource" will eventually be depleted and ruined.
B. FREE TRADE
The second principle of privatization is the ability to
freely trade property rights. This encourages conservation of
limited resources. Industries with a comparative economic
advantage in conserving a resource can sell their excess to
other industries, which presumably have a higher conservation
cost
.
If resource owners choose to ignore the opportunity to
conserve and sell the excess resource, they will incur the
opportunity cost of the foregone profits. This provides an
economic incentive for conservation.
Both buyer and seller gain through trading. Buyers
receive additional resources at a lower cost than if they had
to conserve or provide the additional resource themselves.
The sellers profit by selling the resource at a higher price
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than its value to them. Trade produces a win-win result in
that both buyer and seller gain through the transaction.
Thus, society generally gains as a whole, as demonstrated by
modern western society.
Trade also provides incentives for industry to develop or
improve existing conservation technology. Resource buyers
have incentives to investigate ways to reduce their resource
cost by developing new conservation technologies or methods.
Sellers have incentives to improve their existing conservation
methods to increase their profits. Through trade, both buyer
and seller have incentives to use resources efficiently and
allow society to use the resource for the most valuable
alternative uses; using resources inefficiently would cause a
future economic loss to society if trade were not allowed.
C. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES OF THE SALINAS VALLEY GROUNDWATER
BASIN
When using a natural resource or public good involves
negative externalities, the government should take action to
eliminate the externality if three conditions are satisfied:
1. The cost of public sector involvement is less than the
social and economic cost of the externality.
2. The free market cannot reasonably adjust its market
price to account for the externalities.
3. Public sector involvement does not create a second




1. Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin
The Salinas Valley is experiencing a negative
externality related to water use because water is currently
treated as an open resource. This has led to overpumping in
the SVGB. The State of California has attempted to address
this externality via letter of direction to the MCWRA [Ref.
30] . The State of California Water Resources Control Board
directed the local governments in the Salinas Valley to
develop an allocation program to eliminate over-drafting and
prevent further seawater intrusion into the aquifer. The
Monterey County Water Resources Agency was tasked to develop
this allocation plan.
This negative externality results because the
individual user's cost of pumping water out of the aquifer
does not reflect the true cost of water. The true cost of
water (marginal social cost (MSC) ) is composed of two parts:
the marginal cost of production (MC) and the marginal external
cost of overdrafting the aquifer (MEC) . In equation form,
this can be stated as follows (MSC = MC + MEC) [Ref. 13 :p.
641] ) . The marginal cost of production in the Salinas Valley
includes the following costs:
1. Site development and well drilling.
2. Labor, fuel/electricity, and pumping equipment cost.
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3. Construction and operational costs of the Nacimiento and
San Antonio Reservoirs. These reservoirs are used to
increase the aquifer's recharge efficiency. 10
The marginal external cost of overdrafting the aquifer involve
the following costs:
1. Cost of seawater intrusion absorbed by the coastal
communities and coastal farmers.
2
.
Increased pumping cost because of the lowered water
table in the basin.
3. Opportunity cost of depleting the aquifer reserve.
4. Cost of the irreversible damage to the aquifer's holding
capacity as the semiconsolidated sediments are
compacted. "When the water level is lowered, the
sediments undergo irreversible compaction, squeezing out
water from their interstices" [Ref. 14:p. 229].
Currently, well owners in the Salinas Valley pay
directly for both the capital and operating costs of their
wells. In addition, well owners in Zone 2A help pay for the
capital and operating costs of the two reservoirs in the
southern part of the Monterey County. These costs are
allocated on the basis of the type of crop grown and number of
acres of crop land, not on the amount of water the individual
pumps. This cost allocation strategy gives a misdirected
incentive to the individual well owner.
For example, suppose two identical farms (farm A,
farm B) in Zone 2A are located side-by- side and their tax
contributions for the reservoirs are the same. Because these
10The construction cost for the two reservoirs was $19.9
million. ($7 million for the Nacimiento Reservoir in 1956 and
$12.9 million for the San Antonio Reservoir in 1963) .
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contributions are based on crop type and acreage, not water
pumped, Farmer A realizes that his marginal cost per gallon of
water consumed is zero. No matter how much water is pumped,
Farmer A's costs do not change.
Suppose Farmer A's reservoir tax is $1000 per year.
Under his initial growing plan, Farmer A's water consumption
was 100,000 gals per year. Farmer A decides to adopt a more
water intensive growing plan which substitutes water for some
fertilizer and labor. Under the new growing plan, water
consumption will be 125,000 gals per year. However, Farmer
A's total cost decreases because fertilizer and labor cost
decrease while water costs remain the same. Farmer B, who is
using a less water intensive growing plan, realizes that
Farmer A has an advantage with respect to production costs.
To be competitive, Farmer B switches to a more water intensive
growing plan. Both farmers are equally competitive, but water
use has now increased by 25%.
Well owners in the valley do not pay directly or
indirectly for the marginal external cost of overdraf ting
.
This negative externality was not even considered until the
1940s, when the coastal communities and farmers started to
feel the financial impact of overdraf ting. Overdraf ting has
increased costs due to seawater intrusion and the lowered
water table. The economic and social cost of seawater
intrusion and the lowered water table could be calculated and
charged to well owners. But the economic and social costs of
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depleting the reserve water in dead storage and the
irreversible damage to the aquifer's holding capacity cannot
be estimated with any significant accuracy.
2. Responses to Negative Externalities
The California Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
directed the MCWRA to internalize these negative externalities
by developing an allocation plan which reduces and ultimately
eliminates the aquifer overdraf ting. There are four basic
economic procedures to resolve this situation: regulatory
systems of control, taxation, privatization, and a hybrid mix
of two or more of these three procedures. The primary
differences between these procedures are the amount of
government involvement and the resulting level of economic
efficiency. Each of these procedures requires determining a
maximum sustained water yield and implementing local legis-
lative procedures to monitor and enforce the program.
D. MAXIMUM SUSTAINED YIELD
According to Mandel and Schiftan, the definition of
maximum sustained yield is the maximum rate at which a
resource can continuously be extracted for 100 years without
causing unacceptable consequences. [Ref. 14 :p. 231] In
hydrological terms, the maximum sustained yield is based on
the following six conditions:
1. The safe yield refers to the supply capacity of the
entire groundwater system, not to limitations caused by
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inappropriate location of wells or by the excessive
concentration of many wells in a part of the aquifer.
2. The first undesired but unavoidable effect of ground-
water extraction is a lowered water level that may, in
its turn, induce other unwanted discharges in thin
phreatic aquifers, intrusion of saline water from the
ocean, soil subsidence, reduction of the dry weather
flow in the rivers and springs, and deterioration of
water quality because of the access of air to oxidizable
compounds in the stratigraphic column [Ref . 14 :p. 232]
.
To determine if the effect is truly unacceptable, or
merely a nuisance in terms of environmental, economic,
social or political implications requires social and
moral judgement.
3. Adverse effects can be defined as the new negative
effects occurring if the water level drops below current
levels, or the negative effects that have occurred since
overdrafting reduced the water level below its
historical natural level. Again, this issue of what
water level to use will have to be resolved by social
and moral judgement.
4. For sustained yield exploitation, two hydrologic
conditions must be met: A quasi -steady state was
defined by the preceding factors 1, 2, 3. All other
unwanted effects, including those that take a very long
time to materialize, must be kept within acceptable
limits. Therefore, the maximum rate of exploitation,
commensurate with the first factor must equal the
average annual replenishment rate [Ref. 14:p. 232].
5. The climate and soil coverage of the area will remain
relatively unchanged, and man-made pollution is not
expected to enter the hydrologic cycle.
6. Under the above factors, the aquifer may be regarded as
a simple system with only three major system variables:
annual groundwater extraction, area of distribution of
the groundwater extraction, and water levels. Minor
system variables, such as the depths of boreholes, and
monthly pumping schedules are neglected [Ref. 14 :p.
232] .
Once these factors have been determined, the maximum




Determine the average annual replenishment rate for the
groundwater basin.
Identify the most stringent constraint based on the
conditions in factors 2 & 3 stated earlier.
Determine the quantitative relationship between water
level elevations and the occurrence of the primary
adverse effect.
Locate the key areas of the aquifer and define minimal
water levels that are acceptable to society.
Compute the steady- state rate of groundwater leaving the
groundwater basin based on the preceding assumptions.
Maximum sustained yield is equal to the difference
between average annual replenishment rate (step 1) and
the outflow rate (Step 5)
.
E. LEGAL AUTHORITY
The Monterey County Water Resources Agency Act per Stats.
1990, Chap. 1159, gives the Monterey County Water Resources
Agency (MCWRA) jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to
water within the entire area of the County of Monterey,
including both incorporated and unincorporated areas. Under
this act,
the agency is authorized to conserve water in any manner,
to prevent the waste or diminution of the water supply
within the territory of the Agency, to conserve water for
the present and future use within the territory of the
Agency, and to prevent groundwater extractions which are
determined to be harmful to the groundwater basin. The
Agency may further adopt, by ordinance, reasonable
procedures, rules, and regulations to implement the act,
and may specify in any ordinance that a violation of the
ordinance is an infraction. The Agency has power to
perform all other acts necessary or proper to accomplish
the purposes of the act.
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The West Water Code Appendix, Chapter 52, Section 52-9
(d6) also confers the MCWRA authority to give water rights to
individuals. The authority of the State to issue water rights
and transfer these rights to MCWRA through the West Water Code
is established under the California State Constitution,
Article 11, Section 101. This article gives the state sole
ownership of all groundwater and the authority to control,
transfer and determine what the "reasonable use is" for fresh
water. This legal position is supported by "Reasonable Use
Doctrine, " stating that landowners over the aquifer have
coequal rights to the groundwater, subject to reasonableness.
Reasonableness is determine by judicial judgement based on the
demand and how the particular landowners use the water.
This preceding act and statue gives the Monterey County
Water Resource Agency the authority to implement the four
types of allocation plans (regulatory system of control,
taxation, privatization or hybrid mix of two or more of the
prior procedures) to control and eliminate overdrafting in the
Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin.
The ground work for establishing any one of these three
types of allocation plans has been established by the
following three ordinances.
MCWRA Ordinance No. 3717: establishes the precedent to
monitor water extraction activity and use this information
for enforcement and for assessing fees based on water use.
This is an essential element for all allocation plans.
MCWRA Ordinance No. 3663: establishes the requirement for
water extractors who are within zones 2, 2A, or 2B, and
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have a discharge pipe with an inside diameter of at least
3 inches to report water use information on an annual
basis, and to install flowmeters on their groundwater
extraction facilities and service connections. The
flowmeters will
allow the agency to allocate the costs of water
management activities in the Salinas Valley Ground-
water Basin and any new water projects for the basin,
based upon actual water use. Fees or assessments
based on water use will only be used for the produc-
tion and delivery of water and for water management
activities, including, but not limited to, the
development and implementation of water allocation
plans, water conservation plans, and water supply
projects. (Ref . MCWRA Ordinance No. 3717, p. 4, para
E)
A second ordinance creates a precedent for establishing
and banking water credits 11 and setting upper pumping
limits for certain water uses and industries. The ability
to issue water credits and set upper pumping limits is
essential for establishing a regulatory, or privatization
allocation plan.
MCWRA Ordinance No. 372 0: establishes upper limits for
pumping water from wells for agricultural irrigation uses
in MCWRA zones 2, 2A, and 2B. The limit is based upon
well location and type of crops to be irrigated from the
well. The ordinance allows a credit for savings made by
a water supplier to be applied to excess usage on other
lands by the same water supplier within the same sub-
basin. This credit can be carried over one reporting year
and is non- transferable
.
Finally, MCWRA Ordinance No. 3742: establishes a
precedent for taxing water that is extracted from private
wells. This is an essential element to instituting a
taxation allocation plan. Specifically, it establishes
charges to be levied on agricultural water suppliers
pumping groundwater from zones 2, 2A, and 2B of the
Salinas Valley Groundwater basin based on the quantities
1:L If an agricultural water supplier pumps less than the
quantity allowed for one farming unit served by that water
supplier, then the water supplier may, for one reporting year,
exceed the pumping limit for other farming units supplied by
that water supplier (whether or not from the same extraction
facility) in the same sub-basin where the savings accrued.
(Ref. MCWRA Ordinance No. 3720, para 1.02.30)
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of water pumped. One of the purposes stated in the
ordinance is to "bring about a reduction in pumping by
individual growers, to the maximum extent feasible for
each grower, and to reduce significantly the overall
pumping from the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin. [Ref .
MCWRA Ordinance No. 3742, p. 3, sect. 1.01.20]
These ordinances have provided the framework for estab-
lishing an allocation program that could be based on any of
the four allocation methods discussed previously. The
allocation plan that will eventually be adopted by the MCWRA
will be determined in the political arena. The merits of each
allocation method for the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin are
discussed below.
F. REGULATORY CONTROL SYSTEM
In a regulatory control system (i.e., setting maximum
consumption standards) , a government regulatory agency
determines the maximum sustained yield (MSY) . Once MSY is
determined, the agency establishes and enforces the maximum
sustained consumption limits (i.e., daily, monthly, annual)
for each individual consumer or class of consumer or industry.
Consumers who are unable or refuse to limit their consumption
to these standards are in noncompliance. Such consumers are
subject to a fine or termination of their rights to consume
water. Typically these limits are reviewed and approved on an
annual basis through a public hearing process.
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1. Advantages of Regulatory Control
The following are the basic advantages of this
allocation method:
1. Historically, a regulatory system of control is the most
widely used water allocation method in the United
States. Therefore, agencies have a great deal of
historical data and experience in implementing this type
of program. They also know about the negative effects
such programs can create.
2. This control system is relatively easy to implement.
For example, it took the following three ordinances for
the MCWRA to establish this type of program: MCWRA
Ordinances No. 3720 and No. 3735 instituting upper
pumping limits for agricultural use, and MCWRA Ordinance
No. 3744 instituting upper pumping limits for cities and
urban water use based on a 15 percent reduction using
1987 as a baseline.
3
.
This control system is relatively easy to monitor and
enforce. A monitoring program has been established
through MCWRA Ordinance No. 3 717. Under this ordinance,
all wells that have a 3" inside diameter or larger
discharge pipe must install flowmeters and report water
use information on an annual basis.
4. This control system can be enforced through penalty
system, as established by MCWRA Ordinance No. 3742.
This ordinance instituted a three tier penalty system
for exceeding the agricultural upper pumping limits.
The charges are levied against violators based on the
amount of water by which an individual has exceeded the
limit. Currently, there is no penalty system for cities
and urban water districts. A limited number of
violations are being reported by violators themselves.
MCWRA has not developed an enforcement and verification
program for the annual water use reporting process.
5. This regulatory control system would be designed to have
a neutral financial impact on MCWRA. The revenue
generated from penalty charges are expected to offset
the annual cost of the enforcement and verification
program. The metering program cost is borne by the
individual well owners.
6. The county government would retain complete legal
authority over groundwater use in the basin.
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7. Upper pumping limits create an economic incentive for
water users to invest in sufficient conservation methods
and technology to meet the imposed upper pumping limit.
This increases the efficiency with which they use and
recover water.
2. Disadvantages of Regulatory Control
The following are the basic disadvantages of this
allocation method:
1. The costs of reducing water consumption vary greatly
among different consumers. Some consumers can reduce
their consumption more cheaply than others. The
regulatory system of control fails to use this fact to
maximize water reduction per dollar of expenditure on
conservation. Less water is conserved per dollar than
under the taxation and privatization allocation methods.
This increases society's conservation cost. From the
economic standpoint, a regulatory control system is the
least efficient of the three allocation methods.
2. There are minimal economic incentives for consumers to
reduce their groundwater pumping below the imposed upper
pumping limit.
3. Economic inefficiencies are created by the political
process for several reasons:
a. Voter ignorance. The populace is generally unable
to fully recognize all the costs and benefits.
Some of the costs are concealed by the complicated
legislative actions. Voter ignorance can be
explained by the concept of "rational ignorance."
[Ref. 15 :p. 94] Individuals lack incentives to
fully inform themselves on issues because they do
not recognize individual economic gains from doing
so and they believe that their one vote is unlikely
to be decisive.
b. The power of special interest groups. Special
interest groups frequently receive consideration
and benefits derived from vote- conscious
politicians. Politicians know that special
legislation generally imposes a small cost on
individuals in society. However, political favor
to special interest groups can yield a great deal
of personal political gain for that politician.
This political gain is in the form of voting blocks
and financial contributions provided by these
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groups. Politicians also realize that the general
public doesn't have the time or interest to examine
legislative actions thoroughly, especially complex
ones. Therefore, politicians will often take a
chance and pass legislation that favors a
particular interest group, hoping the public will
not find out. In the end, the net cost to society
will generally exceed the benefit to the special
interest group. [Ref . 15 :p. 96]
Shortsightedness of politicians. Economic ineffici-
encies result from political bias "in favor of
proposals yielding clearly defined current benefits
in exchange for difficult to identify future costs
and against proposals with clearly identifiable
current costs yielding less concrete and less
obvious future benefits." [Ref. 15 :p. 97]
G. TAXATION ALLOCATION SYSTEM
The taxation allocation system (consumption fee) consists
of a surcharge levied on each gallon or acre- foot of water
pumped from an individual well. A surcharge is theoretically
set equal to the marginal cost of the negative externalities
associated with overdrafting the aquifer. However, this cost
is extremely difficult to estimate. It is virtually
impossible to determine either the cost of depleting the
aquifer's reserve water stock in dead storage or the cost of
the irreversible damaged done to the aquifer's holding
capacity as the semiconsolidated sediments in it are
compacted.
Most government regulatory agencies will set their
surcharge equal to maximum sustained yield price (P*) per unit
minus water extraction cost per unit (MC) . [Ref. 13:p. 640]
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The maximum sustained yield price is the price level which
reduces the pumping activity to the maximum sustained yield.
To calculate this price, the agency needs to determine the
groundwater's price elasticity of demand (EP) . This measures
the percentage change in the quantity demanded resulting from
a percentage change in price. This data can be determined
through historical pricing and pumping data, if available, or
estimated by empirical methods.
In addition to the price elasticity of demand (EP) , the
agency needs to determine: the current amount of water being
extracted from the aquifer (Ql) , the marginal extraction cost
per unit (PI) and the maximum sustained yield for the aquifer
(Q*) . The price (P*) can be derived from the following
equation:
EP = (0*-01) /Ql . See Figure 3-1 [Ref . 13:p. 641]
(P*-P1) /PI
EP = Price Elasticity of Demand
Q* = Maximum Sustained Yield
Ql = Current Amount of Water Being Extracted from the
Aquifer
P* = Price
PI = Marginal Extraction Cost per Unit
In reality, however, setting the tax rate will probably be
an iterative process, just as it would be for setting
thresholds for a regulatory system of control . The tax rate
would be adjusted until overdrafting stops. This would be
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determined through hydrological field measurements of the
SVGB. Thus, a lower degree of precision for the computational












Figure 3-1. External Costs
When there are negative externalities marginal social costs
MSC are higher than marginal private costs MC. The difference
is the marginal external cost MEC. In part (a) , a profit
-
maximizing firm produces at q lt where price is equal to MC.
The efficient output is q*, at which price equals MSC. In
part (b)
,
the industry competitive output is Q1; at the
intersection of industry supply, MC 1 , and demand D. However,
the efficient output Q* is lower, at the intersection of
demand and marginal social cost MSC 1 .
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The revenue collected from the surcharge can be used to
offset the cost of the program for verifying the reports of
annual water use. Any remaining revenue could be used to
develop new water supplies to serve the community or to
subsidize additional conservation investments.
1. Advantages of Taxation
The following are the basic advantages of this
allocation method:
1. This allocation system promotes several economic
incentives which increases allocative efficiency.
a. Per unit surcharges increase the economic incentive
to grow or make products that require less water
per dollar of gross revenue. Surcharges increase
production costs, thus lowering profit margins for
water- intensive products.
b. Per unit surcharges promote water conserving
production methods and control technology.
Industry will invest in these programs up to the
point where the marginal cost of the investment is
equal to the cost of the surcharge.
c. Per unit surcharges provide economic incentives to
develop new water conservation, application and
recovery technologies.
2. The taxation allocation system has a positive financial
impact on MCWRA, assuming that the revenue generated
from surcharges will offset the verification and
enforcement program costs. If sufficient excess funds
are available, new water sources could be developed for
the valley and additional conservation investments can
be made
.
3. The taxation allocation system is relatively easy to
monitor and enforce. A monitoring program has been
established by MCWRA Ordinance No. 3717. Also, MCWRA
Ordinance No. 3742 sets a precedent for the MCWRA to
assess fines.
4. This allocation system is relatively easy to implement.
MCWRA has established a legal precedent through MCWRA
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Ordinance No. 3 742 to levy surcharges against well
owners in agricultural pumping in zones 2, 2A and 2B.
5. This allocation system achieves greater economic effici-
ency compared to the regulatory system of control.
Surcharges can achieve the same level of water
reduction, but at a lower cost to society. See Figure
3-2 [Ref. 13 :p. 646] All water users will increase
conservation until the cost of conserving one more unit
exceeds the cost of the tax. Thus, water users with
lower conservation costs will conserve more. Under a
regulatory system, all water users must conserve up to




Level of Water Use
Figure 3-2. Standards and Fees
The efficient level of conservation at E* can be achieved
either through water use fee or a water use standard. Facing
a fee of $3.00 per unit of water use, a firm reduces water use
up to the point at which the fee is equal to the marginal
benefit. The same level of water conservation can be achieved
with a standard that limits water use to 12 units. [Ref.
13:p. 646]
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2 . Disadvantages of Taxation
The following are the basic disadvantages of this
allocation method:
1. Economic inefficiencies can be generated through the
political process by giving special interest groups
special legislation or subsidies as discussed under
regulatory control system.
2. It is politically difficult to change the surcharge.
Changes in the surcharge would become necessary whenever
the surcharge fails to elicit the predicted water
consumption. This could result from an error in
determining the price elasticity of demand or a change
in the recharge rate for the basin due to prolonged
drought conditions. It is also politically difficult to
establish the surcharge in the first place. For
example, several special interest groups have filed
suits intended to stop MCWRA from implementing a
surcharge on agricultural water users in zones 2, 2A and
2B. [Ref. 16]
H. FREE MARKET (PRIVATIZATION) ALLOCATION SYSTEM
A free market allocation system (transferable consumption
rights) involves taking an open access resource, dividing it
into definable units and transferring or selling these units
to private or public organizations. Each private or public
organization would then have the right to use, control and
obtain benefit from their units, or transfer (sell) these
units to another party.
The method of initially allocating this resource can vary,
from granting rights based on historical groundwater consump-
tion patterns to the government selling these rights in an
auction.
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It is one of the desirable properties of an appropriately
designed transferable rights system that the ultimate
allocation of these rights among private parties will be
cost-effective regardless of their initial allocation as
long as the rights are traded in a free competitive
market. [Ref. 17 :p. 251]
According to current economic understanding, free market
allocation systems are the most efficient method for
allocating limited valuable resources. [Ref. 11 :p. 248, and
Ref. 15:p. 534, and Ref. 13:p. 650]
1. Advantages of Free Market Program
The following are the basic economic advantages
accepted by the general economic community for this type of
allocation method:
1. A system of transferable consumption rights has the
potential for achieving greater water conservation and
more efficient allocation of groundwater at a substan-
tially lower cost than would have been achieved with
taxation or with a regulatory control system. This
statement is supported by several pieces of evidence,
including studies of transferable discharge permits for
air pollution in the United States [Ref. 17 :p. 242] , the
success of Great Britain's privatization program for
inland rivers and streams in England and Scotland [Ref.
12 :p. 443, and Ref. 18 :p. 83] and the privatization of




There are at least two potential savings to society
and/or the individual which do not occur under the
regulatory allocation method:
a. Greater efficiency in water allocation can be
achieved by trading water shares within a common
industry than would be achieved by the regulation
allocation method. A typical example of this would
be the agricultural industry. Under a regulatory
control system, the government would establish
upper pumping limits for agricultural use. These
restrictions could force the industry to quit
growing water intensive crops even though these
crops could be produced profitably even if growers
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bear the true marginal cost of water. Society
would lose the economic value added by this crop.
Under the privatization program, this loss to
society would not have taken place. Farmers who
have a distinct competitive advantage growing water
intensive crops due to soil conditions, climate,
farming techniques, or other factors could continue
to do so by buying additional water from farmers
who are now growing non-water intensive crops.
b. Greater allocation efficiency can be achieved from
trading water shares across different industries
than would be achieved by the regulation allocation
method. Similar economic gain for society can be
generated by trading water between industries as
can be generated by trading water within an
industry. This economic gain for society will only
occur if the industries have different costs of
reducing water consumption and water is sold at its
true value. This transaction allows industries to
lower their production cost by purchasing water
more cheaply than the cost of conservation. This
transaction reduces the social cost of water
conservation per unit. Regulatory control systems
do not have the inherent ability to allocate water
conservation efforts and costs evenly across
differing industries.
The preceding theoretical advantages in allocation
efficiency of a free market (privatization)
allocation system were realized by the Tehachappi-
Cummings Water District when the granted private
parties flow rights. This community reduced
imported water use for agricultural by 46% and for
municipal and industrial use by 32% over a five
year period beginning in 1975. [Ref. 11 :p. 242]
A profit incentive is provided for industries to lower
their costs of conserving water and become more water
efficient in order to sell their excess water to
industries where it is more expensive to reduce water
consumption. This new revenue source also provides the
catalyst and funding for renewed water conservation
research application and recovery.
The system allows the free market to allocate current
and future groundwater use based on the most valuable
water use at that time. Industry or business can simply
purchase its water requirements from private parties and
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water districts who value their water less than the
purchasing industry or business.
5. The free market allocation system is compatible with
existing legislation. This system would not be a
radical departure from the existing ordinances. Under
the Monterey County Water Resources Agency Act (Stats.
1990, Chap. 1159), the Monterey County Water Resources
Agency (MCWRA) has the authority to grant water rights
to private parties or organizations. This authority is
supported by the Mutual Prescription Doctrine. In 1972,
California State Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
Mutual Prescription Doctrine, which allows "a basin to
be adjudicated12 and a safe level of extraction be
determined. A share of the rights are then allocated to
the groundwater users in the basin on the basis of their
extraction prior to adjudication." [Ref. ll:p. 228]
6. Ecological flexibility will result since the majority of
the published theoretical privatization plans allocate
water rights (the amount of groundwater a user is
allowed to consume) on the basis of a percentage of the
annual recharge rate of the aquifer the user's zone.
Therefore this type of allocation system automatically
reduces groundwater consumption rates during times of
drought
.
7. Under a free market allocation system, water consump-
tion can be easily monitored and rights enforced due to
recent advances in well monitoring technology and
communications. This statement is verified by the
Tehachappi - Cummings County Water district's
demonstrated ability to define and enforce groundwater
recharge rights. [Ref. 18:p. 107] A monitoring program
has already been established through MCWRA Ordinance No.
3717 which require all wells that have a 3" inside
diameter or larger discharge pipe to be monitored
through the use of flowmeters.
8. A free market system requires less political involvement
than the other two allocation methods. This is due to
the fact that the government does not determine the
amount of water a certain industry or individual will be
allocated. This reduces the possibility of economic
12Judicial decision will determine the legal and safe
level to which groundwater can be extracted. All well owners
will be required to adhere to the level of pumping that will
result in this level of groundwater.
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inefficiencies caused by special interest groups.
Favoritism could influence the initial allocation of
water rights, but it would not affect the final
distribution.
2. Disadvantages of Privatization
The following are the basic disadvantages of this
allocation method:
1. The government's lack of knowledge and experience in
using this allocation method is the greatest disadvan-
tage. A search of literature on this subject only
indicated that one water district is currently using
this allocation method (Tehachappi Cummings)
.
However, a number of air pollution control agencies have
used this method to a limited extent. In these cases,
the government has established markets to allow private
parties to trade air pollution emissions credits. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
established the Emissions Trading (ET) program. The
most extensive such privatization program to date is the
RECLA.IM program managed by the South Coast Air Quality
Management, in Los Angeles, CA. This program fully
implements the idea of freely tradeable sulfur oxide
(SOX) and nitrogen oxide (NOX) rights between private
parties and organizations. This program took effect in
1994.
2. This allocation system may have a negative financial
impact on the MCWRA. This system does not inherently
generate revenue to cover the cost of developing and
operating the program. This impact would be reduced if
the revenue generated from penalty charges for violating
established water rights offsets the cost of the
verification program for water use reporting. This
revenue stream could also be supplemented by
implementing a surcharge or value added tax on the
exchange of water shares or credits. The metering
program cost can be borne by the individual well owners.
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IV. PROPOSED THEORETICAL FREE MARKET (PRIVATIZATION)
GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE SALINAS
VALLEY GROUNDWATER BASIN
The current water allocation problem in the Salinas Valley
provides a rare challenge to local politicians: to devise an
allocation method that will prevent overdrafting in the
Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin and yet allow continued
economic growth. Traditionally, water allocation in the
United States has been controlled by regulatory systems.
However, a Rand Corporation water efficiency study has stated
that "the information difficulties in such an activity (the
regulatory system of control) appear to us to be overwhelming,
and we reject central planning as a feasible method of
achieving efficient use of water" [Ref. 19:p. V] . The Rand
Corporation defines water use as efficient when the marginal
costs of supplying water, both private and public, (public
costs are those costs not borne directly by the water users)
,
just equal the marginal benefits to water users.
Recently there has been a great deal of success in the
environmental field with air pollution emissions trading.
This has demonstrated that innovative approaches can achieve
greater cost savings and efficiency than the traditional
regulatory control system (i.e., maximum emission standard
approach) . This greater efficiency occurs in a market system
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because those who value the resource most highly may purchase
it from those who value it the least, and both parties are
made better off. This exchange will not occur under a
regulatory control system. Thus, a free- trading market leads
to the same efficiency as a regulatory control system with
perfect knowledge. This perfect knowledge is only attainable
in the world of theory.
A. A FREE MARKET ALLOCATION PROPOSAL
This section proposes a free market water allocation
program for the SVGB. The proposed program has the potential
to eliminate the overdraf ting, while still allowing for
economic growth. The primary mechanism to achieve such goals
is to modify the way in which water rights within the Salinas
Valley are held.
Currently, water rights in the Salinas Valley Groundwater
Basin (SVGB) are not transferable, and restrictions have been
established on the maximum amount of ground -water that may be
pumped (Ref . MCWRA Ordinance No. 3 744 & 3 720) . However, under
this proposed free market allocation program the ultimate
users (i.e., farmers) are allowed to choose between using
their allocated water, or conserving it, saving the cost of
pumping, and selling their excess water to other consumers.
Users in the area who need additional water may either reduce
their operations, increase the efficiency of their
conservation programs or pay for additional water rights.
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They should be willing to buy additional water as long as
both the lost profit from reducing operational capacity and
additional conservation costs are greater than the market
price of water.
The ability to sell groundwater rights will increase the
incentive for efficient groundwater use within the Salinas
Valley. It provides a profit incentive for the well owner to
conserve water and to sell the unused portion of their water
rights for a profit.
This proposed allocation program must provide clear,
definable and enforceable water consumption rights which are
easily transferable between well owners. This program must
also allocate initial water consumption rights in a fair and
equitable manner in order to prevent a long and expensive
adjudication processes.
The basic framework of the proposed allocation program has
been broken down into the following elements:
1. Participants and program coverage.
2. The trading units, water credits and water shares.
3. The policy for allocating initial water shares.
4. The policy for allocating initial water credits.
5. The recharge water volume per water share and thres-
holds on pumping activity.
6. The guidelines and restrictions for the trading pro-
gram.
7. The location of the trading zones and other restric-
tions on trading.
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8. The monitoring and enforcement program.
9. The procedures for new commercial water users to obtain
water credits or shares to secure groundwater resources
and policy on closing of existing wells.
10. The proposed allocation program's organizational struc-
ture .
This allocation program is patterned after the Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market (Reclaim) program of the South
Coast Air Basin located in Los Angeles, CA. Each element in
the proposed plan will be described and supporting arguments
given for the various choices. However, to ensure a smooth
transition from the current allocation program to the proposed
allocation plan, the spectrum of choices is limited in order
to take full advantage of the existing MCWRA ordinances on
groundwater allocation.
B. PARTICIPANTS AND PROGRAM COVERAGE
The proposed allocation program will only affect well
owners who pump from the Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin.
The target participants of this allocation program are
governmental, agricultural, commercial and industrial well
owners in the Salinas Valley. These well owners consume more
than 9 0% of the total groundwater pumped out of the Salinas
Valley Groundwater Basin [Ref. 4]. The easiest way to
identify these participants and separate them from residential
well owners is by the size of the discharge pipe on their
individual wells. Typically, the inside diameter of the
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discharge pipes of private residential wells does not exceed
three inches [Ref . 4] . The target participants cannot be
identified by historical water consumption because the
majority of the well owners have not kept accurate records of
their water use. Thus, it would be impossible to calculate
accurate historical figures for these water users. [Ref. 4]
The proposed allocation program will require all well
owners with a discharge pipe having an inside diameter of at
least three inches to participate in the program. To prevent
well owners from subverting this policy, a supporting require-
ment will state any property owner having multiple wells on a
single continuous piece of property must participate in the
program if the combined inside diameter of their discharge
pipes has a cross -sectional area greater than 28.274 inches.
(This is equal to the cross -sectional area of a pipe with an
inside diameter of three inches.) The cross -sectional
requirement will prevent current and future owners with
multiple wells on single properties from avoiding this program
by retrofitting or drilling new wells with the discharge pipes
having an inside diameter less than three inches. The MCWRA'
s
allocation program uses the same threshold for identifying
participants in their surcharge and agricultural upper pumping
limit ordinances. Using the same threshold reduces the
implementation cost and ensures a smoother transition for the
new allocation program.
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C. THE TRADING UNITS, WATER CREDITS AND WATER SHARES
The most critical element of the water allocation program
is the trading unit. Before trading units can be defined, one
must understand the two fundamental water assets: the water
held in storage in the basin and the recharge water that flows
into the basin. This proposed allocation program must
establish procedures whereby these fundamental assets can be
divided into definable units which then can easily be
transferred or sold to public or private parties. This is a
fundamental requirement in establishing a free market
allocation system. The trading unit denoting ownership of
water held in storage in the basin is a water credit; the
trading unit denoting ownership of the recharge water is a
water share.
The water held in storage in the basin is divided into two
zones: live storage and dead storage (See Figure 4-1) [Ref
.
14 :p. 230] . In a natural state (without any pumping) , aquifer
storage capacity (water stock) is equal to the amount of water
in live and dead storage. Live storage reserves are defined
as the body of water that would flow out of the aquifer if it
were not naturally replenished. Dead storage reserve is the
body water that would remain in the aquifer after all live
storage reserves were exhausted through natural outflow or
drainage to the ocean. In terms of this allocation plan, the
live storage reserve is a checking account and dead storage is
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Figure 4-1. Live and Dead Storage in the SVGB
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The proposed allocation program will give the MCWRA sole
ownership of the dead storage reserve. The program allows the
MCWRA to transfer or sell all or a portion of the basin's dead
storage reserve to private parties at a later time.
1. Water Credits
In this proposed program, a water credit denotes
ownership of the water held in the aquifer. Each water credit
represents legal ownership of one acre- foot of water in the
aquifer for an indefinite period of time. 13 Under the
proposed program, these water credits can be freely traded or
banked by the owner for indefinite period of time. The single
limitation is that a water credit can only be redeemed for
water within the zone in which it originated.
Water credits will initially be allocated to the MCWRA
based on the best available hydrological data about the
current amount of water stored in the Salinas Valley
Groundwater Basin. Private parties can obtain these water
credits by purchasing them from MCWRA or receive water credits
from MCWRA for conserving water over a period of time. 14
Water credits provide economic incentive for well
owners to conserve groundwater and improve the proposed
program's water allocation and conservation efficiency through
13One water credit = 1 ac-ft = 325,850 gallons of water
14Water conserved is defined as the amount of groundwater
authorized for consumption minus the amount actually consumed
at the end of the annual reporting period.
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free- trade. They also provide a vehicle for well owners to
slowly acquire ownership of the water in the groundwater
basin. Most of the live storage reserve in the Salinas Valley
Groundwater basin has been exhausted. The private parties and
MCWRA will become co-owners of the basin's live storage
reserve as it is replenished through net recharge flow into
the groundwater basin and water conservation.
2 . Water Shares
A water share is a trading unit used to describe water
that can be safely extracted from the aquifer based on the net
annual recharge. Each water share represents an indefinite
legal right to a thousandth of a percent of the safe extrac-
tion volume based on the prior year's net recharge for that
zone. Under this definition, 100,000 water shares per zone
are available for distribution; there are 400,000 shares for
the entire SVGB. With approximately 4,000 qualifying wells,
an average 100 shares can be distributed to each well owner in
the valley.
These water shares can be freely traded, but only
within the zone where the water share originated. Any water
share not fully exercised by the end of the reporting period
would be retained by its owner as a water credit.
For example, suppose a well owner owns 100 water
shares within a zone that has a 10,000 acre- feet (ac-ft)
annual recharge rate. The well owner can pump 10 ac-ft of
groundwater that year. If only 9 ac-ft of groundwater is
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pumped that year, the well owner automatically receives one
water credit at the end of the year.
D. THE POLICY FOR ALLOCATING INITIAL WATER SHARES
Under this program, MCWRA would have two alternatives for
allocating the initial water shares: it could sell its
shares, for either a fixed price or by auctioning them off to
the highest bidders; or it could allocate shares to existing
well owners based on prior groundwater consumption, acreage
owned or a combination of both. One benefit of the free- trade
allocation system is "that the ultimate allocation of these
permits (shares) among the emitters (parties) will be cost-
effective regardless of their initial allocation as long as
the permit (shares) market is competitive, which was formally
proven by Montgomery in 1972" [Ref. 17:p. 251].
The process of auctioning or selling water shares is
relatively straight forward. The auction process could be
patterned after the National Economic Research Associates,
Inc.'s report on "Market -based Approaches To Reduce The Cost
of Clean Air in California's South Coast Basin." This auction
process requires interested parties to submit sealed bids to
MCWRA. Each bid would include the number of water shares in
each zone the bidder wishes to purchase and the bid price for
each. Once all of the bids are submitted, the market -clearing
price would be determined; i.e., the highest price at which
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the number of shares demanded equals the quantity being
offered. If a bidder's bid price is higher than or equal to
the clearing price, the bidder would receive the number of
shares at the price bid. Shares purchased at this auction
could be traded, held, or banked by conversion to water
credits at the end of each annual reporting period.
The process of selling water shares at a fixed price is
similar to the process of selling water shares at an auction.
In this scenario, MCWRA would have to estimate the market
-
clearing price prior to the sale. The time and day of the
sale would be announced publicly. The shares would be sold on
a "first come, first served" basis. This is similar to
current concert or athletic event tickets sales.
The magnitude of the revenues collected from an auction or
fixed price sale of water shares could be substantial. For
example, the current mean recharge rate for the Salinas Valley
Groundwater Basin (1970-92 years) is 498,000 acre-feet per
year [Ref . 2:pp. 5-14]. Based on historical research by the
Rand Corporation on California water documents and statistics,
the market price of water in a free market allocation program
is predicted to be roughly equal to the extraction cost plus
$15 to $30 per ac-ft of water. The exact amount is impossible
to predict with present data [Ref. 19 :p. 61] . Since current
well owners do not pay for the privilege of pumping
groundwater from the basin, the predicted water share price
would be between $15 to $30 based on Rand Corporation
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estimates. Therefore, MCWRA could conceivably generate
revenue between $7,470,000 and $14,940,000 from selling these
water shares.
The revenue collected from this sale or auction could
presumably be used to fund water projects that would increase
the recharge efficiency of the basin, and/or develop or import
new water resources into the valley. An alternative use of
the funds would be to reduce other taxes imposed by local area
governments
.
This sale or auction could cause at least one negative
side effect. It would theoretically separate the value of the
land from the value of the water underneath it. Thus, land
values could decrease, lowering the community's property tax
revenue
.
An alternative approach to fixed price sales and auctions
is to distribute initial water shares freely to current well
owners based on acreage, historical consumption or a
combination of both. If water shares are allocated by
acreage, it would benefit the agricultural community more than
private industry. (Private industry consumes significantly
more water per acre of land than the farming community.) If
water shares are allocated by historical consumption, members
of the farming community would receive different allocations
according to their prior choices of crops and/or method of
water application. Furthermore, water users who have
previously invested in conservation methods would be
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penalized. Thus, either allocation scheme would be considered
unfair by certain parties.
The way to minimize these problems is to combine both
allocation schemes. Water shares could be allocated based on
historical consumption for industry, governmental and
institutional well owners. For the farming community, water
shares could be based on acreage; specifically, farmable
acreage times the water consumed per acre by the highest water
consumption crop grown in that zone. This allocation scheme
reduces the inequity created by differences in water
consumption versus acreage owned as well as inequalities
created in the farming community by individual crop choice,
irrigation method, and past conservation practices.
This combination approach to allocating initial water
shares is likely to receive more support from the community
than the two methods mentioned earlier. The majority of well
owners typically feel they still retain riparian rights to
groundwater underneath their land. Well owners would probably
feel indignant about purchasing something they believe that
they already own.
Allocating water shares by a combined approach would be
relatively straight forward. MCWRA would first determine the
historical safe groundwater extraction volume for each of the
four hydrological trading zones, using for example a mean five
year average for the period 1982-1987. (This period was
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selected because it was the last normal five year recharge
period before the 1988-1992 drought.)
The second step requires all industrial, governmental and
institutional well owners to document their water consumption
for 1982 through 1987. This would be used to calculate their
mean annual water consumption rate. If this data is not
available, or is currently inaccurate, they may use the 1988 -
1993 period to derive their mean annual water consumption
rate. If there is no water consumption data, MCWRA would then
determine mean annual water consumption based on the best
available engineering estimates. Well owners in the farming
community would be required to submit figures giving their
total acreage and their farmable acreage.
The third step is to subtract the zone's total industrial,
governmental and institutional annual water consumption rate
(IAWC) from the zone's mean historical annual safe extraction
volume (ASEV) . The difference (IAWC-ASEV) is divided by the
farming acreage ( ( (IAWC-ASEV)/ Acres) = Z) . This determines the
annual groundwater per acre (Z) for the farming community.
A second set of calculations are then worked back through
again to determine if the individual farmer is receiving a
fair and equitable amount of water. This is accomplished by
multiplying the acres owned by an individual farmer (Acres) by
the groundwater per acre for farmers (Z) . This is compared to
the amount calculated by multiplying historical farmable
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acreage 15 (FA) by the consumption rate of the crop with the
highest annual water consumption per acre (AWCC in Acre -feet)
in that zone (which in most zones will be lettuce or celery)
.
Annual water consumption rate figures per acre per crop will
be based on standards established by Monterey County Agricul-
tural Extension Service. The farmer's annual consumption rate
is the greater of these two calculations. This process is
repeated for each agricultural farmer with wells.
The revised farming community's annual water consumption
rate is then added to the industrial, governmental, institu-
tional community total. This is the total annual mean
consumption rate for that zone. It will be greater than the
mean annual safe extraction volume for the zone 16 . To
correct for this, the annual safe extraction volume is divided
by the total annual consumption. This yields a correction
factor. To calculate the maximum authorized annual
consumption for an individual well owner, the well owner's
annual consumption rate (as calculated above) is multiplied by
the correction factor.
Once all well owners' authorized annual consumption rates
have been calculated, the number of shares per well owner is
15The historical farmable acreage will be determined by
examining historical crop revenue and production records.
16This is due to the allocation process for the farming
community. This process allows the farming community to have
a higher authorized annual consumption rate than its
historical annual consumption rate would indicate.
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determined. Recall that a water share is a thousandth of a
percent of the safe extraction volume. The number of shares
to be issued to each owner are calculated by dividing each
well owner's authorized annual consumption rate for that zone
by the annual historical recharge rate for that zone and then
multiplying by 100,000 (the number of shares that will be
allocated in the zone) . The result is the number of water
shares that the individual well owner receives as an initial
allocation. This allocation scheme tries to minimize
inequalities, but some may remain. Of course, the initial
allocation will not affect the final distribution of shares.
It only determines the initial owners of water shares.
This allocation process does not create wealth for
individual well owners (current owners already receive this
wealth in the form of groundwater) . It simply defines the
value of this wealth more clearly. Providing the well owners
"with clear title to the groundwater will not add to their
wealth but will merely allow them to transform their wealth
from water into money, if they so wish, by reducing their
water use" [Ref . 19 :p. 38] . New wealth will only be created
as former inefficiencies in the use of water are eliminated.
This new wealth will be shared widely among the existing water
users in the individual zones
.
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E. THE POLICY FOR ALLOCATING INITIAL WATER CREDITS
MCWRA has three choices for allocating rights to the
initial stock of groundwater held in the aquifer. The agency
can retain ownership over the existing groundwater, allocate
it to well owners, or a combination of both. These ground-
water rights are held as water credits. Each credit repre-
sents one acre- foot of groundwater. The initial number of
water credits will be based on an independent engineering
estimate of the total volume of groundwater held in the
Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin.
Currently, the valley's well owners have extracted most of
the groundwater in the aquifer's live storage reserves and
have begun extracting groundwater from the dead storage
reserves. Evidence supporting this includes seawater
intrusion and the increasing concentrations of dissolved
minerals (hardness) . Seawater intrusion occurs when the
basin's groundwater reserve drops below the natural water
level of the dead storage reserves. Hardness of the
groundwater generally increases as water is extracted from the
dead storage reserve. Hardness is directly related to the
length of time the water interacts with soluble minerals. In
other words, the length of time the water is held in the
basin. The water held in the dead storage reserve is the
oldest water in the basin. Thus, it usually has a higher
concentration of dissolved mineral content than the water held
in the live storage reserve.
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Allocating the water stock in dead storage to the MCWRA
does not affect the system's allocation efficiencies. This
assumes that the dead storage reserves would only be consumed
in times of drought or to stabilize the market price of water
shares or credits, in a manner similar to the way that the
Federal Reserve Board controls the U.S. currency system. It
is critical that MCWRA does not abuse this ability because of
the serious side effects caused by extracting too much
groundwater from this region, i.e., seawater intrusion,
permanent damage to basin's holding capacity, devaluation of
water shares and credits.
If and when a serious drought occurs, it is also assumed
that the MCWRA will use the dead storage reserve water credits
to increase the water authorized for extraction. This would
reduce the economic hardship placed on well owners by a
drought
.
Considering the externalities associated with consuming
the aquifer's dead storage reserve, the groundwater rights to
the dead storage reserve should be retained by the MCWRA. In
addition, the MCWRA should be able to sell or transfer these
groundwater rights at any time. This allows MCWRA additional
flexibility to influence the open market price of groundwater.
They can buy and sell water credits, just as the Federal




F. THE RECHARGE WATER VOLUME PER WATER SHARE AND THRESHOLDS
ON PUMPING ACTIVITY
Under this system, the volume of groundwater represented
by one share is based on the prior year's recharge volume in
the Salinas Valley Groundwater basin. MCWRA already
calculates this volume each year, as required by the Monterey
County Water Resources Agency Act. (Stats. 1990, Chap. 1159)
Recharge volume determines the amount of groundwater that can
be extracted without harming present and future basin use.
The proposed allocation plan simply requires the MCWRA to
determine the prior year's annual safe extraction volume
individually for the four hydrological trading zones in the
Salinas Valley.
Once the prior year safe extraction volume has been
determined, it is simple to establish the groundwater volume
per water share. As described in Section C of this chapter,
one water share represents one one- thousandth of a percent of
the safe extraction volume based prior year's recharge for the
particular zone in question. To calculate the volume per
share for a particular zone, simply divide the established
recharge volume for that zone by 100,000.
The proposed allocation plan uses the prior year's
recharge volume. This is primarily based on historical
rainfall data and stream measurements. The current year's
recharge volume would be based on projected estimates of
rainfall and stream flows. Using prior year volumes will
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reduce the amount of subjectivity and judgement required to
calculate the recharge volume. MCWRA can determine the safe
extraction volume for the prior year with a high degree of
accuracy using engineering estimates from the agency's network
of monitoring stations for rainfall, reservoirs, rivers and
streams
.
To avoid negative externalities when an individual well
owner exceeds the well's natural extraction capacity, limits
need to be set on the flow rate for groundwater pumping. The
limit should be based on the hydrological and geological
conditions at the well and the proximity to neighboring wells.
The negative externalities that may occur in these circum-
stances are:
1. Development of a localized cone of depression that would
cause soil subsidence to take place somewhere within the
localized area. This devalues that property and
permanently reduces the aquifer holding capacity.
2. Localized lowering of the water table increases the
pumping costs for adjoining wells.
The task of establishing extraction limits for individual
wells will mostly likely be assigned to the MCWRA. The agency
will need to define extraction flow limits based on the number
of gallons per hour, per day, per hydrological season and per
year.
One issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not to
restore the groundwater stock to its natural volume. This
thesis won't discuss this issue but provides the necessary
means. One possibility would be to allocate 95% of the annual
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safe extraction volume to well owners, retaining the rest to
build up the reserve groundwater stock. The basin has been
overdrafted by 7.4% from 1970 to 1992, based on the current
groundwater model developed by Montgomery Watson. Eliminating
this overdraft and allocating 5% of the annual safe extraction
volume to replenish the groundwater stock is probably the
maximum that is economically feasible.
G. THE GUIDELINES AND RESTRICTIONS FOR THE TRADING PROGRAM
This allocation program incorporates trading to encourage
participants to reduce groundwater consumption in a way that
minimizes society's total conservation costs. Owners and
operators of groundwater wells will be able to purchase water
shares and credits to increase their groundwater allocation.
Well owners who reduce their groundwater consumption by any
means can sell their unneeded shares. Private parties who do
not own or operate groundwater wells will also be allowed to
purchase and sell water shares and/or credits, which will
promote market efficiency.
For this allocation system to maximize efficiency and
operate smoothly, the trading rules need to be simple,
accessible and enforceable, while still maintaining the
system's integrity. The National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. identified three market requirements through
a feasibility study of a free market approach to reducing air
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pollution emissions in the Los Angles area [Ref . 20 :p. 3-17]
.
These market requirements include:
The market is to be efficient. This means that the cost
of accessing the market, completing a transaction, and
responding to new market or price information is
minimized.
The market is to be capable of disseminating accurate and
timely price and volume information for past and current
transactions, and expectations for the future.
The market is to be liquid. A buyer and seller must have
the ability to complete a trade quickly at a price similar
to previous transactions.
Using these three requirements, a variety of market structures
can be used to establish a trading system. There are two
major types of markets: the direct search market, which
allows buyers and sellers to seek out their own trading
partners; and the broker market that uses an intermediary to
identify and assist interested buyers and sellers in
completing their transaction. For direct a search market to
be efficient, participants must have direct access to market
and price information, as well as a list of interested parties
willing to exchange their resources. An example of such a
market is the used- car market.
Since water rights markets are relatively new, a broker
system appears to be the most appropriate market structure.
The broker system should help eliminate participants'
confusion and stimulate market participation. A broker market
system would be similar to the stock market. An individual
would go to the MCWRA (the broker) to purchase or sell water
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shares or credits. The MCWRA broker would charge a small fee
for each market transaction processed. This revenue would
offset the administrative costs of acting as the broker.
To establish this market, all well owners who are required
to participate in the program would register in a trading zone
according to their well location. Any person or organization
who owns or may own water shares or credits would also be
registered. The proposed program would delineate those
actions that would change the participant list. These actions
would include: adding or subtracting water shares or credits
to the official record of ownership due to financial trans-
actions, registering new participants, removing participants,
and changing well owners or participants named in the record.
Each existing well owner would be allocated their water
shares based on the initial water allocation plan. Share
ownership would be recorded at MCWRA. A copy of the official
allocation, as well as the groundwater extraction limitations,
would be sent to each individual well owner. Each participant
would receive a copy of their official water consumption and
transaction report each quarter. The report would be similar
to a bank account statement. It would be divided into three
sections: credits, debits, and net position. The credit
section would be divided into five subsections: the number of
water shares owned at the beginning of the period; the number
of water shares purchased; the number of water credits
purchased; the number of water credits earned; and the total
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of all credits, expressed in acre- feet of groundwater. The
debit section would have three subsections: the groundwater
extracted (prior and current)
,
the number of water shares
sold, and the number of water credits sold. The last section
details each participant's net position. This is the amount
of groundwater available to be extracted or sold. (See Figure
4-2)
Once well owners have received their official water
allocation, they may sell their water shares at any time.
Water credits may be sold after the program has existed for
one reporting period and the participants have received their
official report. The trading process is fairly straight-
forward. An individual who wishes to sell or buy water
credits or shares places an order with the MCWRA Trading Desk.
Sellers indicate the number of shares or credits they wish to
sell and the price per share or per credit. The seller can
either sell at the current market price, or set a price higher
than market and hope there is excess demand at the current
price.
The same process describes buyers. Buyers can place an
order for water shares or credits at the current market price
or at a lower price hoping that there is excess supply at this
price. Each order would stand for a set period (e.g., thirty
days) or until the order is executed, which ever comes first.
Upon expiration, individuals can either renew or remove their
orders. If MCWRA does not receive directions to the contrary,
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Figure 4-2. Example of the Quarterly Report
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the order would automatically be removed. After completing a
trade, both the buyer and the seller would receive official
notification. The funds would automatically be transferred to
the seller's individual bank account. The buyer has ten
working days to settle his account. Any debt outstanding past
this allotted time would result in the automatic reversal of
the sale.
The MCWRA would also be able to purchase and sell water
credits or shares under this program. This allows the agency
to influence the market price. They may also reduce
groundwater extraction in the groundwater basin by purchasing
water credits and shares and retiring them from the market
indefinitely.
This type of trading program is working extremely well for
the South Coast Air Quality Management District in Los
Angeles. However, this trading program is managed by commer-
cial security brokers and not by the district.
H. THE TRADING ZONES AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON TRADING
Trading zones are established to match the basin's ability
to reach a new localized equilibrium after shifting ground-
water extraction from one location to another. The amount of
time it takes the aquifer to reach a new localized equilibrium
is a critical element in defining trading zones. It deter-
mines the physical distance over which water transfers can
take place without negatively affecting the aquifer.
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Hydrological and geological structures in the basin have
created zones that are conducive to this allocation plan.
Trading between these zones should not be permitted because
the soil lacks sufficient hydraulic conductivity to balance
the groundwater across zones in a reasonable amount of time
(greater than year) . Based on discussions with MCWRA, it
appears that the four prior established hydrological regions
would seem to make reasonable trading zones. (See Figure 2-2
in Chapter II) However, this area of the allocation plan
requires further research.
Water shares and credits can only be posted to an
individual's groundwater extraction account if that account is
registered in the zone from which the share or credit
originates. This requirement, however, does not preclude
individuals from purchasing and/or selling water credits or
shares from other zones for investment purposes.
An additional restriction may be placed on the trading
program to prevent a massive water sellout by the agricultural
community. A massive sellout could cause structural changes
in local economies. This appears to be very unlikely due to
the economics of farming. Conversations with people in the
agricultural community suggests that most farmers would
probably modify their crop pattern and/or intensity of
irrigation to maximize profits from both selling their water
rights and farming. However, to reduce probability of these
structural changes water sellers could be restricted to
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transferring some maximum percentage of their water shares in
the first year. This percentage could rise in succeeding
years until ultimately reaching unlimited transfers. This
would give time to absorb the effects of the transfers and
alleviate any undesired externalities.
I. THE MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
Monitoring and enforcing this kind of allocation system
requires the technical ability to detect pumping violations
and the legal ability to punish detected violations. Monitor-
ing extraction rates is a key aspect of this and any other
allocation system. Without it, well owners would most likely
cheat the system for economic gain. The allocation system
efficiencies and incentives to conserve groundwater would be
lost. Thus, it is critical to detect violators and suffi-
ciently penalized them to minimize the incentive to cheat.




Remote sensors (RTU) tied to the flowmeter17 on
individual wells would make it possible for a single agency to
monitor historical and real-time pumping activity of hundreds
of wells throughout the valley. The monitoring system could
use a small high-speed business computer with large memory
capacity and a high speed modem. This computer could be data
linked to all the wells in the Salinas Valley via the
telephone/LAN line or a cellular network. The computer could
obtain data from each remote sensor on a daily basis. The
software would calculate and record the amount of groundwater
extracted from each well, and identify violators who exceed
their pumping limitations.
The computer could also be used to record water shares and
credits and track trades. Using this data, it could compile
and print the official water extraction quarterly and annual
reports. With this monitoring system, the operator could also
monitor any well's real-time pumping activity without
notifying the well owner. This would help deter cheating.
This monitoring system would establish a definable and
17Each individual well would have a frequency generator,
analog/digital converter, microprocessor with data storage
capability, and a built-in high-speed modem capable of reading
and recording the flow rates from the installed flow meter on
the individual well. This RTU could be powered from either
the phone power source, or by solar power for remote wells
that require data transmission through a cellular network.
Remote sensors would have the capacity to store 48 hours of
data. The system operator could shut the system down for up
to 48 hours for maintenance or repairs without losing any
data.
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enforceable system for protecting individual water shares and
credits. It could be used in conjunction with any allocation
plan.
J. PROCEDURES FOR NEW COMMERCIAL WATER USERS TO OBTAIN WATER
CREDITS OR SHARES TO SECURE GROUNDWATER RESOURCES AND
POLICY ON CLOSING EXISTING WELLS
This proposed allocation system would not allocate
additional shares to new commercial wells. The overall
groundwater extraction limit is restricted based on the annual
safe extraction volume and the amount of water credits turned
in for consumption. This ensures that the Salinas Valley
Groundwater Basin is never overdrafted except during times of
severe drought. As in numerous existing pollution trading
programs (i.e., the Federal Government Acid Rain program and
Reclaim NOX-SOX program) , a new commercial well owner would
have to obtain water shares and/or credits from existing
owners before extracting groundwater from the Salinas Valley
Groundwater Basin. The requirement to purchase water shares
and/or credits for a new well would be the same whether the
well is owned by a firm or organization participating in the
initial allocation, or by a firm which has not previously
participated in the trading program. Thus, this system does
not impose unfair barriers to entry by new participants.
This proposed allocation system would also allow the MCWRA
to transfer or sell its water credits to new firms relocating
in the Salinas Valley. It gives local government the flexi-
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bility to give financial incentives to encourage new firms to
relocate in the valley by offsetting their relocation and
initial operating costs.
K. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION PROGRAM'S ORGANIZA-
TIONAL STRUCTURE
The proposed organizational structure assumes that there
will be fewer than 4,000 participants in the program. The
number of participants affects the size of the accounting and
trading program departments. The layout for the organiza-
tional structure is patterned after MCWRA' s existing organiza-
tional structure.
The proposed organization would presumably be a division
of the MCWRA organization. This division would be managed by
a "Water Conservation Manager" in accordance with the Monterey
County position classification guidelines. This Water Conser-
vation Manager would be responsible for operating this water
allocation division. The manager would also act as facili-
tator and local expert on the water allocation system at all
governmental meetings concerning water conservation or
allocation. An administrative secretary/receptionist would be
assigned to support the manager and the division's administra-
tive requirements. (See Figure 4-3)
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Figure 4-3. Free Market Program's
Organizational Structure
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This organization would be divided into two branches, the
Enforcement & Monitoring branch and the Trading & Accounting
branch. The Enforcement & Monitoring branch would operate and
maintain the computerized monitoring system, including the
remote sensors. It would inspect all commercial wells
(defined by this allocation program) to assure compliance with
the allocation program. This branch would include a "Computer
Operation Technician 1" and "Water Conservation Technician."
These two individuals would report directly to the Division
manager.
The Trading and Accounting branch would execute and record
all traded water shares and credits and produce the quarterly
and annual allocation reports. This branch would be super-
vised by a "Senior Accountant Auditor, " who would operate the
trading program. This individual would be assisted by
"Accounting Clerks." The clerks would act like account
brokers, assisting program participants in trading their water
shares and credits. They would also record these transac-
tions. Based on conversations with Paine Webber Inc. and USAA
Brokerage Services, three Accounting Clerks would be required
to handle 4,000 customer accounts. This assumes that pro-
gram's participants will require less time than a client
requires with a full service stock broker, but more time than
with a discount broker.
This proposed administrative structure will be used in the
following chapter to determine whether the MCWRA regulatory
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control program or the proposed free- trading allocation
program has lower implementation costs. This information will
be used in determining which program has higher overall
economic efficiency.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE MCWRA WATER GROUNDWATER
ALLOCATION PROGRAM AND A PROPOSED FREE
MARKET GROUNDWATER ALLOCATION PROGRAM
This chapter examines whether the proposed free market
allocation plan provides greater economic efficiency than the
MCWRA allocation scheme for a selected group of property
owners in the SVGB. This analysis examines the cost of
establishing each program and the estimated economic impact
each will have on three sectors of the Salinas Valley: the
industrial sector (focusing on agricultural production
companies) , the urban water sector and the agricultural
farming community. Each sector is analyzed by taking a
selected company or farm and estimating the cost of complying
with each program, and the effects over time of these
allocation programs on the three sectors.
The industrial sector has a high water consumption rate
and is one of the major employers in the Salinas valley. The
J. M. Smucker Company was randomly selected from the major
agricultural production companies operating in the Salinas
Valley.
The representatives from urban water districts were chosen
from three subgroups: large urban water districts, small
urban water districts and privately operated water districts.
The following organizations were selected: the City of
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Salinas (large urban water district) ; the Marina Coast Water
District (small urban water district) ; and the California
Water Service Company (privately operated water district)
.
Farms were selected based upon the owner's ability to
provide accurate historical data on crop acreage, crop yield,
production cost and net profit after packing and growing
costs. Since this data is extremely proprietary, individual
farmers are not identified. Data from all farms in the group
were averaged. Sixteen farms participated in the analysis.
They are located in or near: Greenfield, Soledad, Gonzales,
Salinas, Castroville, and Chualar. At the time of this
research, no farm in the group had accurate records of water
consumption per acre, by crop type. Nor did any of the farms
have records of the efficiency of their irrigation equipment.
Therefore, this analysis used published average water
consumption per acre of irrigated crop land, as developed by
the Montgomery Watson Groundwater model [Ref. 2: pp. 2-3 & 4-
15] .
The analysis for determining the compliance cost for the
free market allocation plan assumes that subsample representa-
tives can purchase or sell as much water as they desire at the
prevailing market price. This assumption will be reexamined
at the end of the chapter.
The theoretical forms of the equations used in this
chapter can be found in Appendix A. This appendix also
describes the assumptions made in these equations. The
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fifteen equations described in Appendix A are referenced in
this chapter by (EQ. #) immediately preceding the applicable
statement. For example, (EQ. 4) $1,562 indicates that
equation 4 in Appendix A was the basis for the calculation
that led to the value $1,562.
The specific numerical calculations that were made using
these equations are contained in Appendix B. These calcula-
tions are numbered from 1 to 162 and are referenced by
subscripts. For example, $1,562 6 indicates that the numerical
value $1,562 was obtained using calculation number 6 in
Appendix B
.
A. INITIAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATING COSTS
Several assumptions are required to analyze the cost of
establishing each allocation plan. First, no organization
currently exists to implement and monitor either allocation
scheme. Organizations for both plans will be treated as new,
independent divisions of the MCWRA organization. This
requires the agency to hire new personnel, purchase support
equipment and furniture, and lease additional office space to
house the new division.
MCWRA currently appears to have insufficient staff to
properly manage any type of water allocation program.
Therefore, an idealized administrative structure will be
proposed for both allocation plans, understanding that
economic reality will probably reduce the size of the selected
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organization by making use of existing administrative
resources within MCWRA. The administrative organization for
the proposed privatization allocation plan was described in
Chapter IV. The administrative organization for the MCWRA
allocation program will be described in the following section
of this chapter.
The final fundamental assumption concerns the number of
participants in the allocation program. Under the Monterey
County Water Resource Agency Ordinance No. 3660, all well
owners with discharge pipes of 3" inside diameter or greater
are required to register their wells with MCWRA by July 1,
1993. Currently 2,100 such wells have been registered [Ref.
4] . Well industry analysis estimates that there are approxi-
mately 3,500 to 4,000 qualifying wells operating within the
Salinas Valley [Ref. 21] . Both allocation plans have the same
participation requirements, so a population of 4,000 partici-
pants is used for this analysis. Note that of all the wells
in the SVGB, those having an inside diameter of 3" or greater
are estimated to account for more than 90% of the groundwater
extracted from the aquifer each year [Ref. 21]
.
1. Implementation and Operating Cost Analysis
a. MCWRA Water Allocation Program
The administrative structure described here is
based on interviews with the administrative staff of the MCWRA
about job classification, command and control relationships,




























Figure 5-1. MCWRA Allocation Program's
Organizational Structure
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This administrative structure is not MCWRA's proposed
organization since it was developed by the author. It is a
structure, proposed for this analysis, that meets MCWRA's
functional and operational requirement. It was verified by
MCWRA's senior staff in a series of meetings. All salary
levels for this organization comply with the Monterey County
county-wide list of position classifications and pay
requirements
.
(1) Personnel classification & costs. This new
division would be headed by a Water Conservation Manager.
Responsibilities of the Division Manager would include
managing day-to-day operations, providing strategic planning
for the division and representing the MCWRA in all water
allocation matters. The monthly salary for this position can
range from $3,542 per month to $4,388 per month, based on the
individual's seniority and experience. The median monthly
salary for this position is $3,942 per month.
This division would also need an administra-
tive assistant. This person would be responsible for clerical
and support duties. While these duties may be handled using
current resources in the MCWRA, this analysis assumes that the
division won't rely on existing MCWRA resources. The salary
range for this position is between $2,151 and $2,665 per
month, while the median salary is $2,394 per month.
The division would have two departments:
the enforcement and monitoring department and the public
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affairs and education department. The enforcement and moni-
toring department would be supervised by a Water Resource
Engineer II. This person would supervise and plan workloads
of the Water Conservation Technicians. The salary range for
a Water Resource Engineer is from $3,065 to $3,797 per month,
based on experience and seniority. The median salary for this
position would be $3,412.
The Water Conservation Technician would be
responsible for examining wells, reading water-meters and
measuring the water level. MCWRA estimates that a Water
Conservation Technician could survey 20 wells per day, and
that the agency would survey all wells once every quarter.
Four Water Conservation Technicians would be required to
monitor 4,000 wells assuming 260 work days in a fiscal year
and two weeks vacation per year [Ref . 22] . The monthly salary
range for a Water Conservation Technician is from $2,536 to
$3,142 based on experience and seniority. The median salary
for this position would be $2,822.
The Public Affairs and Education Office
would be staffed by a Water Resource Engineer II. This person
would implement and maintain public affairs and educational
programs for the urban and agricultural industries and
represent the MCWRA at all public functions involving water
conservation and allocation issues. The range and median
salary for this position are the same as for the Enforcement
& Monitoring department head.
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In total, the MCWRA' s water allocation
program would consist of eight people with salaries ranging
from $25,812 to $52,656 per year. Based on the median salary
for each job position, the total salary for this division
























Program Total Salary Cost: $293,376
The net present cost over 12 years at a 4
percent discount rate is (EQ. 1): $2,753,363-,^
(2) Furniture and personal computer costs. The
cost of purchasing new office furniture and computer equipment
for the department is based on historical costs obtained from
the County of Monterey's Purchasing Office, Support Services
Division [Ref. 23]. The following are considered standard
allotments for this type of organization:
Managers are allocated $5,000 for office furniture.
Department personnel are allocated $3,500 for modular office
furniture
.
Each employee is allotted $2,500 for one personal computer
with software and printer.




The department is allotted $300 for a conference table and
six chairs at $140 per chair.
The department is allotted $1000 for miscellaneous supplies
and paper stock.































Net Present Cost = $56,040
(3) Transportation costs. The division must
provide a vehicle for each Water Conservation Technician so
that the technician can inspect wells in the Salinas Valley.
The cost of operating and maintaining the necessary four
vehicles is $3,600 per month based on the following
assumptions [Ref. 24]:
A two passenger 1/4 ton pick-up truck would meet the
transportation requirement for a technician.
The operating and maintenance (O&M) cost for a two
passenger pick-up truck equals the MCWRA's historical cost
for this type of truck.
MCWRA continues to self -insure these vehicles.
The MCWRA's historical fuel and maintenance
cost for a 1/4 ton pick-up truck is $900 per year. The




24] . The life expectancy is 8 years and projected
salvage value afterwards is $1,200 [Ref. 24]. The discount
rate is assumed to be 4% per year, and the agency uses
straight-line depreciation for their trucks.
Summary of Vehicle Costs No. Cost Subtotal
Initial Truck Purchase 4 9, 800 39,200
Annual Operating Costs 4 900 3,600
Salvage Value 4 1,200 4,800
2nd Truck Purchase at
the end of 8th year




The net present cost over 12 years at a 4





2nd Truck Fleet Purchase (EQ. 3)
Salvage Value of 1st Fleet (EQ. 2)
Salvage Value of 2nd Fleet based on







(4) Office space costs. Currently the MCWRA
doesn't have adequate office space for its employees. It
would be unreasonable to assume that this additional depart-
ment could share the agency's existing space. The MCWRA is
currently residing in temporary office trailers; it is assumed
that additional trailers would be leased.
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Monterey County has not established adminis-
trative requirements for office space based on job position
and duties. Therefore, this analysis uses federal standards
for government employees to determine the required office-
space. The specific standards used here are based on the
facility planning criteria of the Naval Facilities Engineering





















Total ft2 for the Department: 865
A 24 ft by 40 ft trailer would satisfy the
department's space requirements. The cost of leasing this
trailer, preparing the site, transporting the trailer to the
site, hooking up the utilities and modifying the interior for
administrative use are presented below. This data was
obtained from the General Electric, Inc. - Capital, Modular
Space Division which has leased trailers to Monterey County in
the past.
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Description of individual costs Cost
Monthly lease
Delivery cost of the trailer
Setting up the trailer including utility
hook-up
Installation of seismic tie-downs
Dismantling fee for terminating
contract
Shipping cost for returning the
trailer
Total set-up cost is
Total cost of terminating the lease is














Termination cost (EQ. 3)






(5) Summary of the organizational costs. Eased
on the proceeding calculations, the following table summarizes
the organization's initial capital and operating costs.













The net present cost for implementing and
operating this organization is presented in the following












b. Proposed Free Market Allocation Program
(1) Personnel classification and costs. The
analysis in Chapter IV described the administrative structure
for the proposed privatization allocation scheme in terms of
job classification, command and control relationships,
anticipated workload and reporting hierarchy. While this
administrative structure is not necessarily the ideal
organization, it does meet the allocation plan's functional
and operational requirements. All salary levels for this
organization concur with the Monterey County county-wide list
of position classification salary guidelines, and all salary


































Program Total Salary Cost: $240,792
Net present cost over 12 years at a 4 percent discount rate
(EQ. 1) is $2, 259,857 s .
(2) Furniture and personal computer costs. New
office furniture and computer equipment costs for this
department are based on the same assumptions as the previous
alternative. These costs are summarized below.
Summary of Costs: No. Cost Total
Office Furniture 1 5,000 5,000
Manager 7 3,500 24,500
Department Personnel 8 2,500 20,000
Personal Computers 8 550 4,400
Filing Cabinets 1 300 300
Conference Table 6 140 840





Net Present Cost = $56,040
(3) Computerized monitoring system costs. West
Plant Systems, Inc. of Monterey, CA, estimated the cost for
purchasing and installing a computerized monitoring system.
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In this system, each well would have a frequency generator
tied into the well's flowmeter 4-20 milliampere tap. This
frequency generator is then wired, either remotely or
directly, into a remote terminal unit (RTU) . The cost for
purchasing and installing the frequency generator is estimated
to be $1,100. The RTU consists of an analog/digital converter
and a programmable microprocessor that can accept up to eight
inputs and one output. The unit can transmit and receive
digital data via LAN network or standard phone line (Modem)
.
It has the capacity to hold 48 hours of data before down-
loading the information to a central unit. The RTU has the
capacity to monitor and transmit data for eight wells. This
would lower the per unit cost of installation for well owners
with multiple wells. This RTU is estimated to cost $2,700.
Assuming, on average, that three wells will
be connected to each RTU, the cost of installing this monitor-
ing system for 4,000 wells would be $7,999,100. The cost of
a computer to monitor the system is estimated to be $1,900.
Thus, the total cost of the system would be $8,000,000. This
cost includes all programming and labor. The value of the
system is assumed to depreciate linearly over its service life
of 2 years and have no salvage value at the end.
The operational cost of the equipment is
estimated to be $12.00 per month per well. This cost includes
the line transmission fees and a system maintenance contract.
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The total operational cost per year for 4,000 wells is
estimated to be $576,000.
The net present cost calculations for this
capital improvement using a 4% discount factor over 12 years
is:
Item NPC
Purchase and installation of
equipment
Operational Cost and Maintenance (EQ.
1)
Salvage value at the end of 12th year
(EQ. 2)
$ 8,000,000
$ 5,405, 818 9
($ 1,998,720)^
Total NPC: $11,407,098
(4) Office space costs. The office space
required for this department is the same as in the previous
alternative
.


















Based on the requirement of 865 square feet,
a 24 ft by 40 ft trailer would accommodate the needs of the
department. This is the same requirement as the previous
alternative. Thus, the net present cost is $58,557, the same
as before.
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(5) Summary of the organizational costs. Based
on the preceding calculations, the initial capital and
operating cost of the organization required under this
alternative are as follows:












Total $8 f 061 f 102 $822,492
The net present cost of the initial capital
investment and operating costs for this organization are
presented below. The calculations are based on a 12 year time










Total: $13 f 781 f 552
2 . The MCWRA Program Versus the Free Market Program
Based on the preceding calculations, the MCWRA
allocation program has lower implementation and operating
costs than the free market program. This is largely due to
the initial purchase and operating costs of the well
monitoring system. If the monitoring program costs were
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excluded from both net present cost (NPC) calculations, the
NPC of the free market program would be $2,090 / 180 12 while the
NPC of the MCWRA program would be $1 , 560 , 278 13 . The
difference between the two programs would now only be $529,902
rather than $10,828,868.
If the free market program operated on the honor
system, with the pumping volume verified once a quarter, the
NPC would be $3 , 472 , 372 14 . In this case, the free market
allocation program is less expensive than the MCWRA program if
it reduces water conservation costs by at least (EQ. 4)
$55,374 15 per year in the SVGB.
B. INDUSTRIAL SECTOR COST ANALYSIS
The industrial sector cost analysis is based on one of the
largest agricultural processing and packaging plants in the
Salinas Valley, the J. M. Smucker Company's California Farm
Products Division. It is also one of the leading employers in
the Salinas Valley. This company was randomly selected from
this subgroup, and the most current data available was
collected from it.
The J. M. Smucker Company is an Ohio-based corporation
founded in 1897 and incorporated in 1921. This corporation
currently employs 1,950 full-time employees at thirteen
production or administrative facilities throughout the world.
The company's only industrial operation is the manufacturing
and marketing of food products such as: preserves, jams,
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jellies, fruit -only spreads, fruit and vegetable juice
beverages and other fruit products.
The company's products are sold primarily through brokers
to chain, wholesale, cooperative, and independent grocery
accounts, food service distributors and the hotel industry.
This business segment is highly competitive in product
quality, price, advertising and promotion.
This analysis focuses on Smucker's California Farm
Products Division located near Watsonville, California. This
division produces fruit spreads and toppings from apples,
oranges, peaches, strawberries and apricots. This fruit is
generally purchased from independent growers and suppliers,
although the company does grow strawberries for its own use.
This division employs roughly 400 full-time employees during
its peak production time, late spring and summer. They have
150 full-time employees during the rest of the year.
Due to the perishability and seasonality of fresh fruits,
the Division has more than 100,000 square feet of cold storage
space as well as 15,000 square feet of processing area. The
division can produce more than 50 million pounds of finished
product each year. In processing fruit spreads and toppings,
large quantities of water are required to wash the fruit and
convert it into spreads. During a normal eight hour shift, a
single production line will use over 50,000 gallons of fresh
water. This division's actual annual water use from 1987 to
1993 and its forecasted water use from 1994 to 1996 are
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presented below. Forecasted water use is based on a five year
moving average and the division's projected 5% annual increase
in water use for the next three years.
Water Usage (ac-ft)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
100.11 82.98 144.72 154.36 124.04 178.34 135.9




Water consumption per pound of finished product has
decreased from one gallon per pound in 1990 to .81 gallon per
pound, or 1,620 gallons per ton in 1993 [Ref. 32]. This 19%
reduction in water use resulted from a $70,000 water conserva-
tion program. The water conservation program consisted of
changes in procedures for washing the exterior of the fruit as
well as more extensive use of recycled water. This program
will save an estimated 28.063 ac-ft of water per year in the
future, based on the historical 1989 thru 1993 five-year mean
water use. The average cost of reducing water consumption by
19%, or 28.063 ac-ft, is (EQ. 5) $99.78 16 per ac-ft. This
calculation assumes that this water savings would continue in
the future with no additional investment or special mainten-
ance required. This is consistent with the fact that
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Smucker's maintenance and operational costs did not increase
due to these modifications.
The "Survey of Water Use in the California Food Processing
Industry in 1993," published by the California League of Food
Processors, contains typical water use in processing several
products [Ref. 25:p. 5]:















The Smucker's division seems to be using water more effici-
ently than other California processing plants. This statement
is supported by the fact that Smucker uses 1,620 gallons of
water to process one ton of apricots while the industry
average is 2,992 gallons per ton [Ref. 32].
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Before the Division will invest in water conservation, one
of the following conditions must hold: the conservation
investment is required by law, or the economic return from the
investment must be high enough to satisfy the corporation's
investment criterion. The Smucker Company's investment
criteria are a 36% return on investment and a two year payback
period for the present value of the capital investment. The
two year payback requirement is the most difficult of the two
criteria to meet.
Currently, Smucker has only two viable projects for
conserving water: expansion of the current water conservation
program and a membrane filtration project. Both projects have
been placed on indefinite hold because their economic returns
on investment fail to meet the two year payback requirement.
If the company was forced to increase its water conserva-
tion efforts immediately, it could achieve a maximum 5 to 7
percent additional savings with a $100,000 investment
(excluding any major capital investment in water recycling
equipment) in the current program. Thus, the average cost of
this 5 percent, 7.37 ac-ft 18 additional annual reduction
would be roughly (EQ. 5) $542.74 17 per ac-ft.
The company could further reduce water consumption by
investing in a Membrane Filtration System. This system would
allow Smucker to use recycled water to process their product.
18 7.37 ac-ft is calculated by multiplying 5% by five year
historical mean (89-93). (7.37 = .05 X 147.47 ac-ft)
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This filtration system would reduce water usage between 60%
and 75%. The initial investment is $250,000 to $300,000 and
the annual operating cost is $50,000. The projected life
expectancy is ten years. Using a $275,000 initial investment,
a $50,000 annual operating cost and a 60% water-use reduction,
the annual average cost of reducing one ac-ft of water per
year (EQ. 1 & 4) is $948.27 18 . This project also requires the
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to approve using this
recycled water in Smucker's packaging process. (Such use of
recycled water is not currently allowed by the USDA.)
Currently, the Smucker's California Farm Products Division
receives water from two sources: the Pajaro Water District
and private wells. This division pays an average of $36,000
per year for public water and $40,000 per year to operate its
own water wells. Thus, the division's average annual cost of
receiving water is $76,000 per year which equates to $515.36 19
per ac-ft of water. Based on this calculation, the average
annual cost of reducing water use by one ac-ft for the two
proposals is:
1. Additional investment in current program: $27.38 20 per
ac-ft.
2. Membrane Filtration system: $432.91 20 Per ac-ft.
1. Marginal Cost Curve For Reducing Water Use
The following marginal cost curve was generated by





















2 . Economic Cost of MCWRA Allocation Plan
The following table presents Smucker's cost of
compliance with MCWRA Ordinance No. 03774 in 1994, 1995 and
1996. MCWRA Ordinance No. 03774 requires urban water
districts to reduce water use by 15% per capita (or per
customer account) when compared to 19 87 water use. This
analysis assumes that urban water districts would require
industries in each district to reduce water use by 15% based
on 19 87 water use. The MCWRA allocation program does not
specifically address what water conservation actions are
required by urban industrial water users. The program allows
each urban water district to determine its own policy on
industrial water use, as long as the total water use for the
district is less than the authorized level per MCWRA Ordinance
No. 3774. Therefore, this analysis took a conservative
approach: assume that the urban water districts will pass the
required 15% water use reduction on to the industrial water
users
.
Table 5-1 (EQ. 6) shows the estimated cost per year
for the company to comply with the MCWRA allocation program,
assuming that Smucker would have to reduce water use by 15%
compared to 19 87 water use. The ordinance limit was calcu-
lated by multiplying the 1987 water use by 85%. Economic cost
per year was calculated by using the preceding marginal cost
curve and the required water use reduction for 1994, 1995 and
1996.
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94 154.84 85.09 69.75 $27,210
95 162.58 85.09 77.49 $30,561
96 170.71 85.09 85.62 $34,081
This analysis assumes that Smucker chooses to invest
in conservation rather than reducing its output to achieve the
required reduction in water use. If water conservation costs
reduced profit to unacceptable levels, Smucker may choose to
conserve water by reducing output. This option might be
particularly relevant to the decision Smucker faces concern-
ing the membrane filtration system, since this system is so
expensive. Unfortunately, analyzing this option would
required detailed proprietary information regarding Smucker'
s
operating costs and profit margins. Since this proprietary
information is unavailable, Smucker is assumed to maintain
output levels, even if the cost of conserving water
essentially doubles, as with a membrane filtration system.
This is a reasonable assumption if water costs are a small
portion of the total production costs.
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3 . Economic Cost of the Free Market Allocation Plan
Table 5-2 19 presents the economic cost of compliance
under the thesis allocation plan for 1994, 1995 and 1996.
These results are based on the preceding marginal cost curve,





The company would choose to use the mean of the last
five years for their historical use figure. Average
water use = AEA = ( (FY88 + FY89 + FY90 + FY91 + FY93) /
5) .
2. Average net reduction for the zone is equal to the total
recharge for the zone divided by the total discharge
(ANR = Total Recharge / Total Discharge)
.
3. The company's water share allotment in acre-feet would
be equal to the average net reduction of the zone
multiplied by the five year average water use (allotted
Annual Extraction Amount (AAEA) = AEA X ANR)
.
4. Based on the Montgomery Watson Groundwater Model, the
Total Discharge for the valley = 535,000 ac-ft per year
and the Total Recharge for the valley = 498,000 ac-ft
per year. Therefore, ANR = 498,000 / 535,000 = .93.
5. Five year average water use at Smucker = 147.47 AC-
FT Allocation Limit = 137.15 ac-ft = .93 X 147.47.
6. Subsample representatives will be able to purchase or
sell as much water as they desire at the prevailing
market price.
The top portion of Table 5-2 presents the projected water
demand, allocation limit and the shortfall each year. 20 The
19This table was created using equation 7 in Appendix A,
and the calculations are shown in Appendix B, line 21-35.
20The shortfall is the amount of water that is required
to be conserved and/or purchased in order to fulfill the
projected water demand for that year and be in compliance with
the proposed free market program.
144
lower portion of the table presents the projected annual
economic cost of compliance under the free market program.
TABLE 5-2. J. M. SMUCKER COMPLIANCE COSTS WITH THE






94 154.84 137.15 17.69
95 162.58 137.15 25.43
96 170.71 137.15 33.56
Compliance Costs








94 $ 4, 668 $265 $509
95 $ 8,019 $381 $741
96 $11,539 $503 $985









94 $ 973 $1,231 $2,263
95 $1,554 $2,005 $3,811
96 $2, 163 $2,818 $5,437
4. Comparison of the Economic Costs for the Two
Allocation Plans
The preceding analysis dramatically demonstrates that
the cost of compliance is much less for the proposed alloca-
tion plan than for the MCWRA allocation plan. The range of
cost savings that can be achieved in 1994, 1995, and 1996 is
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shown in Table 5-3. 21 This cost comparison reflects water
use reduction as required in each of the programs. Thus, the
water use reduction increases from the free market plan to the
MCWRA plan. For Smucker, the MCWRA program requires a higher
reduction in water use.
TABLE 5-3. COST SAVINGS PER YEAR
AS A FUNCTION OF THE MARKET
PRICE OF WATER









94 $22,542 $26,945 $26,701
95 $22,542 $30,180 $29,621
96 $22,539 $33,574 $33,291









94 $26,237 $25,979 $24,947
95 $29,007 $28,556 $26,750
96 $31,914 $31,259 $28,640
To show the inherent advantages or disadvantages of a
particular program requires comparing compliance costs for a
given level of water use reduction. The graph in Figure 5-2
illustrates that the proposed allocation program has an
21The definition of "Cost Savings" for this analysis is
the subsample representative's cost of compliance under the
MCWRA' s program minus its cost of compliance under the thesis'
proposed program.
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inherent advantage over the MCWRA allocation program. This
graph is developed from Smucker's marginal cost curve for
water conservation and the water conservation required under
both plans for 1994. (MCWRA' s required level of reduction is
69.75 ac-ft per year and the proposed program's reduction is
17.69 ac-ft per year). The diamonds on the graph correspond
to the cost savings calculations reported in Table 5-3. The
no water trade (i.e., regulatory system) case reported in
Table 5-3 corresponds to a $443 market price of water. At
this price Smucker would choose not to buy or sell water.
30000 -
MCWRA Plan with 69.75 AC-FT Reduction
Thesis Pian with 69.75 AC-FT Reduction
MCWRA Plan with 17.69 AC-FT Reduction
Thesis Plan with 17.69 AC-FT Reduction
40 80 %120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480
Price of Wate;
Figure 5-2. Industrial Sector Cost Analysis
Note that the 17.69 ac-ft per year reduction is based on a 7%
reduction from a five year average selected by the company.
On the other hand the 69.75 ac-ft per year reduction is based
on the MCWRA program for a 15% reduction (for urban users)
from 1987 water use.
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When the level of reduction is 17.69 ac-ft annually,
the graph shows the compliance cost for MCWRA program will be
$4,667.55. The free market allocation program's compliance
cost depends on the market price of water. The market -based
program' s cost does not approach the MCWRA programs cost until
the open market price of water reaches $433 per ac-ft. For
market water prices below $27 per ac-ft, the representative
would purchase water rather than implement water conservation
measures. For market prices between $27 and $433 per ac-ft,
the representative would save 7.37 ac-ft of water through
conservation and purchase the remaining shortfall from the
market. Purchases would still be cheaper than installing the
membrane filtration system. Both programs have similar costs
when water prices equal $433 per ac-ft, the marginal cost of
compliance for a 17.69 ac-ft annual reduction. At this price,
the representative would neither buy or sell water; it would
meet its required reduction through internal conservation
measures, as with the MCWRA program. Finally, the market
-
based program's costs decrease for water prices exceeding $433
per ac-ft. The company could install a membrane filtration
system, reduce its water use more than required, and sell its
excess water on the open market. This at least partially
offsets its conservation costs. If water prices are high




When the required reduction in water use is 17.69 ac-
ft per year, the same cost comparison is repeated. This case
illustrates that the absolute cost advantage of the proposed
free market program increases with the level of water use
reduction.
This analysis illustrates two points. First, the free
market allocation program's compliance costs will always be
lower or equal to those of a regulatory control system
(MCWRA' s allocation program). Second, as the level of
reduction increases, so does the potential for savings from
choosing the free market program in lieu of the regulatory
program.
C. URBAN SECTOR COST ANALYSIS
The urban sector cost analysis is based on three urban
water districts: the City of Salinas, the California Water
Service Company, and the Marina Coast Water District. These
water districts were selected based on location, service
population and private versus public ownership. The City of
Salinas represents a large urban community (115,000 residents)
which is experiencing rapid population growth. The California
Water Service Company's Salinas District (Cal Water)
represents a privately held water utility serving a medium-
size urban center (20,000 customers). It also has extensive
historical data on water consumption and conservation. The
Marina Coast Water District represents a small urban water
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district (15,000 residents) mainly serving a residential
community and a small, light industrial sector. It also has
an active water conservation program. All three water
districts are experiencing the negative externalities
associated with overdraf ting.
It should be noted that Cal Water provides water service
to a significant portion of the City of Salinas. For the
purpose of this analysis this overlap of customers is assumed
to not exist. Due to this assumption, the total cost of
compliance for the urban sample will be slightly overstated
for both the MCWRA allocation program and the free market
program. However, this will not affect the general results of
the comparative analysis since both programs will be affected
to the same extent
.
1. City of Salinas
The City of Salinas is an agricultural, service,
administrative and commercial hub for northern Monterey
County. It is located roughly nine miles from the coast, 13
miles northeast of Monterey and two miles west of the Gabilan
mountain range. Salinas has become the center for all of the
Monterey County government offices. The City's population has
grown 3 7 percent over the last ten years.
The central portion of the City contains retail opera-
tions, including strip and shopping malls, and government
offices for both the City and Monterey County. Surrounding
this central area is prime agricultural land, with the highest
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agricultural land values and best soil conditions in the
region. With the recent population growth, some low produc-
tivity farmland has been converted into residential housing.
The city's industrial base is mainly composed of retail and
service industries, as well as agricultural shipping and
processing industries. Table 5-4 shows the 1986 employment by
sector for the City [Ref. 27:p. 35]:
TABLE 5-4. SALINAS 1986 EMPLOYMENT BY SECTOR














Table 5-5 provides historical groundwater extraction
volumes for the years 1987 to 1993 and projected values for
1994 to 1996. The City of Salinas only maintains groundwater
extraction records for 1987. 22 Thus, this table was
22The City of Salinas is only starting to maintain a
record of groundwater extraction volumes in order to comply
with MCWRA allocation program in late 1993. The city had no
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developed by multiplying the 1987 water use per capita by the
annual population data obtained from the California Department
of Finance, Demographic Research Unit report dated 04/28/93.
The City used this procedure to report their projected ground-
water demand to MCWRA as required under MCWRA Ordinance No.
3744.
TABLE 5-5. CITY OF SALINAS ESTIMATED
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION DATA
Historical Groundwater Extraction

























Wat. - Groundwater in AC FT extracted from the aquifer
Pop. - Population of their area of service
W/P - Groundwater extracted per capita














reason to maintain records since the water service to its
residents is provided by private water service companies or by
the individuals themselves.
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2. California Water Service Company
The California Water Service Company (Cal Water) was
incorporated on December 21, 1926 and currently operates in 38
communities statewide through 21 water systems. The company
has over 500 wells statewide. It produces over 47 billion
gallons annually, accounting for 47% of the company's annual
production. The remaining 53% comes from surface sources
purchased from wholesale suppliers and company owned watershed
on the San Francisco Peninsula. Cal Water reportedly has one
of the most modern water distribution and control systems
operating today. They have also received national recognition
for their innovative, informative water conservation programs.
In the Salinas division, Cal Water operates three
wells located in the 180 foot aquifer, 32 wells in the 400
foot aquifer and no wells in the deep aquifer. These wells
have the capacity to pump more than 10 million gallons per
day. Cal Water has extracted a relatively constant amount of
groundwater over the last seven years. However, the water
extracted per service connection has declined by 9 percent
between 1987 and 1993. This historical data is presented in
the Table 5-6.
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TABLE 5-6. CAL WATER GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION DATA
Historical Groundwater Extraction




























- Groundwater in AC FT extracted from the aquifer
- Population of their area of service
- Groundwater extracted per capita
The current forecast of groundwater volumes was
supplied by Cal Water and also given to MCWRA as required
under MCWRA Ordinance No. 3744. This information is also
presented in Table 5-7. Cal Water determined the projected
water extraction volumes by assuming that the water extracted
will be the same per capita as in 1987 (Wat. = population x
W/P (In 1987) ) .
TABLE 5-7. CAL WATER PROJECTED GROUNDWATER
EXTRACTION DATA














Wat. - Groundwater in AC FT extracted from the aquifer
Ser. - Number of service connections
W/S - Groundwater extracted per service connection
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3 . Marina County Water District
The Marina County Water District (MCWD) is the primary
water supplier for the 17,990 people in Marina, California.
Its service area contains residential and light industrial
users, including the City of Marina, RMC Lonestar, California
Artichoke, the Dole Food Company, and part of the Armstrong
Ranch. The MCWD is located on the coast in the Northwest
corner of the Salinas Valley. The agency also collects and
disposes of wastewater for the community. MCWD's wastewater
reclamation program is projected to sell five ac-ft of
reclaimed wastewater per month starting in mid- 1994. The
agency predicts this program will initially reduce groundwater
pumping by 6 ac-ft per year.
Since 1960, the agency has acquired or drilled 14
wells. Eight have been abandoned: three because of casing
failure and five due to chloride contamination from seawater
intrusion or nitrate contamination from agricultural fields.
Two wells are restricted to non-potable uses.
MCWD's three newest wells are drilled 1400 ft. into the
deep aquifer to avoid chloride and nitrate contamination. The
combined extraction capacity of these three newest wells and
one well in the 400 ft. aquifer is 5,320 gallons per minute.
MCWD's groundwater extraction has been relatively constant
over the last seven years. However, the water use per capita
has declined by 21 percent between 1987 and 1993. This
historical data is presented in Table 5-8.
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TABLE 5-8. MARINA COUNTY WATER DISTRICT
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION DATA:
Historical Groundwater Extraction




























- Groundwater in AC -FT extracted from the aquifer
- Population of their area of service
- Groundwater extracted per capita
MCWD's current water use forecast was provided by MCWD
and was also submitted to MCWRA as required by MCWRA Ordinance
No. 3 744. This information is presented in Table 5-9. MCWD
determined the projected water extraction volumes by assuming
that the water extracted will be the same per capita as it was
in 1987 (Wat. = population x W/P (In 1987)) . This assumption
may overestimate the actual demand because the per capita
consumption has fallen by 21 percent since 1987. While MCWD
has sufficient production capacity to meet its projected
needs, seawater intrusion may degrade water quality in the
deep aquifer, rendering these wells unfit for domestic use.
TABLE 5-9. MARINA COUNTY WATER DISTRICT PROJECTED
GROUNDWATER EXTRACTION DATA















4. Marginal Cost of Reducing Water Use
Water conservation programs are the most cost
effective way to reduce water use. Water conservation
programs usually involve Ultra Low Flow (ULF) Toilets, low
flow showerheads, and public information and education
programs to teach water conservation techniques and raise
public consciousness. The marginal cost analysis for the
urban sector will assume that the preceding water conservation
programs would be implemented. In order to calculate the
marginal costs of these programs the following assumptions
were made:
1. The average single family household has the following
characteristic
:
Persons per household = 3.0
Toilets per household = 2.2
Average household characteristics for multi- family units
are:
Persons per household = 2.5
Toilets per household = 1.2
These characteristics were based on conversations with
AMBAG personnel and Richard Youngblood, Conservation and
Special Projects Administrator at MCWD.
2. Ten percent of the average urban community has pre-
existing Ultra Flow toilets and Low Flow showerheads.
a. ULF Toilet Program
The marginal cost per ac-ft of water saved by
retrofitting existing homes with a Ultra Low Flow toilets
depends on the average water savings per toilet and the cost
of purchasing and installing new toilets. The California
Urban Water Conservation Council estimated the effect of
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retrofitting existing residencies with low flow toilets in
their June 30, 1992 report entitled "Assumptions and
Methodology for Determining Estimates of Reliable Water
Savings from the Installation of ULF Toilets." Using this
report and assuming an average of 3.0 people and 2.2 toilets
per household, the average single family household would save
7,267 gallons or .0223 ac-ft per year +/- 5% by installing
ultra low flow toilets. Assuming an average of 2 . 5 people and
1.2 toilets per multi- family residency, this would save
14,417.5 gallons or .0442 ac-ft per year +/- 5%.
Finally, the California Water Service Company has
data concerning the ratio of single family and multi -family to
total number of residencies. Assuming this data is represen-
tative of the districts considered here, this ratio is used to
estimate a weighted average water savings per ULF toilet. Cal
Water's statistics on the ratio of single family to total








Therefore, the average water savings per ULF toilet for this
sample group is = .27 (.0442) + .73 (.0223) = .02821 ac-ft per
year.
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To determine the cost of purchasing and installing
an ULF toilet, a telephone survey of local plumbers and plumb-
ing supply stores indicated the following:
1. The local plumber's wage rate is approximately $50 per
hour.
2. It takes approximately one hour to remove an existing
toilet and install a new ULF toilet.
3. The Cost of a ULF toilet ranges from $79 to $299 with
the average being $189.
4. The miscellaneous material cost is $10 per toilet.
Based on this information, the cost of purchasing and install-
ing a ULF toilet ranges from $139 to $359, with the average
being $249. The cost of saving for one ac-ft of water per
year through installing an ULF toilet ranges from $363 to
$936, where each toilet is expected to last 20 years (EQ. 8)
.
For the economic analysis, the average of $649 per ac-ft per
year will be used for the cost of reducing one ac-ft of water
use by retrofitting with ULF toilets (EQ.8).
b. Low Flow Showerhead
The marginal cost of saving an acre foot of water
by replacing existing showerheads with low flow showerheads
depends on the average water savings per showerhead and the
cost of purchasing and installing the new showerhead. The
projected water savings of a Low Flow Showerhead is between
8,400 to 17,500 gallons per year, per person, according to
"How to Get Water Smart" by Buzz Buzzelli and others [Ref.
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33 :p. 34] . This analysis will use the average value of 12,950
gallons which is equivalent to .03974 ac-ft per year.
The retail cost of purchasing a low flow
Showerhead ranges from $5.99 to $15.95, with the mid- range
price being $11.00. This data was obtained from a telephone
survey of local plumbers and plumbing supply stores. For this
analysis, the installation cost is zero. The majority of
local plumbers stated that most home owners install the
showerheads themselves. It is also assumed that this retrofit
program will be implemented by enacting an ordinance requiring
all homeowners to retrofit their existing showerheads.
The cost of saving one ac-ft of water per year via
the installation of low flow showerheads range from $25 to
$67, assuming a seven year life expectancy (EQ. 9). An
estimated $46 per ac-ft of water per year will be used in
developing the marginal cost curve. It is also assumed that
10% of the population already has installed low flow shower-
heads .
It should be noted that this is not the only way
of implementing this type of program. MCWD has implemented a
retrofit showerhead program, whereby the MCWD purchases the
low flow showerheads with public funds at wholesale prices
($4.00 per showerhead) . They are provided to residents at no
cost. The cost of saving one ac-ft water via this program is
estimated to be $16.77 per ac-ft.
160
c. Educational and Public Information Program
The marginal cost of saving one ac-ft of water
through educational and public information programs is based
on results obtained from the California Water Service Company
and Marina County Water district:
1. California Water Service Company. During 1990-1991, Cal
Water spent approximately $34,000 on water conservation
educational and public information programs, including
television and radio commercials. The company was also
actively involved with the local community government
water conservation programs and committees. Cal Water
believes that it achieved a 3% reduction in water use
per year (equivalent to 414 ac-ft per year) as their
customers modified their water consumption habits.
Thus, the estimated marginal cost of saving one ac-ft of
groundwater per year through an information and
education program is $82 (EQ. 10). This 3% percent
reduction does not include the water reduction the
agency received through low flow showerheads or toilets
[Ref . 28]
.
2. Marina County Water District. This agency has projected
that it can reduce water consumption by an estimated 42
ac-ft per year (+/- 14 ac-ft) via a public information
and education program for a population of 18,000. The
annual cost of this program is $14,360. Therefore, the
estimated cost of saving one ac-ft per year through
public information and education is $342 (EQ. 11) [Ref.
29:p. 20]
The marginal cost of water reduction via an
informational and educational programs is greatly affected by
economies of scale, as indicated in the preceding data. Cal
Water's state-wide information program, which was conducted
out of their corporate headquarters, was designed to inform
and educate all 350,000 customers in 21 regions of the state.
MCWD, on the other hand, has only 18,000 customers. This
analysis will use an average of the two estimated marginal
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costs as the projected marginal cost of saving one ac-ft of
ground water per year up to maximum reduction of 5%. This
average marginal cost is $212 per ac-ft per year.
d. Water Reclamation Program
The marginal cost for a water reclamation program
was estimated using data from the MCWD reclamation project.
The MCWD facility is an advanced wastewater treatment plant
which reclaims and treats secondary effluent that is used to
irrigate parks, ball fields, median strips and other public
landscape areas. The current estimated cost of water from
this facility is $400 per ac-ft. The MCWD facility can
produce 300 ac-ft per year, which means they can reduce
potable water use by 14%, based on 1993 water use data. This
analysis will assume that a 15% maximum water use reduction
can be achieved through a reclamation program. [Ref. 29 :p.
vi]
e. Seawater Desalination Program
Current estimates for the annual marginal cost of
desalinating seawater ranges from $1,000 to $1,100 per ac-ft
of water, depending on the plant size and other project
elements. This analysis assumes the cost to be $1,050 per ac-
ft of water. The most significant obstacle to operating a
desalination plant is the disposal of brine discharge. Brine
cannot be discharged into the Monterey Bay since it is a
marine sanctuary. Brine discharge would have to be pumped to
inland evaporation pools or pumped into non-potable oceanside
aquifers. [Ref. 29 :p. vi]
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5. Subsample Representatives' Marginal Cost Curves For
Reducing Water Use
The following marginal cost curves are generated from
the preceding analysis for the three urban water districts
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The following marginal cost curves were generated from
the preceding analysis using 1995 population and water use
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The following marginal cost curves were generated from
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6. Urban Sector's Marginal Cost Curve For Reducing Water
Use
The following marginal cost curves were generated by
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7. Economic Cost of MCWRA Allocation Plan
Table 5-10 presents the economic cost of complying
with MCWRA Ordinance No. 03774 23 for the City of Salinas, the
California Water Service Company, and Marina Coast Water
District. These results are based on the preceding marginal
cost curves and the projected required reductions (EQ. 6).
8. Economic Cost of the Thesis Allocation Plan
Table 5-11 presents the economic cost of complying
with the free market allocation plan for the City of Salinas,
California Water Service Company, and Marina Coast Water
District. These results are based on the preceding marginal
cost curves and the projected annual shortfall each year as
well as the following assumptions. 24
1. The subsample representative would choose to use the
mean of the last five years for their historical use
figure. Average water use = AEA = ( (FY88 + FY89 + FY90
+ FY91 + FY93) / 5)
.
2. Average net reduction25 for the zone is equal to the
total recharge for the zone divided by the total
discharge (ANR = Total Recharge / Total Discharge)
.
23This ordinance requires a 15% per capita reduction
based on the 1987 per capita water use.
24This table was created by using equation 7 in Appendix
A, and the calculations are shown in Appendix B, line 79 -
132.
25Average net reduction is a correction factor which is
used to establish the maximum amount of groundwater that can









Demanded Ordinance Limit Required
Reduction
Economic Cost/Yr
94 120,197 35,025 29,772 5,253 $400,002 72
95 122,655 35,742 30,380 5,362 $408,502 73
96 125,163 36,472 31,002 5,470 $416,458 74
1987 Wat./Pop. - .2914
California Water Service Company
YR Pop.
Projected Water
Demanded Ordinance Limit Required
Reduction
Economic Cost/Yr
94 20,188 14,784 12,567 2,217 $101.982 75
95 20,509 15,019 12,767 2,252 $103,592 76
96 20,838 15,260 12,972 2,288 $105,248„
1987 Wat./Ser. - .7323
Marina Coast Water District
YR Pop.
Projected Water
Demanded Ordinance Limit Required
Reduction
Economic Cost/Yr
94 18,000 2,729 2,320 409 $18,814 78
95 18,000 2,729 2,320 409 $18,814
96 18,000 2.729 2,320 409 $18,814




Demanded Ordinance Limit Required
Reduction
Economic Cost/Yr
94 52,538 44,659 7,879 $520,798
95 53,490 45,467 8,023 $530,908
96 54,461 46,294 8,167 $540,520
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3. The representative's water share allotment in acre- feet
is equal to the average net reduction of the zone
multiplied by the five year average water use (allotted
Annual Extraction Amount (AAEA) = AEA X ANR)
.
4. Based on the Montgomery Watson Groundwater Model, the
total discharge for the valley is 535,000 ac-ft per
year and the total recharge for the valley is 498,000
ac-ft per year. Therefore, ANR = 498,000 / 535,000 =
.93.
5. Allocation Limit = AAEA = Five year average water use
(AEA) X Average Net Reduction (ANR)
.
6. In calculating the compliance cost for the free market
allocation plan, it is assumed that subsample
representatives will be able to purchase or sell as
much water as they desire at the prevailing market
price
.
TABLE 5-11. URBAN SECTOR COMPLIANCE COST FOR THE





94 35,025 30,006 5,019
95 35,742 30,006 5,736
96 36,472 30,006 6,466
Five year average extraction amount (AEA) - 3;
ANR - .93
Allocation limit - AAEA - 32,264 X .93
!,264 AC-FT




YR No Water Trades
(Regulatory System)
Mkt Price of Water is
$15/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$30facft
94 $350,394 $75,285 $150,570
95 $487,790 $86,040 $172,080
96 $658,630 $96,990 $193,980
YR
Mkt. Price of Water is
$75/ac-ft
Mkt Price of Water is
$100|ac-ft
Mkt Price of Water is
$200|acft
94 $251,754 $269,754 $341,754
95 $302,977 $336,702 $471,602
96 $355,117 $404,842 $603,742




94 14,784 12,300 2,484
95 15,019 12,300 2,719
96 15,260 12,300 2,960
Five year average extraction amount (AEA) - 13,226 AC FT
ANR - .93





Mkt Price of Water is
$15/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
130/ae-ft
94 $117,916 $37,260 $74,520
95 $166,408 $40,785 $81,570




Mkt. Price of Water is
$75/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$100/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$200|acft
94 $114,902 $115,452 $117,652
95 $132,295 $138,520 $163,420
96 $150,138 $162,188 $210,388
Marina Coast Water District
YR Projected Water Demanded Allocation Limit Shortfall
94 2,729 2,450 279
95 2,729 2,450 279
96 2,729 2,450 279
Five year average extraction amount (AEA) - 2,634.8 AC FT
ANR - .93





Mkt. Price of Water is
$15|acft
Mkt Price of Water is
*30facft
94 $12,834 $4,185 $8,370
95 $12,834 $4,185 $8,370
96 $12,834 $4,185 $8,370
YR
Mkt. Price of Water is
$75facf1
Mkt Price of Water is
$100/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$200facft
94 $2,249 $(6,876) $(43,376)
95 $2,249 $(6,876) $(43,376)
96 $2,249 $(6,876) $(43,376)
$() - negative cost - Profit
- revenue generate by selling excess water generated through





Projected Water Demanded Allocation Limit Shortfall
94 52,538 44,756 7,782
95 53,490 44,756 8,734





Mkt Price of Water is
$15facft
Mkt Price of Water is
$30/acft
94 $481,144 $116,730 $233,460
95 $667,032 $131,010 $262,020
96 $887,636 $145,575 $291,150
YR
Mkt Price of Water is
$75facft
Mkt Price of Water is
$100|acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$200fac-ft
94 $368,905 $378,330 $416,030
95 $437,521 $468,346 $591,646
96 $507,504 $560,154 $770,754
The negative costs for Marina when water prices equal $100 per
ac-ft and $200 per ac-ft indicate that Marina actually profits
by selling excess water at these prices. With a low flow
showerhead retrofit program, Marina can meet their required
water reduction and sell enough water to earn a net profit.
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9. Comparison of the Costs of the Two Allocation Plans
The proposed free market allocation plan has signifi-
cantly lower cost of compliance than the MCWRA allocation plan
based on the preceding analysis. The range of cost savings 26
that can be achieved in 1994, 1995, and 1996 is summarized in
Table 5-12 for each individual water district.
As with the industrial sector, this cost comparison
reflects water use reductions as required in each of the two
programs. Thus, the water use reduction varies from program
to program. Specifically, the MCWRA program requires greater
water use reductions than the free market program for the City
of Salinas in 1994 and MCWD in all years. The free market
program requires greater reductions than MCWRA program for the
City of Salinas in 1995 and 1996 and Cal Water in all years.
As a result, the cost savings in Table 5-12 reflects both the
allocation methodology and the required reduction levels. The
cost savings (both positive and negative) in the "No Water
Trade (Regulatory System) case indicate the cost implications
of the different water reduction levels. The market based
plan has lower costs (positive cost savings) in those cases
where its required water reductions are lower; it has higher
costs (negative cost savings) in those cases where its
required water reductions are higher. If both plans required
26The definition of "Cost Savings" for this analysis is
the subsample representative's cost of compliance under the
MCWRA allocation program minus its cost of compliance under
the free market program.
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the seawater reductions, they would have identical costs in
the "No Water Trade" case.
The other negative costs savings in Table 5-12 also
reflect this pattern. As the price of water increases, it
becomes more expensive to buy water to satisfy the required
reductions. Therefore, negative cost savings are most likely
in cases where the market prices are high and the free market
based program has higher reduction levels. Table 5-12 shows
negative cost savings for the City of Salinas in 1995 and 1996
TABLE 5-12. URBAN SECTOR COST SAVINGS PER YEAR




Nt Witir TradM (Regulatory
System)
Mkt Price af Water is
tIBjac-ft
Mkt Prica af Water '» $30Jae
ft
94 149,608 $324,717 $249,432
95 $(79,288) $322,462 $236,422
96 (242,172) $319,468 $222,478
YR
Mkt Priet af Water n
75/icft
Mkt Priea af Water ia
tlOOJaeft
Mkt Priea af Water ia
*200/ac-ft
94 (148,248 $130,248 $ 58.248
95 1105,525 $ 71,800 $ (63,100)
96 $ 61,341 $ 11,616 $ (187,284)
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TABLE 5-12 (CONTINUED)
California Water Service Company
YR
No Water Trades (Regulatory
System)
Mkt Price of Water is
$15/acft
Mkt Price of Water is $30/ac
ft
94 $(15,934) $64,722 $27,462
95 $(62,816) $62,807 $22,022
96 $(110,924) $60,848 $16,448
YR Mkt. Price of Water is
$75jacft
Mkt. Price of Water is
$100/acTt
Mkt Price of Water is
$200/acft
94 $(12,920) $(13,470) $ (15,670)
95 $(28,703) $(34,928) $ (59,828)
96 $(44,890) $(56,940) $(105,140)
Marina Coast Water District
YR
No Water Trades (Regulatory
System)
Mkt. Price of Water is
$15/acft
Mkt Price of Water is $30/ac-
ft
94 $5,980 $14,629 $10,444
95 $5,980 $14,629 $10,444
96 $5,980 $14,629 $10,444
YR Mkt. Price of Water is
$75{acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$100/acft
Mkt Price of Water is
$200/acft
94 $16,565 $25,690 $62,190
95 $16,565 $25,690 $62,190
96 $16,565 $25,690 $62,190
( ) - Negative Cost Savings
when the price of water reaches $200 per ac-ft and for Cal
Water in 1994, 1995 and 1996 when the price of water reaches
183
or exceeds $75 per ac-ft. This reflects the expected pattern.
The reverse is also true. The positive cost savings for the
City of Salinas in 1994 and for MCWD in all years are at least
partially explained by the free market based program lower
reduction levels in these cases.
The graph of the 1994 compliance cost for the urban
sector in Figure 5-3 shows the inherent advantage that the
free market allocation program has over the MCWRA allocation
program in the urban sector. This graph is developed from the
urban sector combined marginal cost curves and the required
levels of water conservation for 1994. The graph assumes
subsample representatives can buy or sell as much water as
they like at the going market price. The graph shows two
levels of reduced water use for the combined urban sector.
One represents the required 1994 reduction for the MCWRA
program (7,879 ac-ft per year). The other represents the
required 1994 reduction for the free market program (7,782 ac-
ft per year) . This provides a comparison between programs
with the same reduction in water use. When the level of
reduction is 7,879 ac-ft per year, the compliance cost for the
MCWRA program would be $520,798. The compliance cost of the
free market allocation program for this level of reduction is
always lower than the MCWRA program's cost. The same
relative cost comparison is repeated when the required annual
reduction is 7,782 ac-ft per year.
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Figure 5-3. Urban Sector Cost Analysis
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The MCWRA program specifies reduction levels for each
urban water supplier, irregardless of the marginal cost to
meet this requirement. Under the MCWRA program, the City of
Salinas is forced to conserve 5,253 ac-ft of water in 1994, of
which 4,299 ac-ft are conserved through a low flow showerhead
retrofit program at $46 per ac-ft and 954 ac-ft are conserved
through an information and education program at $212 per ac-
ft. MCWD and Cal Water meet their required reductions with
only a low flow showerhead retrofit program. Thus, the
marginal cost of compliance is higher for the City of Salinas
under the MCWRA program. The regulatory program allows
cheaper sources of water conservation to go untapped because
suppliers cannot buy and sell water.
Under the free market based program, urban users could
buy and sell water shares and credits both among themselves
and with other industries. Thus, the market based plan will
always cost less than the MCWRA program. If the price of
water is less than $46 per ac-ft, all urban users would meet
their water requirements by purchasing water. If the price of
water is between $46 and $212 per ac-ft, all urban sector
suppliers would implement a low flow showerhead retrofit
program. MCWD and Cal Water would exceed their water
reduction requirements and sell their excess water27 on the
27Excess water is defined as the amount of water that can
be conserved which is in excess of required level of
conservation. In this case, MCWD has the ability to conserve
644 ac-ft of water annually at $46 per ac-ft through its low
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open market; City of Salinas would not satisfy its required
reduction, so it would continue to purchase some water from
the market. However, the City of Salinas' purchases are less
expensive than the alternative: implementing an information
and education program. If the market price of water exceeds
$212 per ac-ft, all three suppliers could profit by implement-
ing an information and education program and selling their
excess water. This would further reduce the sector's total
compliance costs. Thus, the cost to each supplier and the
total sector's cost are lower for the proposed free market
program than for the MCWRA program at all water prices.
D. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR COST ANALYSIS
The agricultural sector cost analysis is based on sixteen
farms located near the following cities: Greenfield, Soledad,
Gonzales, Salinas, Castroville and Chualar. These farms were
selected based on their ability to provide historical data on
four crops: lettuce, celery, cauliflower, and broccoli.
These crops were chosen because they are four largest sources
of revenue for the county in the vegetable crop category [Ref
.
7:p. 30]. This category accounts for 71.5% of the gross
flow showerhead retrofit program. The MCWRA program requires
the MCWD to conserve 409 ac-ft per year. Therefore, 235 ac-ft
of water is in excess (235 = 644 409) . Cal Water has the
ability to conserve 2,462 ac-ft of water annually at $46 per
ac-ft through its low flow showerhead program. MCWRA requires
Cal Water to conserve 2,217 ac-ft per year. Thus, 245 ac-ft
of water is in excess. The total amount of excess water
available from MCWD and Cal Water is 480 ac-ft per year.
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revenue generated by the agricultural sector of the Monterey-
County [Ref. 7:p. 38]. The historical data included acreage
planted, yield and growing and packing costs per acre. Farms
do not have accurate water use data, so this analysis assumes
that each farmer uses on average 2.59 145 ac-ft of water
annually per acre of crop. This figure is the average annual
water use per acre of crop for the Salinas Valley and is based
on the Montgomery Watson groundwater model. Table 5-13
summarizes the data collected from these farms. Note that
only averages are shown. This protects the identity of each
farm and its proprietary information.
TABLE 5-13. AGRICULTURAL ANALYSIS
FOR THE PERIOD 19 88 - 1993
ACRES
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1988 729 131 203 146
Ave. Grower 1989 664 121 187 164
Ave. Grower 1990 717 141 203 165
Ave. Grower 1991 655 133 203 212
Ave. Grower 1992 740 155 188 234
Ave. Grower 1993 656 131 182 233
Ave. Grower 1988-93 694 135 194 192
% of Ave. Total 57% 11% 16% 16%
Ave. Total
Acreage For the Sample Group 11,104 2,160 3,104 3,072
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TABLE 5 13 (CONTINUED)
YIELD (No. of Cartons per acre)
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1988 753 1220 693 611
Ave. Grower 1989 785 1190 614 618
Ave. Grower 1990 767 1178 693 740
Ave. Grower 1991 773 1161 654 621
Ave. Grower 1992 751 1154 702 649
Ave. Grower 1993 814 1170 706 647
1 Carton - 50 pounds
GROWING COST PER ACRE($)
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1988 1664 3079 1928 1444
Ave. Grower 1989 1743 3051 1976 1467
Ave. Grower 1990 1806 3091 2014 1625
Ave. Grower 1991 1912 3260 2122 1675
Ave. Grower 1992 1989 3407 2244 1751
Ave. Grower 1993 2117 3559 2306 1822
NET PROFIT AFTER PACK AND GROW COSTS (Total in $)
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1988 69 252,223 •42,297 •15,804
Ave. Grower 1989 269,365 116,707 •34,367 •37,749
Ave. Grower 1990 479,852 19,512 2,992 21,858
Ave. Grower 1991 228,452 62,735 •87,206 •22,248
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TABLE 5 12 (CONTINUED)
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1992 270,809 116,309 2,326 30,018
Ave. Grower 1993 220,397 •96,168 •97,948 •36,131
NET PROFIT PER ACRE ($)
Lettuce Celery Cauliflower Broccoli
Ave. Grower 1988 .09 1,925 •208 -108
Ave. Grower 1989 405 965 184 -230
Ave. Grower 1990 669 138 15 132
Ave. Grower 1991 349 •472 -430 105
Ave. Grower 1992 366 750 12 128











Each irrigation methods' efficiency has not yet been
measured in the Salinas Valley. 28 The MCWRA estimates that
28Irrigation efficiency (IE) is a measure of the
proportion of water applied that is actually used beneficially
[Ref . 5:p. 4]
.
IE = (Water Beneficially Used) / (Total Water Applied)
Where beneficial uses include water necessary for:
* crop transpiration
* salinity control
* climate control (frost protection and crop cooling)
and non-beneficial uses include:
* application losses such as spray drift or uncollected run-
off
* evaporation from wet soil surfaces or wet foliage
* deep percolation of water past the root zone (in excess of
the leaching requirements)
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the irrigation efficiency (IE) for all crops and all
irrigation methods is 64% [Ref . 21] . However, the MCWRA
Mobile Lab and the University of California's Cooperative
Agricultural Extension in Salinas evaluated the distribution
uniformities (DU) for various farm irrigation systems in the
Salinas Valley during the period 1990 - 1992.
Distribution uniformity is a measure of how evenly an
irrigation system applies water to all plants in a field. If
water is not applied evenly, portions of a field may be under-
irrigated and/or over- irrigated. If distribution uniformity
is low, a field can be irrigated sufficiently only if
excessive water is applied. Non-uniform water application
(low DU) is one of the main limitations to achieving high on-
farm irrigation efficiencies. [Ref. 5:p. 4]
This distribution uniformity is equal to irrigation
efficiency (not accounting for application losses) when the
amount of beneficially used water is the same as the average
amount infiltrated in the low quarter. Therefore, "DU may be
considered as the maximum potential IE of a properly managed
irrigation system, if under- irrigation is to be avoided."
[Ref. 5:p. 6]
Distribution uniformity is defined as DU = (low 1/4) /
(Average) . The lower 1/4 is the average depth of water
infiltrated in the 25 percent of the study area receiving the
least amount of water; average is the average depth of water
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infiltrated in the entire study area [Ref . 5:p. 6] . Table 5
14 summarizes the findings [Ref. 5:p. 7]
.
TABLE 5-14. DISTRIBUTION UNIFORMITY
System Type No. Min
DU (%)
Max Average
All Systems 103 27 93 68
Sprinkler 39 41 87 67
Linear Move 10 62 88 74

















Furrow 25 27 88 66
This analysis will assume that the irrigation efficiency
of each irrigation method in the valley is the same as its DU
as shown in Table 5-14. This assumption generally agrees with
the historical irrigation efficiency data presented in Chapter
II.
The cost of upgrading a existing furrow irrigation system
to sprinkler or linear irrigation system is based on a
telephone interview conducted on May 6, 1994 with a Salinas
Valley irrigation supplier and rental company (Rain for Rent,
Inc.). Per this telephone conversation, there is no cost
savings from having a pre-existing irrigation system. Very
little of the existing system's material can be used in the
new system. Therefore, the cost of upgrading equals the cost
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of purchasing and installing a new irrigation system. Tables
5-15 and 5-16 show the data that will be used to estimate the
marginal cost curve for reducing water use in agricultural
sector.






Linear 10 Yrs $531 74% $65.46
Sprinkler 10 Yrs $300 67% $36.98
Furrow 10 Yrs $100 66% $12.33
IE = DU (from Table 5-13)
CA/SL = The equivalent uniform annualized cost per year,
per acre, of the capital investment 29 for the
indicated irrigation system. (EQ. 4, & Calc.
146)
TABLE 5-16 ANNUAL COST PER AC -FT OF WATER





Cost per ac-ft of
Water Saved per
Year per Acre
Linear $53.13 $256.42 lfi ^
Sprinkler $24.65 $951.74 lfi4
29The capital investment is equal to the cost of initial
purchase and installation of the system. But, it does not
include the annual operational and maintenance cost of the
system.
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1. Marginal Cost Curve for Reducing Water Use for an
Individual Farmer
The following marginal cost curve uses the preceding
cost for upgrading the irrigation system. The gross profit 30
analysis for each crop is based on its historical two- thirds
trimmed mean. The following assumptions were also made:
1. Water use per acre for a furrow irrigation system is
2.59 ac-ft per year.
2. The average farmer has 1215 acres in production and his
crop mix is:
a. 694 acres of lettuce
b. 135 acres of celery
c. 194 acres of cauliflower
d. 192 acres of broccoli
3
.
The average farmer is using a furrow irrigation system
and would upgrade to a linear move irrigation system
since it has the lowest marginal cost of reducing water
use
.
4. Farmers would opt to remove crops from rotation rather
than upgrading the irrigation system if their profit per
ac-ft is less than the cost per ac-ft of the upgrade.
5. The average farmer will be referred to as "the farmer"
for the purpose of this section.
The average profit per ac-ft of water for all crops in
this subsample is lower than the cost per ac-ft of upgrading
the irrigation system. Thus, farmers would choose to remove
crops out of production before upgrading the irrigation
system. In particular the farmer in this subsample would




















(Calc. 148 thm 149.& 150 thru 152)
choose not to grow broccoli and cauliflower in order to sell
the water saved if the price of water is between $0 and $133
per ac-ft. If the price of water is between $133 and $141 per
ac-ft, the farmer would not grow celery in order to sell the
water normally used on this crop. If the price of water
exceeds $141 per ac-ft farmers would sell all their water
rights and grow no crops.
It must be understood that this curve is based on the
averages observed in the sample. Individual marginal cost
curves can vary greatly from this average. Some farmer's
marginal cost curves may justify the upgrading of the
irrigation system before taking crops out of production.
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2. Projected Allowed Water Use Under the MCWRA Program
and Economic Cost Per Year
The following table (5-18) present the projected
average allowed water use and economic cost per year for an
average farmer in the sample under the MCWRA Ordinance No.
3735. This ordinance establishes upper limits on the amount
of groundwater that can be extracted for irrigation purposes.
The limit is based on the location, acreage of irrigated crop
land, and crop type. Table 5-17 shows the current pumping
limits (MCWRA Ordinance No. 3735)
.
To determine the average farmer's projected annual
water demand, the ordinance limit, the required reduction and
TABLE 5-17. UPPER PUMPING LIMITS PER ACRE
OF CROP LAND (IN AC-PT PER YEAR)
SUBAREA TYPE "A" CROPS TYPE "B" CROPS TYPE "C" CROPS
PI 2.33 4.00 1.67
P2 2.56 4.00 1.84
El 2.84 4.22 1.75
E2 3.00 4.44 2.17
P3 3.23 4.44 2.25
FB 3.89 5.11 2.83
UV 4.11 5.33 3.00
Type "A" Crops = Vegetables, Field, Berries, Trees,
Forage
Type "B" Crops = Nursery
Type "C" Crops = Grapes
PI through P3 are subareas of the Pressure Area
El and E2 are subareas of the Eastside Area
FB = Forebay Area
UV = Upper Valley Area
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TABLE 5-18. SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL COMPLIANCE COSTS
POR THE MCWRA ALLOCATION PROGRAM









1991 52,327 36.437 57,791 51,272 197,827
% 26.45% 18.42% 29.21% 25.92%
HISTORICAL AVERAGE FARMER'S WATER USE AND COST OF


















1989 1136 2,942 3,925 983 $0
1990 1226 3,175 4,236 1,061 10
1991 1203 3,116 4,156 1,040 to
1992 1317 3,411 4,550 1,139 $0
1993 1202 3,113 4.153 1,040 $0
Average:
1.215 3.147 4,198 1,051 10
Sample Total:
19,400 5030 67,165 16,815 2
PROJECTED WATER USE AND ECONOMIC COST
PER YEAR FOR AVERAGE FARMER








1994 1215 3,147 4,198 1,051 (0
1995 1215 3.147 4,198 1,051 to
1996 1215 3.147 4,198 1,051 $0
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the annual cost of complying with the MCWRA's allocation
program (EQ. 6), this analysis assumes:
1. The projected annual demand per acre is 2.59 ac-ft.
This figure is the average water use per acre of
irrigated crop land according to the Montgomery Watson
groundwater model
.
2. The annual upper pumping limit per acre for an average
farmer in the valley is 3.455i 47 ac-ft. This is a
weighted average of the authorized pumping limit for
type "A" crops. It is based on the 1991 distribution
of crop land between the four hydrological regions (See
Table 5-18) [Ref . 2:p. 4-13].
3. The level of crop production and acreage remains
constant for 1994, 1995 and 1996.
3. Projected Allowed Water Use Under the Free Market
Program and Economic Cost Per Year
Tables 5-19 presents the allowed water use and the
annual cost of compliance for the average farmer based on the
proposed allocation program, the agricultural marginal cost of
compliance curve and the projected shortfall. Table 5-20
presents that same data for the agricultural subsample as a
whole. The projections for the free market program are based
on the following assumptions:
1
.
The farmers would choose to use the mean of the last
five years for their historical use figure. Average
water use = AEA = ( (FY88 + FY89 + FY90 + FY91 + FY93) /
5) .
2 The average net reduction for the zone is equal to the
total discharge for the zone divided by the total
discharge (ANR = Total Recharge / Total Discharge)
.
3. Based on the Montgomery Watson Groundwater Model, the
total discharge for the valley = 535,000 ac-ft per year
and the total recharge for the valley = 498,000 ac-ft
per year. Therefore, ANR = 498,000 / 535,000 = .93.
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TABLE 5-19. AN INDIVIDUAL FARMER'S COMPLIANCE COST
FOR THE FREE MARKET ALLOCATION PROGRAM






























$ () = negative cost = Profit
The AEA is 2.59 ac-ft per year per acre which is the
average water use per acre of irrigated crop land given
by the Montgomery Watson groundwater model.
The average farmer water share allotment in acre -feet
would be equal to the average net reduction of the zone
multiplied by the historical average water use (allotted




= AAEA = 2.41 ac-ft/yr = 2.59 ac-
The cost of compliance for the free market allocation
plan assumes that subsample representatives will be able
to purchase or sell as much water as they desire at the
prevailing market price.
All crops that have historically negative profit margin
will be assumed to have zero profit margin for this
analysis
.
The acreage of crop production will stay constant in the
future. Therefore, an average farmer will have 1,215
acres of crop land under production each year based on
data collected from the agricultural sample.
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TABLE 5-20. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR COMPLIANCE COSTS
FOR THE FREE MARKET ALLOCATION PROGRAM









19,440 50,352 46,832 3,520






















$ () = negative cost = Profit from reducing crop acreage
and selling the excess water.
4 . Economic Cost Comparison of the Two Allocation Plans
The preceding analysis shows that the free market
program creates a potential revenue stream for the farmers in
the sample. Cauliflower and broccoli have had a negative
average profit for the sample of farmers over the last six
years . The water used on these crops could be sold on the
open market. The proposed free market program can profit the
agricultural sample group even though it requires a greater
water reduction than the MCWRA allocation program.
This analysis also indicates that the farming commun-
ity would lose its economic incentive to farm if the market
price of water exceeds $140.54 per ac-ft. This is profit
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This thesis examines the advantages and disadvantages of
three ways to allocate groundwater. It also determines if a
free market allocation program is more economically efficient
than the MCWRA allocation program for the Salinas Valley. The
thesis covered four areas:
1. The groundwater resource problems in the SVGB and the
Valley's historical land and water use trends in the
agricultural and the urban sectors were discussed. The
urban sector analysis was divided into five segments:
industrial, residential, commercial, agricultural, and
governmental . Background material was presented on the
MCWRA' s mission and legal authority and the steps they
have taken to solve the groundwater resource problem.
2. The advantages and disadvantages of three basic alloca-
tion systems were analyzed. The three systems are: the
regulatory control system (maximum consumption limits)
;
the taxation allocation system (consumption fee) ; and
the free market allocation system (transferable consump-
tion rights)
.
3. A privatization plan for the SVGB was proposed. Each of
the plan's program elements were identified and analyzed
for feasibility. A proposed organizational structure
was also analyzed.
4. The compliance costs were estimated for two allocation
plans (MCWRA' s plan and theoretical free market (priva-
tization) plan) , based on a sample group of water users
from the industrial, urban and agricultural sectors.
The initial start-up and annual operating costs of both
allocation plans were also estimated.
The conclusions drawn from each component will be discussed in
the following sections.
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A. SVGB GROUNDWATER RESOURCES PROBLEM
The SVGB has historically been overdrafted by 37,000 ac-ft
of water annually (See Table 2-8) . Evidence shows that the
basin's groundwater levels have been constantly declining
since 1945 (see Figure 2-7). The groundwater currently
required by the basin's agricultural, urban and industrial
water users is greater than the basin's natural recharge rate.
This condition, if not corrected, will continue and possibly
accelerate. Data presented in Chapter II indicates that the
urban sector is projected to continue increasing its demand
for water through the year 2020 (See Table 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-
5 , and 2-6). Agricultural water demand will probably remain
constant, or decrease slightly, as small portions of farmland
are annually converted into urban uses.
Overdrafting of the basin has caused several documented
problems
:
1. The cost of extracting groundwater from the basin has
increased as the water table lowers. This has also
permanently damaged the basin's storage capacity because
parts of the water bearing semiconsolidated sediments
have been irreversibly compacted.
2
.
Overdrafting in the Pressure Area has accelerated
seawater intrusion into the basin's aquifers along the
coast [Ref . l:p. 31] . Seawater intrusion poses a
serious, imminent threat to the municipal water supply
for the City of Salinas and other costal communities.
3. Nitrate Contamination in the SVGB is believed to occur
when the agricultural community over- irrigates their
crops. Over- irrigation enables nitrate laden water to
percolate deep into the aquifer system, reducing the
basin's water quality.
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The MCWRA has taken several steps to reduce overdraft ing
in the SVGB:
1. The MCWRA established the Salinas River Basin Management
Plan (BMP) /program to develop and construct alternative
water supplies for the Salinas Valley.
2. The MCWRA has executed a water demand management alloca-
tion plan by implementing the following programs:
a. Voluntary educational programs to promote water
conservation methods/programs and improve
irrigation efficiency (i.e., the Mobile Irrigation
Laboratory program; the California Irrigation
Management Information System (CIMIS) , the Water
Awareness Committee of Monterey County, etc.)
b. A regulatory control system (maximum consumption
standards) for allocating groundwater in the Basin.
This was implemented by a series of ordinances
regulating maximum agricultural water use by crop
type and mandating urban water conservation
targets.
c. A groundwater extraction charge to finance the BMP
program and provide economic incentives for well
owners to conserve water.
These programs are within the MCWRA' s legal authority, as
conferred by the State of California. This includes authority
to:
1. Regulate urban and agricultural water use by setting
upper pumping limits and mandatory water conservation
requirements. (MCWRA Ordinance No. 03 744 and 03 720)
2. Monitor pumping on all Salinas Valley wells having a
discharge pipe with a diameter of 3 inches or greater.
Well owners are required to purchase and install
flowmeters on their wells, and to report annually their
groundwater pumping activity to the MCWRA. (MCWRA
Ordinance No. 3717)
3. Levy a surcharge on well owners, based on the amount of
groundwater they extract from the basin. The charges
are incremental and increase as the quantity of water
pumped increases above the relevant upper pumping
limit. (MCWRA Ordinance No. 3742)
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B. ALLOCATION SYSTEM ANALYSIS
The economic, legal and operational advantages and
disadvantages of three basic allocation systems for the SVGB
were also examined. The major findings for each allocation
program are presented in the following tables:





1) Commonly accepted by the economic community as
the most economically efficient of the three basic
methods.
1) The government lacks knowledge and experience in
using this allocation method.
2) Creates profit incentive to conserve water and
develop new water conservation technology and
methods.
2) This allocation method does not inherently generate
revenues to cover monitoring and enforcement costs
unless MCWRA collects surcharges on water share
trades or collects fines for program violations.
3) Allocates groundwater on the basis of the most
valuable use of water at that time.
4) Compatible with existing legislation.
5) Minimizes political involvement (compared to the
other two allocation systems).
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1} Cost avoidance creates an incentive to conserve
water, and develop new water conservation technology
and methods.
1) Economic inefficiencies can be generated by giving
subsidies and waivers to special interest groups for
political reasons.
2) The allocation method generates a positive revenue
stream for the MCWRA.
2) It is politically difficult to change the surcharge
once it has been established.
3) This allocation method is relatively easy to monitor
and enforce.
4) The government has prior experience and existing
legislation for this type of allocation method.
5) This allocation method will generally have a greater
economic efficiency compared to a regulatory control
allocation method (maximum consumption standards)
given that both reduce water use to the same level.
TABLE 6-3. REGULATORY CONTROL ALLOCATION METHOD (MAXIMUM
CONSUMPTION LIMITS)
Advantages Disadvantages
1) Historically, the most widely used method to
allocate water in the United States.
1) The marginal costs of reducing water consumption
vary greatly among different consumers.
2) Easy to implement due to prior governmental
experience and existing legislation.
2) There is no economic incentive to conserve water
beyond the authorized upper pumping limit.
3) Neutral financial impact; revenue collected from
fines can offset administrative costs.
3) Has the greatest possibility for politically motivated
economic inefficiencies.
4) The MCWRA would retain complete control over the
use and allocation of groundwater in the basin.
4) It is politically difficult to change the pumping limit
once it has been established.
5) Creates an incentive for well owners to invest in
water conservation technology and methods when their
demand for water is greater than the authorized limit.
C. FREE MARKET (PRIVATIZATION) ALLOCATION PROGRAM
The third component of this thesis described a free market
allocation program for the SVGB. It was patterned after the
Reclaim program that is managed by the South Coast Air Basin.
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The proposed program uses water credits (units of ownership
for water stored in the basin) and shares (units of ownership
for the recharge water that flows into the basin) to transfer
water consumption rights between private parties.
The best method to initially the allocate water stored in
the basin is to allocate it to the MCWRA as water credits.
The agency may then sell or transfer these credits to private
parties. The best method to allocate water shares is based on
historical water use for urban and industrial well owners.
For agricultural well owners, the easiest and fairest way of
allocating water shares is based on either total acreage owned
or acreage being farmed.
The most efficient way to trade water credits and shares
is to operate a system similar to the NASDAQ stock exchange.
Buyers and sellers of credits and shares would place orders
which the MCWRA would execute. A computerized system would
track these transactions and monitor the participants' pumping
activity.
D. RELATIVE COMPLIANCE COSTS
Finally, this thesis analyzed the compliance and implemen-
tation costs for both the MCWRA allocation program and the
proposed free market (privatization) program. The analysis
sampled representatives from the industrial, urban and
agricultural sectors. The industrial representative is the J.
R. Smucker Company. The urban representatives include the
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City of Salinas, the Marina Coast Water District and the
California Water Service Company. The agricultural sector
representatives include 16 farms located in the following
areas: Greenfield, Watsonville, Soledad, Gonzales, Salinas,
Castroville and Chualar. Since the agricultural data is
considered proprietary, averages from the sample were
presented and analyzed. This final component of the thesis
was subdivided into five parts: Implementation Cost Analysis;
Industrial Sector Analysis; Urban Sector Analysis;
Agricultural Sector Analysis; and Summary Analysis.
1. Implementation Cost Analysis
This thesis analyzed the initial program implemen-
tation costs assuming that both the MCWRA allocation program
and the theoretical program do not currently exist. When
implemented, both will be managed by new, independent
divisions of the MCWRA. This assumption means the MCWRA would
have to hire new personnel, purchase support equipment and
furniture, and lease additional office space to house the new
division. The analysis was based on a twelve year period and
a four percent discount rate.
Expressed as net present cost, the implementation cost
of the proposed program is $13,781,552; while the implementa-
tion cost of the MCWRA program is only $2,952,684. The major
reason for the difference is the cost of monitoring and
enforcing these two programs. The net present cost of the
free market program's computerized monitoring and enforcement
system is $11,407,098; the MCWRA' s program uses technicians to
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physically check each well's meter on a quarterly basis. The
net present cost of this approach is only $1,382,192. If the
free market allocation program operated on an honor system
similar to the MCWRA program, where pumping volume is verified
quarterly, the net present value to implement this allocation
program would be only $3,472,372. The MCWRA' s allocation
program is much cheaper to implement than the free market
program's allocation plan in large part because the free
market program envisions a more proactive monitoring and
enforcement plan. This requirement is not a unique inherent
requirement of this allocation method.
2. Industrial Sector Cost Analysis
The California Products Division of the J. M. Smucker
Company is an agricultural processing and packaging plant.
This industry segment was selected due to its high water
consumption and its economic significance. This division has
projected that their water consumption will increase by 5% per
year.
Using current water conservation technology, Smucker'
s
can reduce water use by 96 ac-ft annually (65 percent) . The
annual average cost for the first 7.37 ac-ft of water con-
served (5% reduction in water use) is $27 per ac-ft. This
five percent reduction would be accomplished by augmenting
Smucker' s current water conservation program. Smucker can
also save an additional 88 ac-ft of (60 percent reduction in
water use) using a membrane filtration recycling system. This
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latter technology costs $443 per ac-ft of water annually. Tte
preceding cost estimates were used to deter-mine the cost of
complying with both allocation programs, based on the
assumptions stated in Chapter V. For any given level of water
use reduction, the proposed free market allocation program had
a lower cost of compliance than the MCWRA's program unless the
market price of water is $433 per ac-ft. At this price,
Smucker would neither buy or sell water. They would reduce
water to exactly the required level through conservation, as
with the MCWRA program. In this case, both programs would
have a similar cost. Thus, for this company, the proposed
free market allocation program is economically preferable to
the MCWRA's program.
3. Urban Sector Analysis
The urban sector analysis determined the marginal cost
of reducing water use through five methods of water conserva-
tion. The marginal cost of reducing water use by one ac-ft
per year for each of the five conservation methods are shown
below:
1. Low flow showerhead retrofit program: $46 per ac-ft per
year.
2. Educational and public information program: $212 per ac-
ft per year.
3. Water reclamation program: $400 per ac-ft per year.
4. Ultra low flow toilet retrofit program: $649 per ac-ft
per year.
5. Seawater desalinization program: $1050 per ac-ft per
year.
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These marginal costs were used to determine the cost
of compliance for both allocation programs for each urban area
in the sample. The MCWRA plan specifies reduction levels for
each urban water supplier, irregardless of the marginal cost
required to meet this requirement. Under the MCWRA plan,
Salinas if forced to conserve 5,253 ac-ft of water in 1994, of
which 4,299 ac-ft are conserved through a low- flow showerhead
retrofit program at $46/ac-ft and 954 ac-ft are conserved
through an information and education program at $212/ac-ft.
Marina and Cal Water more than meet their required reductions
with only a low flow showerhead retrofit program. Thus, the
marginal cost of compliance is higher for Salinas under the
MCWRA plan. The regulatory plan allows cheaper sources of
water conservation to go untapped because suppliers cannot buy
and sell water.
Under the market based plan, urban users can buy and
sell water shares and credits both among themselves and with
other industries. Thus, the market based plan will always
cost less than the MCRWA plan. If the price of water is less
than $46/ac-ft, all urban users can meet their water require-
ments by purchasing water. If the price of water is between
$46 and $212/ac-ft, all urban sector suppliers would implement
a low flow showerhead retrofit program. Marina and Cal Water
would exceed their water reduction requirements and sell their
excess water on the open market; Salinas would not satisfy its
required reduction, so it would continue to purchase some
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water from the market. However, Salinas' purchases are less
expensive than the alternative: implementing an education and
public information program. If the market price of water
exceeds $212/ac-ft, all three suppliers could profit by
implementing an education and public information program and
selling their excess water. This would further reduce the
sector's total compliance costs. Thus, the cost to each
supplier and the total sector's cost are lower for the
proposed program than for the MCWRA program at all water
prices
.
As a final note, the MCWRA allocation program ties the
annual water consumption of a urban area to its population
(i.e., it specifies a per capita water consumption limit based
on 1987 per capita water consumption) . The Association of
Monterey Bay Area Governments (AMBAG) projects that the urban
sector population will continue to grow. Thus, the urban
demand for water will continue to grow in the future. This is
supported by the data received from the City of Salinas and
Cal Water.
4. Agricultural Sector Analysis
For the sample from the agricultural sector, the
historical average profit margin for cauliflower was -$222 per
acre and for broccoli was -$56 per acre from 1988 to 1993.
Only lettuce and celery consistently made a profit during the
past six years. Furthermore, no government, private, or
academic organization has estimated the irrigation efficiency
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for specific sites and irrigation methods or the required
average water application rates for the major crops grown in
the Salinas Valley. Thus, broad assumptions were made in
these areas to develop reasonable marginal cost curves for
water conservation in the agricultural sector.
The compliance cost for the sample from the agricul-
tural sector is zero under the MCWRA allocation program.
Water use in the sample is equal to the historical water use
per acre of irrigated crop land in the agricultural sector
(2.59 ac-ft of water per year) [Ref . 2:pp. 2-3] . This is less
than the amount authorized by the MCWRA' s allocation program.
The MCWRA' s program allows an average farmer in the valley
with row crops to use 3.455 ac-ft of water per year for
irrigation. (3.455 ac-ft per year is a weighted average of
the authorized pumping limit for row crops based on the 1991
distribution of crop land in the four hydrological regions
(See Chapter V, p. 203 for details).)
There is no compliance cost for the sample from the
agricultural sector with the proposed allocation program
either. This program will actually generate a positive
revenue stream for the average farmer in the sample. Given
the past negative average profit for cauliflower and broccoli,
a farmer should choose to sell the water that would have been
used to grow cauliflower and broccoli. Water sales would have
a greater expected profit than the average loss incurred
growing broccoli, and cauliflower. The projected profit
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generated for an average farmer in the sample will range from
$11,700 to $286,209 per year as the market price of water per
ac-ft ranges from $15 to $200. Thus, the sample from the
agricultural sector would economically prefer the proposed
allocation program rather than the MCWRA program, based on the
assumptions stated in Chapter V.
E. SUMMARY ANALYSIS
This analysis has demonstrated that a free market alloca-
tion program minimizes compliance costs in every sector for
any water use reduction level. This sector by sector analysis
clearly supports a free market allocation program. However,
the benefits of a free market program become more pronounced
when all three sectors are considered simultaneously.
Table 6-4 provides the water use reductions envisioned by
the MCWRA and proposed free market allocation program.
Furthermore, the agricultural sample in this analysis uses an
estimated 16,000 ac-ft of water per year for cauliflower and
brocolli. The required water conservation in both programs
can be satisfied by reducing the water used for these crops.
Both of these crops have had negative average profits for the
farmers in the sample over the last six years. Therefore,
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cost minimization would imply that water reduction should
focus on these crops.
TABLE 6-4. REQUIRED WATER USE REDUCTIONS
(AC -FT PER YEAR)
Industrial Urban Agricultural Total
































Under MCWRA regulatory allocation program, each user in
each sector must comply with specific water use limits. Table
6-5 shows the annual costs of complying with both of the above
levels of water use reduction under a regulatory allocation
system. Under a free market allocation program, the entire
water use reduction requirements would be satisfied by
reducing cauliflower and broccoli production. Because these
crops have negative average profits, the total compliance
costs are assumed to be zero. Thus, the total compliance
costs for the regulatory program in Table 6-5 represents
31Any sector with excess water capacity will be assigned
a value of zero when used in calculating the total required
water use reduction. This requirement is necessary since the
regulatory allocation program can not transfer excess water
capacity from one sector to another.
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savings under the free market allocation program.
Furthermore, farmers could sell any excess water on the open
market. This would further increase the savings associated
with a free market program. Assuming farmers eliminate
cauliflower and broccoli production, Table 6-6 shows the total
cost savings of a free market program as the price of water
varies from $15 to $100 per ac-ft. At higher market water
prices, it might become more profitable for farmers to start
withdrawing celery and lettuce from production and selling the
excess water. The net profitability of these additional water
sales would further increase the benefits of a free market
allocation program.
Assuming both the MCWRA and free market programs use the
same monitoring plan, the cost savings associated with the
free market program will easily exceed the extra costs
required to implement this program. As described above, if
both programs check pumping rates quarterly, the free market
program costs approximately $520,000 more to implement
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TABLE 6-5. COMPLIANCE COSTS

















































































































































Total (41,122) (82,265) (426,333) (685,028)
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TABLE 6-6. COST SAVING FOR A FREE
MARKET ALLOCATION PROGRAM
YR Total Water Use
Reduction
$15 acft $30 ac ft $75 ac ft $100 acft
94 7,949 acft
per yr
921,017 1,294,048 2,628,150 3,435,141
11,320 acft
per yr
556,017 626,243 1,051,934 1,354,251
95 8,100 acft
per yr
932,202 1,302,956 2,633,015 3,438,612
12,279 acft
per yr
730,860 786,690 1,171,976 1,452,700
96 8,253 ac-ft
per yr
943,052 1,311,524 2,637,579 3,441,823
13,259 ac-ft
per yr
940,297 981,440 1,325,508 1,584,203
($3,472,372 - $2,952,684). This cost difference can be
recovered by this sample in the first year. If similar cost
savings characterize the rest of the SVGB, it is clear the
free market program's higher implementation costs will be
fully recovered in one year. In fact, the free market program
would likely generate enough savings in the first few years to
pay for the $11,407,098 (NPC) computerized monitoring system,
even at modest water prices.
The analysis also discovered that the MCWRA's allocation
program focuses on the urban sector (the industrial sector is
a sub- component of the urban sector) and the agricultural
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sector. The MCWRA program allows urban sector water use to
increase in the future but does not force the agricultural
sector to reduce its water use below historical levels.
Therefore, the MCWRA allocation program will not bring the
Salinas Valley Groundwater Basin back into balance.
This conclusion results from two program requirements.
First, the MCWRA allocation program allows the urban sector to
increase water use in proportion to increases in population.
Furthermore, the urban sector population is expected to
increase until 2020 according to data received from AMBAG.
Thus, water use in the urban sector can be expected to
increase above its current levels until at least the year
2020. This conclusion is supported by the data received from
the urban areas in the sample.
Second, the pumping limit for agriculture under the MCWRA
allocation program is set at level higher than the historical
average annual historical agricultural water use per acre of
irrigated crop land. Historical agricultural water use is
2.59 ac-ft/yr per irrigated acre and the upper pumping limit
for an average farmer in the valley is 3.455 ac-ft/yr per
acre. 32 This upper pumping limit was chosen because "B" and
"C" type crops have higher pumping limits than "A" type crops.
Therefore, one can assume that the agricultural sector will
32 3.455 ac-ft/yr per acre is a weighted average of the
authorized pumping limit for Crop "A" type crops (row crops)
based on a 1991 distribution of crop land in the four
hydrological regions.
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not reduce water use since there is no effective requirement
to do so.
The MCWRA was questioned on this point and stated it was
true that their allocation program would not by itself bring
the basin into balance. However, they believe the basin will
be in balance in six years, when the Basin Management Plan
(BMP) project is completed. The California State Water Board
is skeptical that the BMP project will be completed in six
years. [Ref . 30:p. 3]
.
This analysis has established that a free market
allocation program is not only feasible, but it is probably
more economically efficient than the current MCWRA'
s
allocation program. It is, however, more difficult to operate
and maintain than the other two allocation methods discussed
in this thesis. While the precise values and responses in
this thesis (i.e., withdrawing cauliflower and broccoli from
production) depend critically on the assumptions and sample
selected, the efficiency of a free market program relative to
a regulatory control system would persist for other assump-
tions and samples. The free market program provides water
users with considerable flexibility in responding to water use
limits. Users can replicate the inflexible results mandated
by a regulatory control system but they have the flexibility
and mechanism to find a more efficient response.
The analysis in the thesis should provide sufficient
justification for the MCWRA and the County Board of super-
visors to discuss the possibility of further research on a
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free market allocation system for SVGB. This thesis will
hopefully stimulate policy makers and leaders of the commun-
ities within the valley to re- open the discussion on how to
properly allocate groundwater in the Salinas Valley as well as









(Uniform Annual Cost) X [(1/i) - (1 / (i X
(1 + iV 1 ) )]
i = Inflation rate, which will always be 4% for this
analysis
n = Number of years being discounted
Projected Net Future Cost for Present Cost is:
NFCin= (Present Cost) X (1 + i) n
i = inflation rate, which will always be 4% for this
analysis
n = Number of years projected into the future.
Net Present Cost for a Single Future Cost is:
NPC, = (Future Cost) X (1 / (1 + i) n )
i = inflation rate, which will always be 4% for this
analysis
n = Number of years being discounted
Uniform Annual Cost in the Future calculated from NPC is
Uniform Annual Cost = NPC / [ (1/i) - (1 / (i X (l + i) n ) ) ]
i = Inflation rate, which will always be 4% for this
analysis
n = Number of years
Calculation of NPC for Uniform Annual Cost in Perpetuity
NPC (Perpetuity) = Uniform Annual Cost / Inflation Rate
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This calculation is determined by the following
method: (For the Industrial and Agricultural sectors
skip to step c
.
)
A) Ordinance Limit for the Urban Sector is determined
by:
Ordinance Limit = Pop. X (85% X (Representative's
1987 Wat. / Pop. or Ser.))
B) Required Reduction = Projected Water Demanded -
Ordinance Limit
C) The annual economic cost of reducing water use - by
the level required each year - is determined from
the marginal cost curve. The area underneath the
curve, at the required reduction level, is equal to
the annual economic cost of reduction. For
example: Table 5-1, Required Reduction is 69.75 ac-
ft. The area underneath the curve for this level
of reduction is equal to: ($27 X 7.37) + ($433 X
(69.75 - 7.37)) = $27209.53. All calculations for
determining the cost of complinace with MCWRA'
s
program will be calculated in this manner.
The economic cost of reduction is calculated in the same
manner as in EQ. 6 for the situation where there is no
water is available for trade. When water is available
it is assumed that a subsample representative will only
purchase water up to a price that is equal or less than
its own marginal cost of reduction. The water reduction
requirement, which is not fulfilled by open market
purchase, will be accomplished through internal water
conservation programs. The economic cost of reduction
is then equal to: Cost of the water purchased + Cost of
conservation program (determined by the marginal cost
curve) . For example, Table 5-2, Market Price of Water is
$30/ac-ft, required reduction 17.69 ac-ft. Therefore,
economic cost = $509 = Purchase ((17.69 - 7.37) X $30)
+ Water Conservation program (7.37 X $27)
.
If the market price of water is greater than the
marginal cost of reduction, then it is assumed that the
representative will sell any available water that is not
required to meet the allocation's program requirements.
Example (On page 44 of the thesis, Calculation: 127)
Compliance Cost = Water Conservation Cost - Revenue
From Water Sold (For calculations 124 thru 132)
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Water Conservation Cost = (Amount of Water Conserved X
Cost per ac-ft of water)
Revenue From Water Sold = (Amount of Water Conserved -
Amount of Required Water Reduction) X (Market Price of
Water)
Negative Compliance Cost = Profit
-6,876 - (46 X 644) - (100 X (644 - 279))
This calculation is determined by the following method:
A. Uniform annual cost using EQ. 4 assuming i =4%, n =
20 years, NPC = $139, $249, $359.
Uniform Annual Cost = NPC / [(1/i) - (1 / (i X
(l+i) n ) )]
10.2279 = $139 / 13.5903
18.3219 = $249 / 13.5903
26.4159 = $359 / 13.5903
B. Cost per saving one ac-ft per year, assuming water
savings per year = .02771 ac-ft per yr per toilet.
Cost per yr /ac-ft = Uniform Annual Cost / Water
Savings per yr
$369.11 = $10.2279 / .02771 ac-ft
$661.20 = $18.3219 / .02771 ac-ft
$953.30 = $26.4159 / .02771 ac-ft
This calculation is determine by the following method:
A. Uniform annual cost using EQ. 4 assuming i =4%, n =
7 years, NPC = $5.99, $11.00, $15.95.
Uniform Annual Cost = NPC / [(1/i) - (1 / (i X
(l+i) n ) )]
$ .9980 = $5.99 / 6.0021
$1.8327 = $11.00 / 6.0021
$2.6574 = $15.95 / 6.0021
B. Cost per saving one ac-ft per year, assuming water
savings per year = 12,950 gallons/yr = .03974 ac-ft
per yr per showerhead. 325,850 gallons = 1 ac-ft
Cost per yr /ac-ft = Uniform Annual Cost / Water
Savings per yr
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$25.11 = $.9980 / .03974 ac-ft
$46.12 = $1.8327 / .03974 ac-ft
$66.87 = $2.6574 / .03974 ac-ft
10. This calculation is determine by the following method:
A. Cost per saving one ac-ft per year, assuming water
savings per year = 414 ac-ft per yr and the annual
cost is $34,000 / yr.
Cost per yr /ac-ft = Uniform Annual Cost / Water
Savings per yr
$82.13 = $34,000 / 414 ac-ft
11. This calculation is determine by the following method:
A. Cost per saving one ac-ft per year, assuming water
savings per year = 42 ac-ft per yr and the annual
cost is $14,360 / yr.
Cost per yr /ac-ft = Uniform Annual Cost / Water
Savings per yr
$341.90 = $14,360 / 42 ac-ft
12
.
The Maximum amount of water that can be reduced for
Salinas and Marina is determined by the following
calculations
:
A. For Low Flow Showerhead Program, assuming 90%
population currently do not own low flow
showerheads
.
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (population X
9 0%) X (water savings per year per person using a
Low Flow Showerhead)
B. For Information and Education Program, assuming it
can reduce water use by 5%.
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (projected water
use) X 5%
C. For Reclamation Program, assuming it can reduce
water use by 15%.
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (projected water
use) X 15%
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D. For the ULF Toilet Program, assuming 90 % popula-
tion currently do not own ULF toilets and that
ratio of multi to single family residencies is .22.
This calculation also assumes that the following
characteristics are:
Average Single Family Household has the following
characteristic
:
Persons per household = 3.0
Toilets per household = 2.2
Average household characteristics for a Multi-
Family residency are:
Persons per household = 2.5
Toilets per household = 1.2
No. of toilets available for retrofit = (
population X 90%) / ((( ratio: single /multi) X (
Single Family ratio: Persons / toilets) ) + (
(
ratio: multi / single) X (multi Family ratio:
Persons / toilets) )
)
Max. Annual Water Savings = (No. toilets available)
X (Annual Water Savings Per Toilet)
E. Seawater Desalination Program can produce an
infinite amount of fresh water given enough
resources
.
The Maximum amount of water that can be reduced for
Cal Water is determined by the following
calculations and based on following assumptions:
1) The ratio of multi - residency water use to the
total water use growing at linear rate of: '94
11.2%, '95 11.5%, '96 11.8% and single family
residency is constant at 48%.
2) The following growth projections are based on
prior rates assuming linear relationship for






3) On average, there are three persons residing in
a single residency and there are on average 2.5
persons residing in a multi- family residency.
A. For Low Flow Showerhead Program, assuming 90%
population currently do not own low flow shower-
heads .
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (population X
90%) X (water savings per year per person using a
Low Flow Showerhead)
Population = (No. of single residency X 3.0 persons
/ single residency) + (No. of Multi residency X 2.5
persons / Multi)
Annual Water Savings per Showerhead per person =
12,950 gallons = 12,950 / 325,850 = .03974 ac-ft
B. For Information and Education Program, assuming it
can reduce water use by 5%.
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (projected water
use) X 5%
C. For Reclamation Program, assuming it can reduce
water use by 15%.
Max. Annual Total Water Savings = (projected water
use) X 15%
D. For the ULF Toilet Program, assuming 90 %
population currently do not own ULF toilets and
that ratio of multi to single family residencies is
.22. This calculation also assumes that the
following characteristics are:
Average Single Family Household has the following
characteristic
:
Persons per household = 3.0
Toilets per household = 2.2
Average household characteristics for a Multi-
Family residency are:
Persons per household = 2.5
Toilets per household = 1.2
Max. Annual Water Savings = (No. Single Residencies
X No. of toilets per Single X Annual water savings
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per toilet) + (No. Multi Residencies X No. of
toilets per Multi X Annual water savings per
toilet)
Seawater Desalination Program can produce an






1. $2,753,363= ($293 , 376 ) [ (1/ . 04) - (1/ ( . 04 (1+ . 04) 12 ) ) ]
i = 4%, n = 12
2. $13,412 = (9,800) (1 / (1 + .04) 8
i = 4%, n = 8
3. $33,786= ($3,600) [ (1/. 04) - (l/(. 04(1+. 04) 12 ) )]
i = 4%, n = 12
4. $39,200 = (53,648) [1 / (1 + .04) 8 ]
i = 4%, n = 8
5. ($3,507) = ( ($1,200) (1/(1+. 04) 8 ) X4
i = 4%, n = 8
6. $1,562 = ($2,500) ( l/(l+.04) 12
i = 4%, n = 12
7. $53,495= ($5,700) [ (1/.04) - (l/( .04 (1+.04) 12 ) ) ]
i = 4%, n = 12
8. $2,259,857= ($240 , 792 ) [ (1/ . 04) - (1/ ( . 04 (1+ . 04) 12 ) ) ]
i = 4%, n = 12
9. $5,405,818= ($576,000) [ (1/. 04) - (l/( .04(1+. 04) 12 ) ) ]
i = 4%, n = 12
10. ($13,741) = ( ($5,500) (1/(1+. 04) 12 ) X4
i = 4%, n = 12
Salvage value = (9800 - 1200)X 50% + 1200 = $5,500
11. ($1,998,720) = ( ($3,200,000) (1/ (1+. 04) 12 )
i = 4%, n = 12
Salvage value = $8,000,000 X 40% = $3,200,000
12. Total NPC - Monitoring System - Furniture/computers
Salary = NPC without monitoring program
NPC for Salary (EQ. 1) =
$277,724 = ($29,592) [ (1/. 04) - (l/( .04 (1+.04) 12 ) )]
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NPC without monitoring program =
$2,090,180 - 13,781,552 - 11,407,098 - 6,550 227,724
13. Total NPC - Transportation - Furniture/computers -Salary
= NPC without monitoring program
NPC for Salary (EQ. 1) =
$1,271,268 = ($135,456) [ (1/. 04) - (l/( .04 (1+.04) 12 ) ) ]
NPC without monitoring program =
$1,570,492 = 2,962,898 - 94,938 - 26,200 - 1,271,268
14. NPC under honor system =
= NPC without monitoring program + ( (Transportation +
Furniture/computers + Salary) = MCWRA monitoring
program)
= 2,090,180 + 94,938 + 26,200 + 1,271,268
= $3,482,586
15. Difference in the NPC of two programs = 3,482,586 -
2,962,898 = $519,688
Uniform Annual Cost =
= $519,688 / [(1/.04) - (1 / (.04 X (1+.04) 12 ))]
= $55,374
i = 4%, n = 12
16. Future Annnual Cost = NPC X i
$2,800 = $70,000 X .04
Cost per ac-ft = Annual Cost / Annual Water Savings
$99.78 per ac-ft = $2,800 / 28.063 ac-ft
17. Same as 16.
$4,000 = $100,000 X .04
Cost per ac-ft = $542.74 = $4,000 / 7.37 ac-ft
18. NPC
Initial Investment = $275,000
Operating Cost
$50,000 / [(1/.04) - (1 / (.04 X (1+.04) 10 ) ) ] =
=$405,545
Total NPC =$680,545
Uniform Annual Cost =
$680,545 / [(1/.04) - (1 / (.04 X (1+.04) 10 ))] =
= $83,905 per year for 10 yrs
Water Saved = 147.47 ac-ft X 60% = 88.482 ac-ft
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Therefore: average cost of saving one ac-ft =
$948.27 = $83,905 / 88.482 ac-ft
19. Cost per ac-ft = $70,000 / 147.47 ac-ft of water
= $515.36 per ac-ft of water annually
20. Cost per ac-ft = Cost of Reduction - Cost of extraction
or purchase
A. $27.38 = $542.74 - $515.36
B. $432.91 = $948.27 - $515.36
21. 265 = 15 X 17.69
22. 381 = 15 X 25.43
23. 503 = 15 X 33.56
24. 509 = 30 X (17.69 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
25. 741 = 30 X (25.43 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
26. 985 = 30 X (33.56 - 7.37) + (7.37 x 27)
27. 973 - 75 X (17.69 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
28. 1554 = 75 X (25.43 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
29. 2163 = 75 X (33.56 - 7.37) + (7.37 x 27)
30. 1231 = 100 X (17.69 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
31. 2005 = 100 X (25.43 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
32. 2818 = 200 X (33.56 - 7.37) + (7.37 x 27)
33. 2263 = 200 X (17.69 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
34. 3811 = 200 X (25.43 - 7.37) + (7.37 X 27)
35. 5437 = 200 X (33.56 - 7.37) + (7.37 x 27)
36. (12,950 X (120,197 X.9))/ 325850 = 4299.2 ac-ft,
Showerhead
37. (35,025 X .05) = 1751.25, information program
1751 + 4299 = 6050
38. (35,025 X .15) = 5253.75, reclamation program
6050 + 5254 = 11,304
39. [(120,197 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5 /
1.2)))] X .0271 = 1926.19, toilet replacement program
11,304 + 1926 = 13,230
40. (12,950 X ((17297 X 3) + (6779.5 X 2.5) X.9))/ 325850 =
2462.26 ac-ft, Showerhead
41. (14,784 X .05) = 739.2, information program
2462 + 739 = 3201
42. (14,784 X .15) = 2217.6, reclamation program
3201 + 2218 = 5419
43. [(17297 X 2.2 X .0223) + (6779.5 X 1.2 X .0442)] =
1,2 08, toilet replacement program
5419 + 1,208 = 6627
44. 1: (12,950 X (18,000 X.9))/ 325850 = 643.82 ac-ft
45. 2: (2,729 X .05) = 136.45
644 + 136 = 780
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46. 3:(2,729 X .15) = 409.35
780 + 409 = 1,189
47. 4:[(18 / 000 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5
/ 1.2) )) ] X .0271 = 668.175
1,189 + 668 = 1,857
48. 1: (12,950 X (122,655 X.9))/ 325850 = 4387.123 ac-ft,
Showerhead
49. 2: (35,742 X .05) = 1787.1, information program
4387 + 1787 = 6174
50. 3: (35,742 X .15) = 5361.3, reclamation program
6174 + 5361 = 11535
51. 4:[(122,655 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5
/ 1.2)))] X .0271 = 1965.58, toilet replacement program
11535 + 1966 = 13501
52. (12,950 X (((17354 X 3) + (6800.4 X 2.5)) X.9))/ 325850
2,470.24 ac-ft, Showerhead
53. (15,019 X .05) = 739.2, information program
2,470 + 739 = 3,209
54. (15,019 X .15) = 2217.6, reclamation program
3,209 + 2,218 = 5,427
55. [(17354 X 2.2 X .0223) + (6800.4 X 1.2 X .0442)] =
1,212.08, toilet replacement program
5,427 + 1,212 = 6,639
56. (12,950 X (18,000 X.9))/ 325850 = 643.82 ac-ft
57. (2,729 X .05) = 136.45
644 + 136 - 780
58. (2,729 X .15) = 409.35
780 + 409 = 1189
59. [(18,000 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5 /
1.2) )) ] X .0271 = 668.175
1189 + 688 = 1877
60. (12,950 X (125,163 X.9))/ 325850 = 4476.83 ac-ft,
Showerhead
61. (36,472 X .05) = 1823.6, information program
4477 + 1824 = 6,301
62. (36,472 X .15) = 5470.8, reclamation program
6,301 + 5471 = 11,772
63. [(125,163 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5 /
1.2)))] X .0271 = 2005.773, toilet replacement program
11,772 + 2006 = 13,778
64. (12,950 X ((17410 X 3) + (6821.22 X 2.5) X.9))/ 325850
= 2,478.1 ac-ft, Showerhead
65. (15,260 X .05) = 763, information program
2,478 + 763 = 3,241
66. (15,260 X .15) = 2289, reclamation program
3,241 + 2,289 = 5,530
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67. [(17410 X 2.2 X .0223) + (6821.22 X 1.2 X .0442)] =
1,215.93, toilet replacement program
5,530 + 1,216 = 6,746
68. (12,950 X (18,000 X.9))/ 325850 = 643.82 ac-ft
69. (2,729 X .05) = 136.45
644 + 136 = 780
70. (2,729 X .15) = 409.35
780 + 409 = 1,189
71. [(18,000 X .90) / ((.78 X (3.0 / 2.2)) + (.22 X (2.5 /
1.2) ) ) ] X .0271 = 668.175
1,189 + 668 = 1,857
72. (4,299 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft) + (954 ac-ft X $212/ac-ft)
= $400,002
73. (4,387 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft) + (975 ac-ft X $212/ac-ft)
= $408,502
74. (4,477 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft) + (993 ac-ft X $212/ac-ft)
= $416,458
75. $101,982 = 2,217 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft
76. $103,592 = 2,252 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft
77. $105,248 = 2,288 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft
78. $18,814 = 409 ac-ft X $46/ac-ft
City of Salinas
79. 350,394 = (46 X 4,299) + (212 X 720)
80. 487,790 = (46 X 4,387) + (212 X 1349)
81. 658,630 = (46 X 4,477) + (212 X 1824) + (400 X 165)
82. 75,285 = 5019 X 15
83. 86,040 = 5,736 X 15
84. 96,990 = 6,466 X 15
85. 150,570 = 5019 X 30
86. 172,080 = 5,736 X 30
87. 193,980 = 6,466 X 30
88. 251,754 = (46 X 4,299) + (75 X 720)
89. 302,977 = (46 X 4,387) + (75 X 1349)
90. 355,117 = (46 X 4,477) + (75 X 1989)
91. 269,754 = (46 X 4,299) + (100 X 720)
92. 336,702 = (46 X 4,387) + (100 X 1349)
93. 404,842 = (46 X 4,477) + (100 X 1989)
94. 341,754 = (46 X 4,299) + (200 X 720)
95. 471,602 = (46 X 4,387) + (200 X 1349)
96. 603,742 = (46 X 4,477) + (200 X 1989)
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Cal Water
97. 117,916 - (46 X 2,462) + (212 X 22)
98. 166,408 = (46 X 2,470) + (212 X 249)
99. 216,172 = (46 X 2,478) + (212 X 482)
100. 37,260 = 2,484 X 15
101. 40,785 = 2,719 X 15
102. 44,400 = 2,960 X 15
103. 74,520 = 2,484 X 30
104. 81,570 = 2,719 X 30
105. 88, 800 = 2,960 X 30
106. 114,902 = (46 X 2,462) + (75 X 22)
107. 132,295 = (46 X 2,470) + (75 X 249)
108. 150,138 = (46 X 2,478) + (75 X 482)
109. 115,452 = (46 X 2,462) + (100 X 22)
110. 138,520 = (46 X 2,470) + (100 X 249)
111. 162,188 = (46 X 2,478) + (100 X 482)
112. 117,652 = (46 X 2,462) + (200 X 22)
113. 163,420 = (46 X 2,470) + (200 X 249)
114. 210,388 = (46 X 2,478) + (200 X 482)
Marina
115. 12,834 = 279 X 46
116. 12,834 = 279 X 46
117. 12,834 = 279 X 46
118. 4,185 = 279 X 15
119. 4, 185 = 279 X 15
120. 4, 185 = 279 X 15
121. 8,370 = 279 X 30
122. 8,370 = 279 X 30
123
.
8, 370 = 279 X 30
Compliance Cost = Water Conservation Cost - Revenue From
Water Sold (For calculations 124 thru 132)
Water Conservation Cost = (/Amount of Water Conserved X
Cost per ac-ft of water)
Revenue From Water Sold = (Amount of Water Conserved -
Amount of Required Water Reduction) X (Market Price of
Water)
Negative Compliance Cost = Profit


















-6, 876 = (46 X 644)
-6,876 = (46 X 644)
-6,876 = (46 X 644)
-43,376 = (46 X 644)
-43,376 = (46 X 644)










(200 X (644 - 279)
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(200 X (644 - 279)




















Urban Sector's Marginal Cost Curve Calculations
1994
7,405 = 4,299 + 2,462 + 644
10,031 = 6,050 + 3,201 + 780
17,912 = 11,304 + 5,419 + 1,189
21,714 = 13,230 + 6,627 + 1,857
7,501 = 4,387 + 2,470 + 644
10,163 = 6,174 + 3,209 + 780
18,151 = 11,535 + 5,427 + 1,189
22,017 = 13,501 + 6,639 + 1,877
7,599 = 4,477 + 2,478 + 644
10,322 = 6,301 + 3,241 + 780
18,491 = 11,772 + 5,530 + 1,189
22,381 = 13,778 + 6,746 + 1,857
2.588 Ac-ft = 512,000 ac-ft per year / 197,827 crop acre
based on information provided by [Ref. 2]
Uniform Annual Cost = NPC / [(1/i) - (1 / (i X (l+i) n ))]
i = 4%, n = 10 yrs
.
$65.46 = $531 / 8.1109
$36.98 = $300 / 8.1109
$12.33 = $100 / 8.1109
3.445 = [.2645 X ((2.33 + 2.56 + 3.23) / 3)] + [.1842 X
((2.84 + 3.00) / 2)] + [.2921 X 3.89] + [.2592 X 4.11]
$140.54 = $364 (Profit per Acre) / 2.59 ac-ft (amount of
Water used per acre)
$133.20 = $345 (Profit per Acre) / 2.59 ac-ft (amount of
Water used per acre)
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150. 999.74 ac-ft = (194 ac + 192 ac ) X 2.59 ac-ft of water
per acre
151. 349.65 ac-ft = 135 ac X 2.59 ac-ft of water per acre
1,000 ac-ft + 350 ac-ft = 1350 ac-ft
152. 1,797.46 ac-ft - 694 ac X 2.59 ac-ft of water per acre
1,350 ac-ft + 1,797 ac-ft = 3,147 ac-ft
Profit = Market Price of Water X No. of Representatives
X (Acreage of Crop Land Economically Viable to take out
of production - Acreage of Crop Land Required to take
out of production )
153. $187,200 = 16 X (($15 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft) - 0)
154. $374,400 = 16 X (($30 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft) - 0)
155. $936,000 = 16 X (($75 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft) - 0)
156. $1,248,000 = 16 X (($100 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft) - 0)
157. $4,579,344 = 16 X ((($200 X (3,147 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft) -
(694 ac. X $364/ac.) - (135 ac . X $345/ac.))
Profit = Market Price of Water X ( Acreage of Crop Land
Economically Viable to take out of production - Acreage
of Crop Land Required to take out of production -
forgone profit on crops removed)
158. $11,700 = ($15 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft)) -
159. $23,400 = ($30 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft)) -
160. $58,500 = ($75 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft)) -
161. $78,000 = ($100 X (1000 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft)) -
162. $286,209 = ($200 X (3,147 ac-ft - 220 ac-ft)) - (694 ac
.
X $364/ac.) - (135 ac. X $345/ac.
163. $256.42 = ($53.13/yr) / (2.59 ac-ft/yrX (.74 - .66))
164. $951.74 = ($24.65/yr) / (2.59 ac-ft/yrX (.67 - .66))
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